THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VOL. XVIII JULY, 1955 No. 3

SACRAMENTAL GRACES: MODES OF SANCTIFYING GRACE

MANY Thomistic theologians have seen in the theory of John of St. Thomas that sacramental graces are modes of sanctifying grace, a satisfactory explanation of the nature of sacramental grace. It does not seem, however, that there has been a satisfactory solution to the problem of integrating this theory into the Thomistic sacramental synthesis as a whole. While John of St. Thomas undoubtedly saw that his doctrine of modality was related to the sacramental principles laid down by St. Thomas, nowhere does he directly explain this relationship. Nor in the whole of his philosophical and theological treatises is there to be found more than a passing reference to the nature of modes. As a result, many adherents to the modal doctrine of sacramental grace have accepted it principally on his authority.

Our purpose is to propose a doctrine on modes with suf-

ficient clarity to demonstrate that the distinct modes which constitute sacramental graces must result from the instrumental efficiency of the sacraments—that is, we shall attempt to show that the different instrumental causes of grace which are the sacraments must produce distinct modes in the sacramental effect which is grace. In this solution the *existence* of a distinct mode in sanctifying grace granted sacramentally is traced to the instrumentality of the disjoined instrument, the sacrament. The *diversity* of these sacramental modes is accounted for by the external signification of the sacrament which determines the instrumentality of each sacrament. Thus, both the existence and diversity of the sacramental modes are established and the theory is seen as the logical culmination of St. Thomas' teaching concerning sacramental signification and causality.

The first part of this work is a textual study of St. Thomas' writing concerning sacramental grace. This will enable the reader to see clearly the development and progress of the sacramental teaching of the Angelic Doctor. This consideration is necessary for an understanding of the difficulties involved and also for a true evaluation of the proposed solution. The rejection or acceptance of the modal theory of sacramental grace must ultimately be based upon its success or failure as a solution which safeguards the known teaching of St. Thomas regarding sacramental grace.

The main portion of the article is devoted to establishing the principles upon which the modal theory of sacramental grace is based, namely, that diverse instruments cause diverse modes in the effect produced by the principal efficient agent; and, that the sacraments are diverse efficient instruments. The first principle demands 1) an exposition of the nature of modes which will indicate how a modification of the efficiency of the principal cause necessarily diversifies the mode of the effect; then, 2) a treatment of efficient instrumentality with emphasis upon the manner in which this instrumentality modifies the efficiency of the principal agent. The last part of the article is

directed to an exposition of the second principle: the sacraments are diverse instruments. It contains 1) an explanation of the teaching of St. Thomas regarding the efficient instrumentality of the sacraments, including a reply to the more important objections raised against this doctrine. Since, however, it is the form of the instrument which limits the efficiency of the principal agent and hence diversifies the mode of the effect, this section 2) also sets forth the nature of sacramental signification as the formal and limiting principle of the sacramental instrument.

I. Sacramental Grace in the Writings of St. Thomas

Nominal Definition of Sacramental Grace. In the broadest meaning of the term all the effects gratuitously bestowed by God upon the recipients of the sacraments may be called sacramental graces. These would include sanctifying grace, the special grace which is an effect proper to each sacrament, and lastly, the character. According to the more common usage, however, sacramental grace is distinguished from the character and refers to the primary sacramental effect, sanctifying grace as including the grace ordained to the special effects of the individual sacraments.

There is no question concerning the fact that sanctifying grace is conferred by all the sacraments of the New Law. It is the express teaching of the Council of Trent that the sacraments both contain and confer the grace which they signify.[1] Moreover it is theologically certain that each of the sacraments has a special effect. Writing of these special effects the Council of Florence declared:

> For by baptism we are spiritually reborn; by confirmation we increase in grace and we are fortified in the faith; reborn and fortified we are nourished by the divine food of the Eucharist. But if through sin we contract a sickness of the soul, we are spiritually cleansed through penance; spiritually and corporally, as befits the soul,

[1] Conc. Trid. sess. 7 can. 6; Denz. 849.

through extreme unction; by orders the Church is spiritually governed and multiplied; by matrimony it is bodily increased.[2]

It is to these special effects of the individual sacraments that the Sacred Scriptures and the Fathers generally refer.[3] In the evolution of sacramental doctrine theologians eventually came to consider these effects in a generic concept in some way different from sanctifying grace in general, and for this concept they reserved the name of " sacramental grace."

St. Thomas writes of the use of sacramental grace in this restricted sense in the *Sentences*: " Whence this effect [of the sacrament] does not have a proper name but retains the name of its cause, and is said to be sacramental grace." [4] He repeats this explanation of the derivation of the term in almost identical language in the *De Veritate*: " The effects of the sacraments do not have a proper name but are called by the name of grace, for they are called sacramental graces." [5] In the *Summa Theologiae* he indicates the use of sacramental grace as distinct from sanctifying grace when he states: " sacramental grace adds to the sanctifying grace, commonly so-called, something that produces a special effect, and to which the sacrament is ordained." [6]

Thus the nominal definition of sacramental grace is, according to St. Thomas, properly reserved for the special effect to which each sacrament is ordained. It is in this restricted sense that the term is used hereafter.

Sanctifying Grace and the Virtues. Because of the intimate connection between sanctifying and sacramental grace, it is advisable to preface the textual study of St. Thomas' doctrine

[2] Conc. Flor., *Decretum pro Armenis*; Denz. 695.

[3] Thus Sacred Scripture speaks of Baptism as: a burial with Christ (Rom. 6: 86); the bath of regeneration (Titus 3: 5); the newness of life (Rom. 6: 4). The Fathers write of Baptism as the spiritual regeneration of the soul (St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* c. 2, 23, *P. L.* 44, 177); the burial and resurrection with Christ (St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, c. 1, *P. L.* 16, 722).

[4] *IV Sent.*, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5.

[5] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.

[6] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 2.

concerning sacramental grace with a brief summary of his teaching on the nature and division of grace in general. Moreover, since wherever he explicitly treats of sacramental grace, he compares it to sanctifying grace by an analogy with the relation existing between sanctifying grace and the virtues, it will be useful also to summarize his doctrine on the virtues.

Whereas nominally grace signifies any gift freely bestowed by God upon man, it more properly refers to those gifts which surpass man's natural endowments. St. Thomas makes a general division of grace into that which is intended for man's personal sanctification and that which a man receives in order to assist others, i. e., charismatic grace.[7] The former grace can be understood either as a divine help by which we are moved to will or act well (actual grace) or as an habitual gift which is divinely infused into the soul.[8] This habitual grace, sanctifying grace, which is subjected immediately in the essence of the soul,[9] pertains to the first species of quality.[10] Since it is subjected immediately in the essence of the soul, it is distinct from the virtues which reside in man's potencies.[11] The supernatural habit of sanctifying grace makes man a formal participant in the divine nature,[12] whereas the infused virtues are ordained to the performance of acts in conformity with that participation.[13] Moreover, since this grace is a formal participation in the divine nature, it is impossible that there could be essentially diverse species of sanctifying grace.[14]

The theological and infused moral virtues physically emanate from habitual grace in the essence of the soul into its potencies in somewhat the same manner that the potencies themselves flow

[7] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 111, a. 1.

[8] *Ibid.*, a. 2.

[9] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 6.

[10] Gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis, nec tamen est idem quod virtus, sed habitudo quaedam quae praesupponitur virtutibus infusis, sicut earum principium et radix (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 110, a. 3, ad 3).

[11] *Ibid.*, q. 50, a. 2.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*, a. 3.

[14] R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., *De Gratia* (Rome: Marietti, 1947), p. 113.

from the essence of the soul.[15] The virtues differ essentially not only from sanctifying grace but are specifically distinct from one another by reason of their diverse formal objects.[16] Lastly, the gifts are habits distinct from the infused virtues whereby man is made docile to the motions of the Holy Ghost.[17] The importance of the foregoing summary will become clearer as we proceed to a consideration of St. Thomas' writings on sacramental grace.

Sacramental Grace in the COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES. In this section the principal texts in the *Sentences* on sacramental grace will be given to enable the reader to see in the very words of St. Thomas his teaching on the matter. At the end a brief summary will be made of the principal points of his doctrine. The same procedure will be followed in the next section of this part with regard to texts from the *Summa Theologiae*. Finally, a brief comparative study will be made to highlight any differences in his method of treatment or doctrine revealed in these textual studies.

In the article in the *Sentences* dealing with the causality of the sacraments, St. Thomas places as the fifth proposition to be considered: " It seems that the grace which is in the sacraments does not differ from that which is in the virtues and gifts." [18] As will become evident from his reply to the objections and also the main body of the argument, in the proposition under consideration the expression " the grace which is in the sacraments " has reference to the grace of the sacrament which is ordained to the special effect of the sacrament. The same evidence serves to identify the grace " in the virtues and gifts " as sanctifying grace.

Three arguments are given in support of the proposition.

[15] Sicut ab essentia animae effluunt ejus potentiae quae sunt operum principia; ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes in potentias animae, per quas potentiae moventur ad actus (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1).

[16] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 2; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 4; q. 62, aa. 1, 2, 3.

[17] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

[18] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5.

The first states that since the grace granted by the sacraments is sanctifying grace and is thus the same grace as in the virtues and gifts, these two graces are one by reason of the unicity of sanctifying grace.[19] The second argument identifies the two graces by reason of an identity of effect, namely the destruction of sin.[20] Finally, it would seem that the effects of the two graces are merely diverse terms of the same motion and hence are not distinct but one.[21] Thus, in these three objections St. Thomas raises the fundamental question which he and all succeeding theologians faced in treating of the nature of sacramental grace: how were they to explain the diverse sacramental effects while safeguarding the unicity of sanctifying grace? His replies to these objections are as follows:

Sanctifying grace is one in the essence of the soul; but it is multiplied insofar as it perfects the potencies and destroys their defects.[22]

The grace of the virtues is opposed to sin insofar as sin contains an inordinate act; but sacramental grace is opposed to it as it wounds the natural good of the potencies.[23]

The removal from sin as it is opposed to virtue and is an approach to the perfection of virtue pertains to the same grace; but the removal from sin insofar as it [sin] wounds nature does not, because here there is required a special remedy, as is apparent even in the case of bodily disease.[24]

What is the meaning of defects of sin in these responses? St. Thomas writes of two kinds of spiritual defects. The first type consists in the placing of a contrary, i. e., sin, which rules

[19] Gratia enim quae est in sacramentis, est gratia gratum faciens, quia fecit dignum vita aeterna, ut patet de baptismo. Sed gratia gratum faciens est una tantum, quod patet ex unitate subjecti quod est essentia animae et ex unitate effectus quod est Deo acceptum facere. Ergo cum gratia quae est in virtutibus et donis, sit gratia gratum faciens, videtur quod eadem gratia sit hic et ibi (*Ibid.*).

[20] Unum uni opponitur. Sed tam gratia quae est in sacramentis quam illa quae est in virtutibus, opponitur peccato, quia utraque peccatum destruit. Ergo est una tantum gratia (*Ibid.*).

[21] Idem est motus in natura a termino et ad terminum. Sed gratia sacramentalis ordinatur contra peccatum, gratia autem virtutum ad perficiendum animam et Deo conjungendum. Ergo est una gratia (*Ibid.*).

[22] *Ibid.* [23] *Ibid.* [24] *Ibid.*

out grace in the soul as illness in the body removes health. The second type consists in the removal of something which is necessary for the performance of spiritual duties and leaves the soul weak in regard to these tasks. Remedies against the first type are truly purgative, since they remove the contrary. Remedies directed against the second type of defect do not remove any reality but rather make some addition. Hence they are called perfections.[25] Since even this second type of defect requires a remedy, such defects are healed by the sacraments of the living, i.e ., those which require grace in the recipient in order to be worthily received as such sacraments do not remove a contrary but supply some defect.[26]

St. Thomas speaks of this second type of defect as a penalty of sin. The first penalty for sin is that of temporal and eternal punishment. The sacraments are directed against these punishments only indirectly, insofar as by removing the cause, sin, they also remove the effect. The second penalty for sin is an immediate consequence of the inordinate act and which in turn leads to further sinful actions, such as the debility of nature to resist sin. It is against this second penalty that the sacraments are directly aimed, " namely, against the defect which results from the withdrawal of some necessary aid rather than from the withdrawal of any contrary form." [27]

[25] Defectus spiritualis dupliciter contingit, sicut et corporalis. Uno modo ex positione contrarii, sicut quando corpus est aegrum et quando in anima est peccatum. Alio modo ex subtractione ejus quod ad perfectionem necessarium erat vel corporis vel animae: sicut quando corpus est debile ad exercenda corporalia opera, et similiter quando spiritus ad exequenda spiritualia. Remedia ergo quae dantur contra primum defectum, aliquid realiter tollunt, et ideo purgationis rationem habent. Remedia autem quae sunt contra defectum secundum, non tollunt aliquid secundum rem, sed solum aliquid adjiciunt ad perfectionem. Et ideo talia remedia non dicuntur purgare, sed perficere (*Ibid.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 2).

[26] Illa sacramenta quae gratiam in suscipiente praeexigunt non ordinantur directe contra culpam; quia non sunt ad tollendum contrarium, sed ad supplendum defectum (*Ibid.*, qcla. 4, ad 1).

[27] Contra primam autem poenam non datur sacramentum in remedium directe, sed ex consequenti ut scilicet curata causa, scilicet peccato, cesset effectus, scilicet poena; sed contra secundam poenam datur directe aliquod sacramentum, illa scilicet quae in remedium sunt contra defectum contingentem ex subtractione necessarii, non ex positione contrarii (*Ibid.*, qcla. 3).

A specific application of this teaching is found in reference to the grace of Confirmation. In this same text there is to be noted the diverse effects of sanctifying and sacramental grace in relation to the defects of sin.

> Sacramental grace, which is the principal effect of the sacrament, although it has a connection with the grace which is in the virtues and gifts, is, however, distinct from it, because sacramental grace perfects primarily and principally *the defect consequent upon sin,* but the grace of the virtues and gifts perfects by inclining to the good of the virtues and the gifts. Just as the grace of Confirmation perfects by removing the disease of infirmity, the gift or the virtue of fortitude perfects by inclining to the good which is proper to the virtue and the gift.[28]

In the main argument against the proposition that sacramental and sanctifying grace are identical, St. Thomas has three conclusions: 1) The sacramental effects are not diversified by sanctifying grace which is one, but by the diverse defects of sin to which they are ordained; 2) since the sacramental effects are less known than the acts of the virtues, they are called sacramental graces; 3) sacramental grace differs from sanctifying grace but has some connection with it.

St. Thomas arrives at the first conclusion by use of an analogy which had been used by St. Albert.[29]

> Sanctifying grace is one and is in the essence of the soul as in a subject; the virtues and gifts flow from it to perfect the potencies of the soul, just as the potencies flow from the essence [of the soul]. And these virtues are distinguished according to the diverse acts for which the potencies of the soul need perfecting. In a similar way there flows from that grace in the essence of the soul something to repair the defects which have resulted from sin; and this is diversified according to the diversity of the defects.[30]

This same analogy is used in the Second Book of the *Sentences* to refute an argument against the unicity of sanctifying grace,[31]

[28] *Ibid.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2, ad 2.

[29] *Opera Omnia* (Rome: Vives, 1895), Vol. 29, *In IV Sent.*, d. 7, a. 5, ad 1 et 2; p. 163.

[30] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5.

[31] *II Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 6, ad 5.

in the *De Veritate*,[32] and, as we shall see later on in this chapter, in the *Summa*.[33]

In the second conclusion St. Thomas gives the reason for the failure of the sacramental graces to have a name other than that of their cause. He attributes this to the fact that the defects which they remedy are less known to us than are the acts of the virtues.[34] Elsewhere he gives the same reason, describing these defects as hidden.[35]

In the third conclusion there is stated the relation existing between sanctifying grace and sacramental grace.

> [Sacramental grace] cannot be without grace which affects the essence of the soul nor without the virtues. And the grace in the essence of the soul cannot be without the virtues. And therefore the virtues have a connection [as properties] with [sanctifying grace]. This grace [sanctifying grace] can be without sacramental grace, however. Therefore the sacramental graces do not have a connection. And thus it is apparent that the grace which the sacrament directly contains differs from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts, although they also [virtues and gifts] are connected to that grace [in the essence of the soul] as a certain extension [of it].[36]

Does this text imply that there is no connection between sanctifying and sacramental grace? It seems at the most to imply that the connection which exists between them differs from the connection between sanctifying grace and the virtues. For in the *De Veritate* St. Thomas says "that the diverse sacramental effects . . . depend upon sanctifying grace as do the virtues and gifts. . . . These [sacramental] effects pertain to sanctifying grace which is connected with these effects and thus they have a common effect, which is sanctifying grace,

[32] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.

[33] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 2.

[34] Sed quia hujusmodi defectus non sunt ita noti sicut actus ad quos virtutes perficiunt; ideo hic effectus ad reparandum defectum non habet speciale nomen, sicut virtus, sed retinet nomen suae causae, et dicitur gratia sacramentalis ad quam directe sacramenta ordinatur (*IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5).

[35] *De Verit., loc. cit.*

[36] *IV Sent., loc. cit.*

along with their proper effects." [37] He also speaks of the sacramental graces as " certain emanations of sanctifying grace." [38]

Although the manner in which the diverse sacramental graces differ from one another is not as clear-cut as the distinction between virtues, which fact is due to the hidden nature of the defects which they remedy, St. Thomas sheds some light on their distinction in comparing the graces of Baptism and Confirmation.

> Because baptismal grace is given for the perfection of those things which pertain to the common state of the christian life, whereas the grace of confirmation is given to perfect man in those which are most difficult in that state, namely, to confess the name of Christ against persecutors; for this a special grace is required. It is for this reason that the grace of confirmation differs from the grace of baptism, and is given to remedy a different defect. For the grace of baptism is given to remedy a defect which impedes the ordinary state of justice in christian life, namely, original and actual sin; the grace of confirmation is given to remedy the defect opposed to the strength demanded in those who confess the name of Christ, namely, infirmity.[39]

St. Thomas also indicates that the specific diversity of these graces can be explained by reason of the fact that the defects which they remedy are in diverse potencies. Baptismal grace perfects the intellect that it might rightly believe the truths of faith whereas the grace of confirmation seems to pertain more to the irascible appetite.[40] Because of this diversity one sacrament does not directly perfect the sacramental grace of another sacrament, but only indirectly insofar as it bestows an increase of sanctifying grace from which all the sacramental graces proceed.[41]

[37] *De Verit., loc. cit.*

[38] (Illae perfectiones quae diversis sacramentis conferuntur), quaedam emanationes sunt illius gratiae de qua nunc loquimur, sicut et virtutes (*II Sent.*, d. 26, a. 6, ad 5).

[39] *IV Sent.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2.

[40] *Ibid.*, ad 1.

[41] Accipiendo autem gratiam baptismalis et confirmationis secundo modo, sic directe auget eam, cadens in eamdem essentiam cum ipsa, sicut baptismus directe auget gratiam quam prius invenit (*Ibid.*, qcla. 3).

The doctrine of St. Thomas on sacramental grace as contained in the *Commentary on the Sentences* may be summarized in the following conclusions:

1. There exists some distinction between the grace of the virtues and gifts, i. e., sanctifying grace, and sacramental grace.

2. This distinction appears to be a real one as sanctifying grace can exist in the soul without sacramental grace.

3. Though really distinct from sanctifying grace, sacramental grace has some connection with it because it "flows from," "emanates from," and "depends upon" sanctifying grace as do the virtues and the gifts.

4. The relation of sacramental grace to sanctifying grace, while similar to the relation between sanctifying grace and the virtues, differs from it because sanctifying grace may never be present without the virtues and gifts.

5. Sacramental grace is diversified by the diversity of the defects which it remedies.

6. These spiritual defects are principally those which are consequent upon sin, such as the weakening of nature to resist sin, the removal of which defects is necessary for the performance of spiritual duties.

7. The exact nature of this sacramental grace or remedy is nowhere stated, although it would seem to be something both intrinsic and permanent by reason of the permanent and intrinsic nature of the defects which it remedies.

Sacramental Grace in the Summa Theologiae. In vain does one look in the *Summa* for some clarification of the teaching of St. Thomas regarding the nature of the special effect of the sacrament which is called sacramental grace. The treatment of this matter in the *Summa* is brief and is confined to the second article of the sixty-second question of the Third Part where St. Thomas inquires "Whether Sacramental Grace Confers Anything in Addition to the Grace of the Virtues and Gifts?" Here, as in the *Sentences,* the body of the article and the re-

sponses to the objections serve to establish that the term "sacramental grace" is taken in its most formal sense, namely, as the special aid by which the distinct sacramental effects are attained;[42] and the grace of the virtues and the gifts is to be understood as sanctifying grace.

Though in the *Summa* St. Thomas makes little positive addition to his teaching concerning the nature of sacramental grace, there is evidence of evolution in his thought concerning the nature of the sacramental effects. The first objection to the article stresses this change in his teaching. As a study of the texts of the *Sentences* has revealed, the emphasis there was principally upon the negative aspects of the sacramental effects, namely, the removal of the defects consequent upon sin. In the *Summa*, however, the primary emphasis is laid upon the positive perfections which are placed in the soul by the sacramental graces. The first objection states that both the essence of the soul and its potencies are sufficiently perfected by the grace of the virtues and the gifts. Hence, since all grace is ultimately ordained to the perfection of the soul and its faculties, sacramental graces do not add anything to the perfecting capacities of habitual grace. To this St. Thomas replies:

> The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers of the soul sufficiently as regards the general ordination of acts: but as regards certain special effects which are necessary in christian life, there is required sacramental grace.[43]

There is a tendency to interpret this response as referring only to the individual moral actions of those who have been sacramentally initiated into the christian life. This limited interpretation does not seem to be in accord with the explanation given by St. Thomas himself when enumerating the reasons for the seven sacraments. Drawing an analogy between the spiritual and corporeal life of man, he sets forth the various

[42] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus* (Paris: Vives, 1885), t. IX, d. 24, a. 2, n. 7; p. 285; Cajetan, *Comm. in Summam Theologiae* (ed. Leonina; vol. IV, *Opera Omnia*). In III, q. 62, a. 2.

[43] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 2, ad 1.

perfections of bodily life and then explains how the sacraments effect a corresponding perfection in the supernatural life of the soul. He enumerates the seven perfections of the soul in those things that pertain to the worship of God according to the rite of the christian life, namely, life, strength, conservation, healing, restoration, power and propagation. These perfections, then, are the " special effects " necessary in christian life.[44]

The second objection of this article in the *Summa* contains in substance the three objections in the *Sentences* since it proceeds on the basis that the grace of the virtues and gifts sufficiently excludes all sins and also the defects resulting from sin. Sacramental grace, being ordained to the removal of the defects of sin, cannot therefore add anything to the grace of the virtues and gifts. To this argument St. Thomas responds:

> Vices and sins are sufficiently removed by virtues and gifts, as to present and future time; insofar as they prevent man from sinning. But in regard to past sins, the acts of which are transitory whereas their guilt remains, man is provided with a special remedy in the sacraments.[45]

Certainly, St. Thomas had no intention of teaching that the grace of the virtues and gifts does not exclude the contrary vices or that past sins are not destroyed, but rather, in accordance with his teaching in the *Sentences*, he states that the defects of sin remain and hence require special remedies lest they retard man in the attainment of full supernatural perfection.

What are these defects of sin? St. Thomas declares that sanctifying grace takes away the stain and restores the order of the soul to God; but, although the wound of sin as far as the will is concerned is healed, there are medicines required for the healing of the other powers of the soul which were disordered by sin.[46] And again he writes: " Sacramental grace is opposed to sin insofar as sin wounded the natural goodness of the soul." [47]

[44] *Ibid.*, q. 65, a. 1.
[45] *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2.
[46] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 87, a. 6, ad 3.
[47] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, q. 5, ad 2.

As a result of original sin Adam lost not only sanctifying grace and the preternatural gifts which perfected his composite nature,[48] but the very natural inclination of his powers to virtue was wounded. The reason is subject to *ignorance* and experiences difficulty in attaining to truth; the will is deprived of its order to good by *malice* and is prone to evil; the irascible appetite is subject to *weakness* and shrinks in the face of an arduous task; by *concupiscence* man is inordinately inclined to the sensible good. These four wounds of nature, found in us as a penalty of original sin, are increased by actual sins, both venial and mortal.[49] Since the subjection of the body to the soul was lost through the withdrawal of original justice, death and all consequent bodily defects also became penalties of original sin.[50] St. Thomas describes how the various sacraments are given as a remedy against these penalties when giving reasons for the number of the sacraments.

We may likewise gather the number of the sacraments from their being instituted as a remedy against the defect caused by sin. For Baptism is intended as a remedy against the absence of spiritual life; Confirmation against the infirmity of soul found in those of recent birth; the Eucharist, against the soul's proneness to sin; Penance, against actual sin committed after Baptism; Extreme Unction against the remainders of sins, of those sins, namely, which are not sufficiently removed by Penance, whether through negligence or through ignorance; Order, against divisions in the community; Matrimony, as a remedy against concupiscence in the individual, and against the decrease in numbers that results from death.

Some, again, gather the number of sacraments from a certain adaptation to the virtues and to the defects and penal effects resulting from sin. They say that Baptism corresponds to Faith, and is ordained as remedy against original sin; Extreme Unction, to Hope, being ordained against venial sin; the Eucharist, to Charity,

---

[48] Tertium vero bonum [*donum originalis justitiae*] naturae totaliter est ablatum per peccatum primi parentis (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 1).

[49] *Ibid.*, a. 3.

[50] Sed Deus, cui subiacet omnis natura, in ipsa institutione hominis supplevit defectum naturae, et dono iustitiae originalis dedit corpori incorruptibilitatem quandam, ut in Primo dictum est. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod Deus mortem non fecit, et quod mors est poena peccati (*Ibid.*, a. 6).

being ordained against the penal effect which is malice, Order, to Prudence, being ordained against ignorance; Penance, to Justice, being ordained against mortal sin; Matrimony, to Temperance, being ordained against concupiscence; Confirmation, to Fortitude, being ordained against infirmity.[51]

The sacraments then are as diverse medicines healing the defects of sin. These defects, as we have seen, since they vary in individuals, are hidden from us and the sacramental grace does not have a proper name as do the virtues.[52] The physician of the body in recommending a diet primarily intends the nourishment of the patient but he is not always aware of the many diverse infections against which the food will prove to be a remedy. So also, for example, one receiving the sacramental grace of the Eucharist will be fortified not only against the malice resulting from original sin but also the malice resulting from whatever type of actual sins he has committed. Though the sacramental graces will never restore to man in this life the despotic control of reason over passion which Adam enjoyed, our political dominion over it should increase as a result of the fruitful reception of the sacraments and a fidelity to their graces by the practice of virtue. "Just as concupiscence is diminished by Baptism, so as not to enslave us, so also are both the aforesaid defects [proneness to evil and difficulty in doing good] diminished, so that man be not overcome by them." [53] The sacraments do not remove the bodily defects as the Christian retains a passible body in this life so that he may suffer in conformity with Christ and the penalties of sickness and death are not taken away until the resurrection.[54]

To the doctrine that sacramental grace adds something real to sanctifying grace St. Thomas places as a third objection that such an addition would seem to make grace an equivocal term. This objection is based on the fact that any addition to a form varies the species. His response to this objection has given rise to considerable difficulty.

[51] *Ibid.*, III, q. 65, a. 1.
[52] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.
[53] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 69, a. 4, ad 3.
[54] *Ibid.*, a. 3, ad 3.

Sacramental grace is compared to grace commonly so-called as species to genus. Wherefore just as it is not equivocal to use the term *animal* in its generic sense, and as applied to a man, so neither is it equivocal to speak of grace commonly so-called and of sacramental grace.[55]

The first difficulty arises over the fact that in the objection sacramental grace is referred to as adding to the grace of the virtues and the gifts, i. e., sanctifying grace, whereas in the response the term "*gratia communiter dicta*" is used. With the exception of Cajetan, most commentators are agreed that in the light of the wording of the objection itself St. Thomas did not intend by common grace to speak of *gratia in communi* but rather of sanctifying or habitual grace.

Granted this interpretation of the terminology involved, the solution of the second problem is much simpler, namely, whether the addition which sacramental grace makes to sanctifying grace is essential or accidental. Though the example which St. Thomas uses in his response is that of essential species to proximate genus, namely, man to animal, the doctrine which he holds concerning the unicity of sanctifying grace rules out the possibility of admitting that he intends to describe each of the sacramental graces as true species of sanctifying grace. This line of reasoning seems to be confirmed by his statement concerning the relation of the sacramental grace of Baptism and that of Confirmation.

> Sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace commonly so-called something that produces a special effect, and to which the sacrament is ordained. If, then, we consider, in its wide sense, the grace bestowed in this sacrament, it does not differ from that bestowed in Baptism, but increases what was already there. On the other hand, if we consider it as to that which is added over and above, then one differs in species from the other.[56]

Were the sanctifying grace granted by these two sacraments essentially diverse, one sacrament would not increase the grace of the other but would be an entirely new habit infused into

[55] *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 2, ad 3.

[56] *Ibid.*, q. 72, a. 7, ad 3.

the soul. It must be concluded, then, that the sacramental graces constitute accidental species of sacramental grace. The whole purpose in raising the objection seems to have been to show that sacramental grace has a relation to sanctifying grace similar to that which exists between species and genus, i. e., it adds to and terminates, without destroying, the essence of that which it adjoins.

In the *Sed contra* of a preceding article St. Thomas argues to the existence of sacramental grace as an effect distinct from sanctifying grace by reducing the opposing argument to absurdity. If sacramental graces do not add anything over and above the grace of the virtues and the gifts, the sacraments would be conferred in vain upon those who already possess that grace. Since God does not work in vain, it would seem that the sacraments must make some special addition to sanctifying grace.[57]

One might object to this reasoning on the basis that the sacraments confer an increase of sanctifying grace and hence it is not contrary to Divine Wisdom to have instituted the various sacraments. This does not explain, however, why there are seven sacraments. To increase grace it would seem that two or perhaps three sacraments would suffice. Thus St. Thomas' argument manifests that by the special effect of the sacraments he does not mean merely an increase in sanctifying grace but something superadded to sanctifying grace. The plurality and diversity of sacraments would be rendered superfluous if one sanctifying grace in all ways the same could be obtained through a single sacrament. Furthermore, the Council of Trent has declared that all seven sacraments are necessary for salvation, though not all for every individual.[58]

The argumentation in the body of the article is brief. St.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 62, a. 2, *sed contra.*

[58] Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novae legis non esse ad salutem necessaria, sed superflua, et sine eis aut eorum voto per solam fidem homines a Deo gratiam iustificationis adipisci, licet omni singulis necessaria non sint: A. S. (Conc. Trid., sess. 7, can. 4; Denz. 847.)

Thomas first establishes the fact of diverse sacramental effects, not from the defects of sin as he did in the *Sentences* but from the need for certain special effects in Christian life. He illustrates this fact by the sacrament of Baptism; then applying the analogy between sanctifying grace and the virtues to sanctifying grace and these sacramental effects, he arrives at a single conclusion: sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace a divine aid to obtain the end of the sacrament.

> As stated in the second part, grace considered in itself, perfects the essence of the soul, insofar as it [grace] is a certain participated likeness of the Divine Nature. And just as the soul's powers flow from its essence, so from grace there flow certain perfections into the powers of the soul, which are called virtues and gifts, whereby the powers are perfected in reference to their actions. Now the sacraments are ordained to certain special effects which are necessary in the Christian life: thus Baptism is ordained to a certain spiritual regeneration by which man dies to vice and becomes a member of Christ: which effect is something special in addition to the acts of the potencies of the soul: and the same holds true of the other sacraments. Consequently, just as the virtues and the gifts confer a certain special perfection ordained to the powers' proper actions, so does sacramental grace confer over and above grace commonly so-called and in addition to the virtues and the gifts, a certain divine assistance (*divinum auxilium*) to attain the end of the sacrament. It is thus that sacramental grace confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and the gifts.[59]

The doctrine of St. Thomas regarding sacramental grace as set forth in the *Summa* is evidently not entirely clear, and this lack of clarity is evidenced by the wide divergency of interpretation given to it by his principal commentators. His doctrine in the *Summa* can be summarized in the following statements.

1. There are diverse sacramental effects or graces because of the diverse perfections required in the Christian life.

2. These sacramental graces also serve to heal the permanent defects resulting in the potencies from original and actual sin, i. e., ignorance, malice, infirmity and concupiscence.

[59] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 2.

3. The relation between sacramental grace and sanctifying grace is similar to the relation between genus and species, i. e., it adds to and terminates sanctifying grace without destroying the nature of this latter grace.

4. The existence of seven sacraments seems to argue to the reality of diverse sacramental effects or graces.

5. These sacramental graces are a divine aid to accomplish the end of the sacrament. The nature of this divine aid is not explained.

Conclusion. The most important difference to be noted between St. Thomas' doctrine on sacramental grace in the *Sentences* and in the *Summa* is that already mentioned, namely, the change of emphasis from the defects of sin to the need for special effects which these sacramental graces fulfill in the Christian life. With this emphasis upon them as positive perfections St. Thomas becomes somewhat more explicit and describes them as divine aids.

In the *Summa* as in the *Sentences* sacramental grace is described as healing the defects of nature resulting from original and actual sins. In the *Summa* St. Thomas introduces a new analogy to describe the relation between sanctifying and sacramental grace, comparing it to the relation between genus and species. This would seem to imply that while sacramental grace adds to and terminates sanctifying grace intrinsically, it does not destroy the essential nature of sanctifying grace.

Combining the common features of his teaching in the *Sentences* and the *Summa*, the following points summarize the known doctrine of the Angelic Doctor regarding sacramental grace. Any successful attempt at the completion of his teaching concerning the precïse nature of this grace must necessarily safeguard these features of his doctrine.

1. Sanctifying grace is a single habit in the soul.

2. Sacramental grace makes a real addition to sanctifying grace.

3. There exists a real distinction between sanctifying and sacramental grace.

4. There are diverse sacramental graces because of the diverse perfections required in the Christian life and the diverse defects which these graces remedy.

5. Sacramental grace is permanent and intrinsic because its effects are permanent and intrinsic.

Interpretations of the Thomistic Doctrine. As this consideration of the writing of St. Thomas reveals, the Angelic Doctor did not set forth with completeness his own teaching regarding the nature of sacramental grace. This failure, if it may be termed such, is not surprising when one considers the fact that it was only during his own lifetime that theologians had begun to consider the nature of the sacramental effects. St. Thomas recognized the evident teaching of the Scriptures and the Fathers that grace received through the sacraments produced effects over and above grace received extra-sacramentally. The problem confronting theologians was to account for these special effects while safeguarding the essential unity of sanctifying grace.

That there was some addition to the grace of the virtues and the gifts when received sacramentally was almost universally admitted, though, as we have noted, there was disagreement as to the nature of the distinction between these two graces. St. Bonaventure observed that there had already appeared in the thirteenth century two extremes regarding the nature of sacramental grace.[60] One, emphasizing the unicity of habitual grace, affirmed the real identity of sanctifying and sacramental grace and admitted only a rational distinction between the two. The proponents of this opinion based their arguments on the premise that both graces are ordained to the same effect, namely, sanctification. The other extreme, by placing emphasis on the distinct effects of sacramental grace,

[60] *Opera Omnia* (Ex. typ. Coll. S. Bonaventurae, Florence: 1939), *IV Sent.*, dist. 1, p. 1, *Unic. Quaest.*, 6.

concentrated on the reality of the distinction which exists between sacramental and sanctifying grace.

In general there are three principal attempts to complete the teaching of the Angelic Doctor concerning the nature of sacramental grace.

1. Sacramental grace adds to the grace of the virtues and gifts a distinct habit. This was the opinion of Peter Paludanus (d. 1342), and Capreolus (d. 1444). Although it has never gained any widespread acceptance, it has from time to time, even in our own day, found some adherents.

2. Sacramental grace adds to the grace of the virtues and gifts not some habitual gift but an actual divine aid extensive of the grace of the virtues and the gifts to the proper effect of each sacrament. Cajetan appears to have originated this doctrine, which became, for lack of a better interpretation of St. Thomas, the more commonly accepted theory until the time of John of St. Thomas. Under this classification can be included the opinion of those who interpreted the doctrine of Cajetan as a right or title to actual graces.

3. Sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace an intrinsic and permanent mode ordered to the attainment of the special effects of each sacrament. In addition to this mode which varies in species for each sacrament there is conferred a title to the actual graces needed for the attainment of the special sacramental ends.

This last opinion, which is generally held to have been first proposed in a systematic manner by John of St. Thomas, is now the common Thomistic doctrine on sacramental grace. According to this theory sacramental grace is a new mode, or formality, which is entitatively identified with sanctifying grace and only modally distinct from it. The graces of the various sacraments are specifically distinct from one another but constitute only accidental species of sanctifying grace. This theory, therefore, safeguards the unicity of sanctifying grace; it explains the reality of the addition made by sacramental

grace, while saving its real distinction from sanctifying grace; it offers a specific diversity of sacramental graces to explain the diverse effects of the various sacraments; and it makes sacramental grace intrinsic and permanent to sanctifying grace. It thus conforms to all the express doctrines of St. Thomas concerning the nature of sacramental grace without itself involving any contradiction. While this explanation of the nature of sacramental grace has found widespread acceptance among Thomists, the problem of accounting for the existence of this perfecting mode which constitutes sacramental grace seems to be somewhat neglected. Nor has there been any wholly successful express effort to integrate this solution into the other principles of Thomistic sacramental theology. The remainder of this article will be an attempt to solve these two problems.

II. Principles of Solution

A. The Nature of Modes

Despite the importance of modes in speculative thought and the validity of their existence, there still remains to be set forth by scholastic philosophy a universally accepted treatment of their nature and origin.[61] It has been in part the lack of such a doctrine which has impeded the development and evolution of any clear exposition regarding the influence of sacramental causality on the ensuing effect, sanctifying grace.

The doctrine concerning the nature of modes which is set forth here is not intended to be exhaustive. The extent of our treatment of modes has necessarily been limited by their relation to the problem at hand; but the exposition of their nature as given here should be adequate to render acceptable the solution which is proposed, namely, that the existence of the distinct modes in sanctifying grace produced sacramentally is due to the diverse efficient instrumentality of the sacraments.

[61] The only explicit treatment of modes which we were able to find in available sources was that concerning accidental modes by Father E. Hugon, *Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1928), Vol. III, tr. 3, q. 3, a. 3; p. 543.

Mode as a Commensuration to an Extrinsic Principle. One definition of a mode given by St. Thomas is found in his opusculum *On Modal Propositions.* In his consideration of the modal proposition, he writes:

> Because a modal proposition is denominated from the term " mode," in order that we may know what is the nature of a modal proposition, it is necessary first to know the nature of a mode. *A mode is a determination adjoining something.*[62]

This admittedly broad definition of a mode requires considerable clarification.

The fact that the genus of this definition is " determination " of some sort indicates the existence of a potentiality in the subject modified. Every determination presupposes in the determinable subject a potentiality or capacity for the reception of the new form or determination. The reality which is a mode must therefore immediately be excluded from God as there is nothing determinable in Him.[63] Every actually existing being, substantial or accidental, other than God will possess some type of mode. The reason for this is that every created form necessarily implies the notion of composition and hence of limitation. St. Thomas writes, " Wheresoever there is something received there must be a mode since what is received is limited according to the recipient: and therefore since created being, essential and accidental, is received, mode is found not only in accidental things but in substantial things." [64] Hence mode is a transcendental because it is found either actually or reductively in all the categories of being except relation.[65]

But what is the nature of this determination which constitutes a mode? St. Thomas replies to this question by stating that " mode is that which a measure determines: wherefore it

[62] *De Propositionibus Modalibus* (*Opera Omnia*, ed. Misurgia-Parma).

[63] Nisi effective Deus dicatur species, modus et ordo accidentium (*I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, a. 3); non ponitur in Deo modus qui sit qualitas divinae substantiae superaddita (*De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 2).

[64] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 6, ad 5.

[65] Cf. Hugon, *loc. cit.*

implies determination according to a certain measure." [66] Since a mode bespeaks a determination according to a measure and a measure is necessarily extrinsic to the thing measured, a mode is a determination or commensuration of a thing according to some extrinsic principle.

The Subject of Mode. In any modification the received thing is modified by the receiver; and in all composed things it is the form which is received into matter. Hence the commensuration or mode falls upon the form. " The form of each thing, howsoever it be . . . is according to a certain measure . . . and from this it has a certain mode." [67] A mode does not affect the essential notes of the received form. These essential notes are not capable of determination without variation of the essential species. A mode therefore is said to be extrinsic to the essential notes of the form.

The form of walking, for example, is a special kind of locomotion. In itself it implies a potentiality for either speed or slowness. When the walking is actual one of these potentialities will be actualized; but only one at one time. The actualization of the potentiality cannot be explained through the essential notes of the form itself. These notes are in themselves indifferent to the ultimate determination which is the mode. Moreover, since the form does not have actual existence until one of these potentialities is actualized, and the exercise of causality demands the existence of the cause, the form modified could not cause its own mode.

To explain this ultimate determination in the form, recourse must be had to those extrinsic principles of the form which are the efficient and material causes. " To form there is pre-required a determination or commensuration to its principles, whether material or efficient; and this [commensuration] is signified by mode." [68] The mode by determining imposes limita-

[66] Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, *super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit*: (L. IV, c. 3, n. 7: *ML* 34, 299) unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 49, a. 2).

[67] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 4. [68] *Ibid.*, I, q. 5, a. 5.

tion upon form. Since the form is the perfecting principle, it cannot simultaneously be the limiting principle, but demands that its mode come from principles extrinsic to it.

If an artist wishes to use marble as the matter for a statue, he must measure or limit the form to be induced in accordance with the properties of the marble, i. e., the artistic form will be determined, modified, to some degree by the exigencies of the matter. This predetermination of the form required by the matter to be informed is accomplished through a modification of the efficiency of the agent inducing the form. The material cause, while it necessarily affects the mode of the form, is not the sole determining factor; the more important principle in the determination of mode is the efficient cause.

In the production of a form the efficient agent intends through his activity the attainment of some end, and he consequently produces a form which will not only attain the end desired but which will do so in a manner conformable to his intention. The form which is produced must possess not only what is essentially required for the ordination to the end but the necessary perfection or mode required that such an end be attained in accordance with the intention of the agent. Thus Cajetan remarks that wood cut for use in building a ship will necessarily have a different mode than wood which is being cut for firewood.[69] This added perfection or mode of the form is dependent for its commensuration upon the efficient principle intending the attainment of this end, and, as will be seen in the following section, upon the instrument used in the cutting. For example, an artist who wishes to include in a picture an horizon which will portray a sunrise will produce in the colors a mode which will resemble such a light as closely as his own artistic talents permit. The mode of the effect will primarily reflect the end which the artist intended even though it will be further modified by the perfection of the efficient agent himself and the instruments which he uses to attain it.

Applied to the sacraments this means that if the grace pro-

[69] *In Summam Theol.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 3.

duced through their instrumentality is to attain the end ordained by Christ in their institution (namely, " the removal of the defects of sins and the accomplishment of the special acts of the Christian life "), it must possess not only the essential notes of sanctifying grace, but also a mode enabling it to accomplish the sacramental effects in a manner conformable to the intention of the principal agent, who in this case is God Himself.

Thus far it has been ascertained that a mode is a determination of a form which implies a commensuration to the extrinsic principles of the form, namely, the material and efficient causes. It has also been seen that this determination, while falling upon the form, does not affect the specific notes of the form. But is their adjoinment wholly extrinsic to the form or does it have a positive effect in the form itself?

An Intrinsic Adjoinment. While a mode is extrinsic to the essential formal mode of a thing, i. e., to its specific notes, some modes complete the form in its own order, while other modes adjoin a thing already completed in its own order but measured by still other extrinsic principles. John of St. Thomas distinguishes these two types of mode in regard to the Aristotelian categories of being.

> Briefly I say this . . . that modes are in a twofold division. Certain ones . . . pertain to the very constitution or completion of any thing or its nature, as the constitution of substance is accomplished through a union (which is a mode) and completed through subsistence (which is another distinct mode), an accident through inherence, a quality through a grade of intensity or remissness . . . and these modes are reduced to the predicament of the thing which they compose or terminate by modifying. . . . The other modes, pertaining neither to the constitution nor to the completion of a thing but convening only from some extrinsic *ratio* or principle . . . are capable of constituting predicaments, such as *ubi*, *situs*, etc. . . .[70]

[70] *Curs. Phil.* (ed. Reiser; Turin: Marietti, 1930), Vol. I, Log., II, p., q. 14, a. 1, p. 502, b38.

As we have seen, according to the doctrine of John of St. Thomas sacramental grace pertains to the very completion of the quality which is sanctifying grace and hence will only reductively be placed in a category.

The reason why modes which only complete a form in its own order do not constitute distinct predicaments is due to the fact that one requirement for a thing to be a predicamental being is that it be an *ens completum*, that is, that it constitute a nature or quiddity.[71] Modes completing a form enter into the very constitution of the thing they modify and do not constitute a distinct being. On the contrary, modes resulting from adjoinment to a form already completed in its own order, affect an already constituted being, constitute a *tertium quid* in relation to the subject which they adjoin, and are thus predicamental accidents.

This distinction between modes which complete a being in its own order and those which affect a being already completed sharply accentuates the very reason for our difficulty in attaining to a knowledge of the former type of modes. Our minds are made to know the essence of things, that is, after the manner of a *totum ens*. Hence, while considerable knowledge can be gained concerning the modes which constitute predicaments, or predicamental modes, the attainable knowledge of intrinsic modes must be analogical. Consequently, in order to determine whether the determination which results from the adjoining of an extrinsic principle, a mode, is purely an extrinsic denomination or whether it implies a change instrinsic to the form which it adjoins, it will be profitable to examine further the nature of the predicamental modes.

While the predicamental modes are extrinsic denominations insofar as they arise from a commensuration to an extrinsic principle, it must not be admitted that they are wholly extrinsic to the form which they adjoin. There is a twofold extrinsic denomination. The first type is wholly extrinsic since it de-

[71] *Ibid.*, a16.

nominates without any change, e. g., a thing seen which is denominated from vision. The second type of extrinsic denomination " denominates by means of some application and mode of itself to another, from which mutation or application there is necessarily left something quasi-changed in that to which it is applied . . . thus the principal denominator is the extrinsic form from which the change originated but insofar as it is applied to the actual informing of the other thing it is a mode." [72] Since the predicamental modes constitute a genus of real being they cannot be purely extrinsic denominations, which could not constitute such a genus, but they are extrinsic in the second sense. In this type of denomination the intrinsic change while bespeaking an essential order to and dependence upon the concurrent extrinsic form [73] does not depend upon the extrinsic form as upon a pure term but " as upon a principle and form from which it derives its denomination." John of St. Thomas concludes that the last six predicaments, precisely as modes, are determinations affecting forms, although the determinations arise from principles extrinsic to the form which is modified and hence they are transcendental relations.[74]

Applying this concept to those modes which complete a form in its own order, it can be said that a mode is not something entirely extrinsic but is a transcendental relation which principally signifies something absolute in the form and which

[72] *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 1, p. 621, b35.

[73] Forma denominans non est solum forma extrinseca ut extrinsece manet, sed ut relinquit ex sua adiacentia exteriori aliquam mutationem in re, quae non est sola applicatio et conditio, sed ratio denominandi cum ordine et dependentia essentiali ab extrinseco concurrente ad ipsam denominationem. Itaque si forma mediante inhaerentia informat, resultat forma intrinseca in ratione informandi. Si mediante aliquo modo, qui non sit inhaerentia, sed mutatio ex adiacentia relicta, est forma non pure intrinseca mediante immutatione intrinseca, quae est ratio denominans (*Ibid.*, p. 624, a34).

[74] Ista praedicamenta dependere ab aliquo extrinseco existente, non ut a termino, sicut relatio secundum esse, sed *ut a principio et forma, a qua originetur vel circa quam versatur denominatio.* Et iste respectus est secundum dici vel transcendentalis quia, licet dependeat ab existentia illius extrinseci, ut actu existenter denominet, tamen quia essentialiter et per se a tali extrinseco dependet . . . ideo dicitur illa relatio transcendentalis et secundum dici (*Ibid.*, b33).

arises from the adjoinment of an extrinsic principle upon which it depends for denomination.

The Modal Distinction. There remains the problem of determining the type of distinction which exists between the mode and the thing modified. A real distinction is either absolute or formal.[75] The former is that which exists between two individuals of a species, or between quality and quantity, etc. The latter type of distinction is that which exists between something and its mode, i. e., between a tree and its place; or between two modes really identified with one object but modally distinct. This is exemplified in the distinction which exists between action and passion and between them and motion.[76] Action and passion are really distinct since they constitute distinct predicaments. The fact that the real distinction between them is not absolute but only modal is established from the fact that in order for the reality of motion to be denominated action, there is not required any new reality, but only that the same reality be related to the agent as originating from it. Or it is denominated passion in relation to its term. This relation, since it is not a new reality, cannot be a predicamental relation but a transcendental relation. Action is consequently only a mode, i. e., not a new reality but a new relation and modification of the same thing.[77] This fact is confirmed by the example of one person striking another. In the same act by which one strikes and another is struck, there is both action

[75] Distinctio realis dividitur in realem *simpliciter*, ut inter duas res, v. g., Petrum et Paulum, quantitatem et qualitatem, et in realem modalem seu *formalem*, ut inter rem et modum, v. g., inter hominem et sessionem vel ubi, sive inter duos modos, qui realiter identificantur cum subiecto, id est ab illo realiter non differunt, modaliter autem distinguuntur (*Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 3, p. 294, b24).

[76] Actio et passio non distinguuntur sola distinctione ratione, sed distinctione modali seu formali reali, tam inter se quam a motu (*ibid.*, Vol. II, *Phil. Nat.*, I p., q. 14, a. 2, p. 300, a33).

[77] Quod vero distinctio istorum trium non sit nisi modalis, ex eo probatur, quia ut realitas illa motus dicatur actio, non requiritur realitas superaddita, sed quod eadem se habeat ad agens secundum rationem originis ab eo; solum ergo est modus aliquis, non realitas distincta, sed eiusdem realitatis nova respicientia et modificatio (*Ibid.*, p. 301, a24).

and passion by reason of the relation of the motion to the origin of the motion and the recipient.[78]

The reality of this distinction of modes from their subject is likewise illustrated in the case of *ubi* and *situs*. These two modes or accidents of the subject can be changed without the subject being essentially affected or ceasing to exist; yet as modes they are identified with the subject.[79]

Conclusion. The following conclusions summarize the doctrine on modes which has been set forth:

1. Since a mode follows upon the reception of one thing by another, all created substantial and accidental being will have mode.
2. The determination which is a mode, since it is affixed by a measure, implies commensuration to an extrinsic principle.
3. Since the form is the received thing, the commensuration or mode will fall upon the form.
4. Since the extrinsic principles of form are the material and efficient causes, a mode implies commensuration to these causes.
5. Modes caused by the activity of created being are intrinsic or extrinsic, depending upon whether they complete the form in its own order (intrinsic) or adjoin a form already completed (extrinsic).
6. A mode is not something entirely extrinsic but is a transcendental relation which primarily signifies something absolute resulting in the form from the adjoinment of an extrinsic principle.

Definition. Interpreting the definition of St. Thomas that "a mode is a determination adjoining a thing" in the light of

[78] Et constat etiam ex eo, quia eodem actu, quo impello vel percutio alterum, ille dicitur percussus vel impulsus. Non ergo requiritur distinctus actus seu realitas, ut motus sit actus activi et actus passivi, sed sufficit distincta modalitas (*Ibid.*, p. 301, a33).

[79] Haec enim est natura modorum, ut licet identificetur cum re, tamen possint amitti vel desinere esse ipsa re permanente, licet non possint separatim existere sine re, ut patent in ubi et situ et relationibus, quae amittuntur vel ponuntur subiecto non pereunte, et tamen identificantur ut modi (*Ibid.*, p. 303, a45).

these conclusions, it can be said that a *mode is a determination of a form, which determination implies a transcendental relation to its extrinsic causes, namely, material and efficient, and, though the mode is identified with the thing it modifies, it is formally distinct.*

Considering this complete definition of a mode there seems to be no conflict between the teaching of St. Thomas concerning sacramental grace and the opinion of John of St. Thomas that sacramental grace is a mode of sanctifying grace. First, sacramental grace as a mode is really and formally distinct from sanctifying grace; secondly, while intrinsic to the form of sanctifying grace, it does not affect the essential notes of the form and hence does not vary the essential species and so preserves the unicity of habitual grace; lastly, the mode explains how sanctifying grace can accomplish distinct sacramental effects while remaining essentially the same.

The problem which remains to be solved is to account for the existence and diversity of the new mode in sanctifying grace which is caused through the sacramental instrumentality. We shall try to show that the solution of this problem rests upon the fact that since a mode implies a commensuration to the efficient cause, any limitation of this efficiency necessarily affects the mode which the principal efficient agent can produce in the resulting form. In the following section the role of instruments in determining the efficiency of the principal agent will be examined in order to set forth the instrument's role in the production of a new mode in the effect.

B. EFFICIENT INSTRUMENTALITY

Our purpose here is limited to an examination of the essential characteristics of efficient instrumentality in order to demonstrate how this type of causality modifies the activity of the principal efficient cause and, in doing, so, produces its own modality in the effect. Secondarily, the exposition includes a treatment of those elements of efficient instrumentality which

offer the greatest difficulty to understanding how this type of instrumentality can be properly applied to the sacraments.

Principal and Instrumental Efficiency. The efficient cause is divided by reason of subordination into principal and instrumental cause. The former is an efficient cause which acts in virtue of its own proper power, as the writer who uses a pen; the latter acts not by reason of its own proper power, but insofar as it is moved by the principal efficient cause as the pen used by the writer. When it is said that the principal cause acts by its own proper power, that power is meant which is permanent in the principal cause and proper to its very nature. Causes are termed principal precisely because they move without being moved: *movens non mota.*[80]

An instrument in the wide acceptation of the term is taken to signify any type of causal subordination. Consequently, in this wide acceptation, instrumentality can be applied to any combination of diverse causes, insofar as one is subordinated to the other ministerially. This would include the subordination which exists between the motion of God as primary principal cause and man as secondary principal cause in the production of human actions.[81] The term instrument, however, is properly taken in a more limited sense as applying to three particular types of instrumental causality, namely, moral, logical and physical instrumentality.

The moral instrument, which John of St. Thomas calls a metaphorical instrument, is that which moves an efficient cause by way of final causality.[82] As an illustration of this type of

[80] Dicuntur causae principales, quatenus effectus a causa producitur seu principaliter movetur a virtute propria agentis, non a motione accepta ab alia causa, et ideo formaliter loquendo causa efficiens principalis movet non mota, in quantum agit (movet) virtute propria (non mota seu motione accepta) (F. X. Marquart, *Elementa Philosophiae,* [Paris: Blot, 1937], Tom. III, pt. 2, p. 223).

[81] *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 7.

[82] Omittimus in praesenti instrumenta moralia, quae ut instrumenta sint, non requirunt aliquid reale sibi superadditum, sed sufficit aliqua denominatio extrinseca, v. g., aliquod pactum vel designatio aut praesentia, ad cuius positionem causa physica operatur, et sic tale instrumentum solum se habet ut conditio requisita et metaphorico modo dicitur instrumentum (*Cursus Phil.*, Vol. II, p. 513, b21).

causality St. Thomas cites the traditional example of the lead coin, which, though it has no intrinsic value itself, has, from the edict of the ruler, the effect of moving the ruler to grant the holder of it certain favors. Its causality is presupposed to the actual operation of the efficient cause.

The logical instrument is a sign and, as such, leads the one observing it to a knowledge of the object for which the sign stands. The sign consequently exercises the same type of causality as any other knowable object, namely, that of extrinsic formal causality.

The physical instrument is an instrument from which there flows an effect, a physical reality, by reason of its subordination to a principal efficient cause to which it ministers and by which it is moved. Since this type of instrument exercises its ministerial activity in the order of efficient causality, it alone can be properly termed an efficient instrument.

The Instrument Attains an Effect Beyond its own Power. St. Thomas points out that whether the instrumental cause attains to the ultimate perfection of the form which the principal agent produces or only to the disposition for the form, in every case it acts beyond the power which belongs to it according to its own nature.[83] The reason for this is manifest. If the instrument did not attain an effect beyond its proper power, the effect would be attributed to the instrument as to a principal cause and it would not require movement from another to produce its effect.

Yet this aspect of instrumentality does not furnish a sufficient basis for distinguishing an instrumental cause from a principal cause. There are cases where the principal agents attain effects which are beyond their proper nature but this does not make such principal causes instruments. Man, for example, is the principal agent in the production of supernatural acts, since these acts proceed from infused habits. The fact that the instrument attains an effect superior to its own

[83] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4.

nature while a necessary condition of true instrumentality is not the essential characteristic of such causality.

The Formal Constitutive of Efficient Instrumentality. An instrument, properly so called, performs a function to which it is directed by the principal cause, and one which of itself it does not possess the power to perform. For this reason an instrument is defined as an agent which is raised by the power of the principal cause or agent to produce an effect of a higher order than its own nature, and one which is proportionate to the power of the principal cause alone. Hence the formal aspect of instrumental causality consists in its operating as moved by the principal agent.[84] It is this dependence of the instrument on the principal cause which underlies St. Thomas' dictum: "*Est ratio instrumenti in quantum est instrumentum, ut moveat motum.*" [85]

Although a secondary principal cause needs to be moved from first to second act in order to operate, this motion of the primary principal cause is only the condition for the operation of the secondary principal cause and not the formal constitutive of the causality of the secondary principal cause as is the case with instrumental causality. St. Thomas writes, "An instrumental cause does not act through the power of its own form, but only through the motion by which it is moved by the principal cause, whence the effect is not attributed to the instrument but to the principal cause." [86] Again he says that there is no motion in the instrument unless it is moved by the principal agent which is the essential mover.[87] In the *Contra Gentiles* he

[84] Propria et formalis ratio causae instrumentalis, ut distinguitur a principali, consistit in eo, quod operetur ut mota a principali agente (John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 515, b43).

[85] *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 21.

[86] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1.

[87] Instrumentum enim ut dictum est, non operatur nisi inquantum motum a principali agente, quod per se operatur, et ideo virtus principalis agentis habet permanens et completum esse in natura, virtus autem instrumentalis habet esse transiens ex uno in aliud et incompletum, sicut et motus est actus imperfectus ab agente in patiens (*Ibid.*, a. 4).

insists that the instrument operates through the manner of motion and states that this is the distinctive formality of its causality.[88]

The Instrumental Power. From the above it follows that there is received in the instrument, after the manner of a motion, a power derived from the principal cause. This motion enables the instrument to truly attain the effect of the principal cause, which effect exceeds the proper power of the instrument itself. This instrumental power which is received by the instrument from the principal agent is a transitory entity which begins and ends with the action for which it is given, and which is received intrinsically by the instrument which it perfects. Being thus something which is intrinsically received, it affects the nature of the instrument; and so it is said to be a natural or physical entity as opposed to a moral one which acts from without.[89] Further, such a physical or transitory assistance communicated to the instrument by the principal cause, being essentially a transitory and passing help given to the instrument for the purpose of action, is called a motion; and, since it is presupposed to the action of the instrument, a premotion.

What is the nature of this transient power in instances in which corporeal instruments might be used for the production of spiritual effects? It cannot be corporeal or there would

[88] *Loc. cit.*

[89] This doctrine of St. Thomas rules out the possibility of there being in the instrument an *active* obediential potency. To conceive of the obediential potency as having an active character would be to place the instrument in first act. The power it receives from the primary principal agent would be merely the condition for its own operation much the same as the relation between primary and secondary principal agents. An active obediential potency would make the instrument positively ordered to the effect of the principal agent, and would thus rule out the possibility of there being any physical instruments with respect to supernatural effects. Nor would mere extrinsic assistance suffice to explain instrumental causality while preserving the notion of a true instrument. If the subordination of the instrument to the principal cause were extrinsic, the only effect which would truly proceed from the instrument would be that which is proportionate to its own proper power.

exist no proportion between it and the effect produced. On the other hand, it does not seem that a corporeal subject is capable of receiving a spiritual power. St. Thomas replies: " The power is neither properly corporeal nor incorporeal, for corporeal and incorporeal are the differences of complete being, but this power is properly spoken of as being *to* an incorporeal effect, just as motion is spoken of as *to* being rather than *a* being." [90] The instrumental power in question ought to be proportionate to the effect and not to the subject receiving the power because by its means the subject is elevated to attain an effect beyond its proper power. If the power were bodily merely because it was received in a corporeal subject, it would be impossible to explain a spiritual effect attained by such an instrument.

The difficulty which some experience in understanding how a spiritual power can inhere in a corporeal instrument arises from a misinterpretation of the transient nature of instrumental power. To understand the term " transient " to mean merely of short duration and the term " permanent " of long duration is only an accidental consideration. The power should rather be conceived of as transient and incomplete or permanent and complete by reason of the special task which it accomplishes. Thus a permanent and complete power is primarily given to constitute a subject as the principal agent, whereas the transient and incomplete power is given to subordinate one subject to another as serving the former in the attainment of its effect.[91] Thus such a transient power, even though ordained to a supernatural effect, can be subjected in a corporeal subject, not absolutely, but insofar as that subject is capable of being used by a spiritual power for the attainment of a spiritual effect.[92]

[90] *De Ver.*, q. 27, a. 4, ad 5.

[91] Nec intelligimus nomine virtutis transeuntis et permanentis virtutem, quae parvo tempore vel multo duret, hoc enim per accidens est, sed intelligitur virtus transiens et permanens completa vel incompleta ratione muneris et officii, quod exercet (John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, q. 26, a. 1, p. 520 a34).

[92] Nihil tamen prohibet in corpore esse virtutem spiritualem instrumentalem,

The Proper Action of the Instrument. The instrument when elevated by the principal agent to an effect beyond its proper power nevertheless requires some action proper to itself. With regard to the use of instruments by created agents, the necessity for this proper activity is readily understood. Creatures use instruments precisely because of the imperfection of their nature. A sculptor is incapable of producing an image in marble unless he employs some instrument which will assist him in overcoming the resistant quality of the marble. "Because an instrument is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is better, not for being a greater instrument but for being more adapted to the end." [93] But since God does not use instruments to attain a spiritual effect because of any dependence upon the proper operation of the instrument, the question arises as to the necessity for a proper action in corporeal instruments used by God.

St. Thomas replies that even in these cases the instrument must have its own proper activity if the true concept of instrumentality is to be preserved. It must be remembered that when the instrument receives the transient power from the principal cause, the nature of the instrument is intrinsically affected and in the very operation of its own power the effect of the principal agent is accomplished.[94] It is this fact which rules out the possibility of there being an instrument in creation. Creation presupposes no subject; it is the production of something from nothing. But a created instrument, even under divine influence, must have a subject upon which it exercises its

inquantum scilicet corpus potest moveri ab aliqua substantia spirituali ad aliquem effectum spiritualem inducendum (*Summa Theol.*, III. q. 62, a. 4, ad 1).

[93] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 188, a. 7, ad 1.

[94] Instrumentum habet duas actiones: unam instrumentalem, secundum quam operatur non in virtute propria, sed in virtute principalis agentis: aliam autem habet actionem propriam, quae competit ei secundum propriam formam, sicut securi competit scindere ratione suae acuitatis, facere autem lectum, in quantum est instrumentum artis; non autem perficit instrumentalem actionem, nisi exercendo actionem propriam, scindendo enim facit lectum. (*Ibid.*, a. 1, ad 2) Sed diligenter consideranti apparet hoc esse impossibile. Nam actio alicuius, etiamsi sit eius ut instrumenti, oportet ut ab eius potentis egrediatur (*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 4).

proper activity. Consequently, for an instrumental cause to exercise its ministerial function, it is necessary that there be some proper action which it administers and, insofar as it is elevated, this action attains something beyond its proper effect.

Nor is it necessary that the instrument by this proper action produce in the subject of the effect a term distinct from that of the principal agent. To be a true efficient instrument it suffices that in using the instrument the principal agent conform his action to the manner of operation which pertains to the instrument. This is a most important distinction because it marks the difference between the use of instruments by God and by created agents. Many have been deceived by interpreting the words of St. Thomas, "*dispositive operari*," to mean "*operari dispositionem*." [95]

Created agents, as we have said, make use of instruments to assist them in the attainment of desired effects and they choose the instrument whose operation will be most suitable for the attainment of that effect. Created agents employ instruments since they do not have the power over the nature of the subject of the effect. Likewise, created agents do not have the power over the nature of the instruments which they employ and must consequently modify their activity in conformity with the form of the instrument.

When the principal cause takes hold of the instrument, the latter, in the very motion it receives, restricts and determines to its own *form* the force which passes through it. Consequently, it impresses its particular mark on the final result. The principal cause is obliged, in its action, to yield to the exigencies of the instrument, to adapt itself to it, to let itself be determined and influenced by it; and this determining influence is necessarily found in the effect. It is the role of the instrument thus to impose itself on the principal cause, and to canalize its action.[96]

---

[95] Quod instrumentum debet dispositive operari ad affectum principalis agentis, per ly dispositive non intelligit aliquid transiens ad ipsum effectum, aut subjectum ejus, sed aliquid quid disponitur intra se instrumentum, seu sit capax motionis principalis agentis ad effectum, quia non potest illam motionem accipere, nisi aliquid agendo (John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theol.*, t. IX, *De Sacramentis*, q. 62, a. 24, a. 1; p. 208).

[96] C. V. Héris, *The Mystery of Christ* (Westminster: Newman, 1950), p. 82.

Since the mode of the effect, as indicated in the previous chapter, depends upon the commensuration to its efficient cause, the limitation of the efficiency by the instrument necessarily affects the mode of the effects. Indeed, the artist chooses the better of two pianos to play a masterpiece because the mode of the instrument will be reflected in the effect. The instrument of the created agent does then produce in the effect a term distinct at least modally from the effect of the principal agent.

While even in the use of instruments by divine power there must be some proper activity on the part of the instrument, all that is required is that the instrument limit the mode of operation of God. He, as it were, adopts his activity to the operation of the created instrument for the production of the effect. God is not limited, however, in attaining His effect by reason of the particular form of the instrument. He can use any instrument to attain any effect insofar as it does not involve a contradiction. As we have pointed out, the created agent must act in accordance with the exterior properties of things, i. e., from without. God acts on the very being of the thing which he uses. While it must be kept in mind that even God must be limited in His activity by the operation of the instrument, He does not choose one instrument in preference to another because there is any positive ordination in it to attain a spiritual effect.

> It is as *being*, and not because it is *such a being* that God deigns to make use of it. In the respect, there is a proportion between the instrument elevated by Divine Power and everything that can be produced in the order of being. . . . Thus there are no effects, even supernatural, which cannot be brought about by created instruments in the hands of God.[97]

Created instruments used by God in the production of supernatural effects, while diversifying the mode of His action through their diverse proper operations and thus fulfilling the essential conditions for true efficient instrumentality, are not capable of producing in the supernatural effect any mode com-

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 85. Cf. C. Spicq, O. P. "Les Sacrements sont cause instrumentale perfective de la grace," *Divus Thomas* (Piac.), XXXII (1929), p. 352.

mensurate to their natural form. God is not limited by their proper operation as regards the effect and there is no proportion between the natural form of such an instrument and the effect produced through its ministerial activity. If, then, there is to be an instrument which produces a mode in a supernatural effect, the form of that instrument must be proportioned to the effect. Since the supernatural effect can only be produced by a supernatural agent, the form of the instrument proportioned to such an effect must likewise be received from a supernatural agent. If the proper operation of the created instrument must modify not only His activity in accordance with the natural operation of the created instrument but also the very divine power which is communicated to the instrument in order that the effect produced will be commensurate with the signification He has imposed upon the instrument. It is in this respect that the sacraments differ from all other forms of divine activity. Our next task is to explain the theory that there is a divine power transiently communicated to the sacraments to make them true efficient instruments, and, secondly, that the effect produced through their instrumentality is limited by their supernatural signification, the formal element of the sacramental instrument, producing in sanctifying grace the new mode which is termed " sacramental grace."

Principle I: Diverse Instruments Produce Diverse Modes

A mode implies a commensuration of a form to its extrinsic principles, namely, efficient and material causes. Any limitation of these principles will consequently produce in the form measured by them a determination or mode commensurate to such limitation.

An efficient instrument employed by a created agent limits the efficiency of such an agent to the proper operation of the instrumental form. In receiving the influx of the principal agent, the instrument exercises a determining causality upon the principal agent, leaving in the power it receives from that agent a commensuration to its own form. The modification

produced will necessarily vary in accordance with the diverse form of the instrument. Since the mode in the effect will reflect any modification produced on the principal efficient cause, diverse instruments produce a diverse mode in the ensuing effect, which mode is commensurate to the instrumental form.

Though created instruments used by God in the production of supernatural effects are not capable of producing in the effect any mode commensurate to the natural form of the instrument, when such instruments have a supernatural form proportionate to the effect, which form limits the divine power, such instruments will produce a mode in the supernatural effect.

C. SACRAMENTAL INSTRUMENTALITY

Theological Foundations. The doctrine of sacramental causality proposed by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* was indeed an innovation when compared to the theories which were then being taught. But it ceases to be an innovation when studied in the light of tradition. The Angelic Doctor ever sought to evolve a doctrine soundly rooted in authority. Seldom has this eminent quality of his teaching been so manifest as it is in this question of sacramental causality. In the *Sentences,* lacking a mature doctrine of his own, he expounded the theory of dispositive causality because " this seems more in conformity with the doctrine of theologians and the saints." [98] In his rejection of the theory of occasional causality, he appeals to the authority of the Saints.[99] Thus it was St. Thomas' purpose in proposing the theory of efficient instrumentality to explain satisfactorily the doctrine of faith concerning sacramental efficacy. Although it is not our purpose here to elaborate completely on the positive theological foundations of this theory, a brief glance at several scriptural and patristic texts

[98] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4.

[99] Secundum hoc igitur sacramenta novae legis nihil plus essent quam signa gratiae: cum tamen ex multis Sanctorum auctoritatibus habeatur quod sacramenta novae legis non solum significant, sed causant gratiam (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1).

enables one to see how this theory explains these texts in their most proper sense.

Christ speaks of the efficacy of Baptism in his conversation with Nicodemus: " Amen, amen I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water *and* the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." [100] Accepted in its most proper sense, this text refers to Baptism of water and implies from the use of the single preposition " of " (in Latin, " *ex* ") and the particle " and " in a conjunctive sense that there is a twofold principle in the production of grace, namely, water *and* the Holy Ghost. Since the material element cannot be the principal cause, it must be concluded that the water is the instrumental cause and the Holy Spirit the principal efficient cause in the production of baptismal grace. To accept the word " *and* " as used disjunctively forces a metaphorical interpretation and would twist the text to mean that just as water cleanses exteriorly, so the Holy Spirit cleanses interiorly. Such an exegesis would run contrary to tradition which has always accepted this text as referring to the sacrament of Baptism. If the words of St. Paul, " He saved us through the bath of regeneration *and* renewal by the Holy Spirit," [101] were interpreted in the light of moral causality, it would likewise force a metaphorical interpretation and the word " *and* " would be used disjunctively. According to this theory the sacramental instrument is in the order of moral cause while the Holy Spirit works efficiently. Even Cardinal Franzelin was compelled to admit that moral causality could not fully and sufficiently explain the words of Christ that " unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you," [102] for it implies a sanctifying power intrinsic to the material elements of the sacrament.

In patristic sources, as in the Scriptures, one will look in vain for any explicit treatment of the nature of sacramental causality, yet the examples used by the Fathers and their de-

[100] John 3: 5. [101] Tit. 3: 5. [102] John 6: 54.

fense of the intrinsic power of the material elements in the sacraments to sanctify can only properly be understood by means of the transient *vis* proper to true efficient instrumentality. Thus St. Basil responds to the heretics who said the water would be equal to God if it possessed the power of sanctification: "The grace which is in the water is not from the nature of the water, but from the presence of the Holy Spirit." [103] While the heretics argued that the water is nothing more than a simple sign, Basil held that there is in the water some power productive of grace. St. Gregory of Nyssa compares the baptismal water to the semen which is the "*causa hominis effectrix*," [104] which would imply a true intrinsic efficacy. St. Cyril of Alexandria drew an analogy between the effect of water heated by fire and water used in Baptism. As the effect of the heated water is not other than the manner in which fire itself heats, so the water used in Baptism is refashioned to a divine power.[105]

In the West Tertullian, in reply to a certain Quintilla who was denying the efficacy of baptismal water, answered: "Is it not proper to divine action to combine power with simplicity? God really imparted to the water that wonderful efficacy, which some refuse to admit." [106] St. Ambrose likewise testified to the intrinsic power of water to sanctify: "It may seem impossible that water can blot out sin . . . but what was impossible, God, who alone can grant grace, made possible." [107]

While the Fathers were not speaking in a strict philosophical

[103] Si quae est in aqua gratia, non ex aquae natura est, sed ex praesentia Spiritus (*On the Holy Spirit*, c. 15; *PG* XXXII, 127).

[104] *Oration on the Baptism of Christ*; *PG* XLVI, 479.

[105] Quemadmodum viribus ignis intensius aqua calefacta non aliter urit quam ipse ignis; sic Spiritus Sancti operatione aqua qua baptizati corpus aspergitur, reformatur ad divinam virtutem et potentiam (*Commentary on John*, bk. 2, 3: 5; *PG* LXXIII, 243).

[106] . . . quae denegas Deo proprietates suas, simplicitatem et potestatem. (Quid ergo? nonne mirandum est lavacro dilui mortem?) (*On Baptism*, c. 1; *PL* I, 1309).

[107] Impossible videbatur ut peccatum ablueret aqua . . . sed quod impossible erat, fecit Deus esse possible, qui tantum nobis donavit gratiam (*On Penance*, c. 2; *PL* XVI, 499).

sense, their constant use of examples of efficient instrumentality makes it seem clear that they intended to attribute a true efficient causality to the material element in the sacraments.

Nor can the decrees of the Councils of Florence and Trent be understood in their proper sense except by attributing to the sacraments a true efficiency. These Councils taught that the sacraments confer and contain grace.[108] If the system of moral causality were applied to interpret this text, its meaning would be that the sacraments signify the grace which God alone confers; the sacraments themselves would not properly confer the grace. The Council of Trent spoke of the sacraments as having a *vis* or power and taught that in the Eucharist the conversion takes place by the force of the words.[109] According to the theory of moral causality, the power would be solely in God. Melchior Cano stated that the majority of the theologians at the Council of Trent favored the doctrine of St. Thomas.[110] Thus, though the Fathers of this Council had no intention of explicitly proposing a specific doctrine of causality, they chose terminology which can only be most aptly interpreted in the light of true efficient instrumentality.

As John of St. Thomas points out, the theological reasons for this theory of causality can only be reasons of convenience, since the sacramental causality of grace is dependent upon the will of God.[111] The first of these reasons is the necessity of attributing to the sacraments of the New Law a type of causality which surpasses that of the sacraments of the Old Law. The sacraments of the Old Law possessed a moral causality, and Circumcision at least conferred grace *ex opere operato passive*. In order, therefore, that the sacraments of the New Law be distinguished from those of the Old Law, an intrinsic power

[108] *Conc. Flor.*, Decr. pro Armen.; Denz. 695. *Conc. Trid.*, sess. 7, can. 6; Denz. 849.

[109] *Conc. Trid.*, sess. 7, can. 1, *de Baptismo*; Denz. 857. Sess. 13, can. 3; Denz. 876.

[110] *Relectio de Sacramentis* (Madrid, 1764) P. IV, 1, 2; pp. 425-434.

[111] *Op. cit.*, t. IX, q. 62, d. 24, a. 1, n. 551; p. 271.

ought to be attributed to them in order that they may truly be said to confer the grace which they contain. Moreover, it seems that they should possess a causality similar to the physical instrumentality of the Humanity of Christ. Finally other theories of sacramental causality fail to remove the sacraments from the order of signification insofar as they limit the causality to that of extrinsic formal or final causality.

Objections to the Theory of Efficient Instrumentality. One of the principal objections to the doctrine that the sacraments are efficient instruments in the production of grace is based on the teaching that grace is created and hence does not permit of the use of any instrument in its becoming. This objection is alleged to arise from the authority of St. Thomas himself.[112] The fact is, however, that the proper object of creation is a subsistent being.[113] The fact that grace is not a subsistent being but rather an accident inhering in a substance can be deduced from the words of the Council of Trent: " Men ought to be justified by grace and charity, which is poured forth through the Holy Spirit, and inheres in their hearts." [114] Since grace is dependent in being upon the pre-existence of its subject, it cannot properly be the term of creation.

A search of St. Thomas' writings reveals that St. Thomas at least three times expressly denies that grace is created, and in none of his works is there expressly stated that the doctrine of the creation of grace is his own opinion. On the contrary, St. Thomas is careful to avoid even the expression " creation of grace," which was in common usage among theologians of his time.[115]

[112] S. Thomas docet instrumentum attingere gratiam in se; sed objicies primo, loca illa D. Thomae supra relata in quibus aperte dicit non operari instrumentum ipsam gratiam, secundum entitatem suam, sed aliquid praevium ad illam, quam sententiam non apparet D. Thomam alibi retractasse (*Ibid.*, n. 298; p. 208).

[113] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 45, a. 4.

[114] Per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum qui iustificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret (Denz. 800).

[115] M. Tuyaerts, O. P., " Utrum S. Thomas Causalitatem Sacramentorum Respectu Gratiae Mere Dispositivam Unquam Docuerit," *Angelicum*, VIII, 2 (1931), 180.

Another argument frequently urged against the theory of the efficient causality of the sacraments is that an corporeal instrument can attain to the very reality of grace as this exceeds the proper object of the instrument. Moreover, it seems that an instrument should dispose the subject for the reception of the effect of the principal agent and the sacraments do not dispose the soul for the reception of grace. As St. Thomas writes, "An instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the principal cause unless it dispositively operates for the effect of the principal agent through something proper to itself."[110] To this reasoning it must be conceded that an corporeal instrument can not act beyond its natural object by its proper power, but this does not prevent it from attaining a more noble effect insofar as it is moved by the power of a superior agent. In an instrument a threefold object must be distinguished. The first is the object of its proper power according to which it can act as a principal agent. The second object extends to the natural agent as it is the instrument of a superior natural power. Finally, insofar as the natural agent is moved by an infinite agent, God Himself, there is not required any proportion to the effect attained, but only an obediential potency which is nothing other than its non-repugnance to being used by God for any purpose. Thus the sacraments can attain to grace insofar as they are moved by the divine power of the principal agent who is God.

As for the confirmation of this argument that the instrument must dispose the subject for the reception of the action of the principal agent, it has been pointed out that the instrument does not require a distinct form. All that is required is that the instrument have operation and that the action proceeds from its potency. So long as the action proceeds according to the disposition and manner of action of the instrument, the instrument is said to operate dispositively.[111] As explained in treating of the nature of true efficient instrumentality, the instru-

[110] Summa Theol., I, q. 45, a. 5.
[111] John of St. Thomas, op. cit., I, 338, n. 22.

siently received power must proceed from the potency of the instrument if it is to be a true instrument. In the sacraments the operation of the divine power presupposes and is limited to the manner of operation of the material elements, i. e., to the pouring of the water in Baptism. The sacramental instruments thus operate dispositively.

To understand how the sacraments can be said to touch the very entity of grace demands a clear notion of instrumental causality. The power of the principal agent is communicated to the instrument after the manner of a motion. Thus grace, as an effect, depends upon a divine power and this divine power is communicated to the instrument. The effect which is attained by the divine power is also attained by the power of the instrument. Since the instrument does not act through a proper form communicated to it but by means of the instrumental power transiently received from God who is the principal cause, the instrument can exercise an action which attains the effect. This is the formal reason why St. Thomas attributes a perfect efficient instrumentality to the sacraments in the production of grace, i. e., the instrumental action by which they attain the entity of grace is the same divine power which attains the entity of grace, but it is in the sacraments by way of a transient motion.

It is also argued that since the sacraments are corporeal, they cannot be the subject of a spiritual power. While it must be admitted that a complete and permanent spiritual power cannot adhere in a corporeal subject, there is no repugnance to such a subject receiving a transient and incomplete spiritual power, just as the human voice is said to have a spiritual power. Since the instrumental power is of this nature, there is no incongruity in attributing such an incomplete spiritual power to the sacraments.[118] Furthermore, the instrumental power of the sacraments is not properly said to be spiritual. It is only reductively so insofar as it is reduced to the genus

[118] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 4.

of its principle, which is the complete power of God, or as it is reduced to the genus of its term, which is grace.

Nor can it be objected that since the sacraments do not touch the soul itself, the contact necessary for causality is lacking. While it must be granted that there is not a contact of supposit between the material element of the sacrament and the soul of the recipient, there is contact of sacramental power.[119] It is true that there must be some immediate contact with the subject of the effect in order that a principal agent reach its term, but it is not necessarily required that his contact be by the immediacy of a quantitative contact of the instrument. When natural principal causes are not present to the subject of the effect, at least when they are not present under the formal aspect of cause, they require instruments in order that their power be communicated to the subject. In this case it is required that the instrument make contact with the subject of the effect either by a quantitative contact or through some other medium. If all contact is lacking to the instrument, the effect will not be accomplished. The power of God, however, because of His immensity, is intimately present to all things and it is not required that it be rendered present to the subject of the supernatural effect by means of quantitative contact with the subject of the effect. Nor must the instrument of the divine power be present to the subject of the effect by an immediacy of supposit, but merely by reason of its instrumental power. The sacraments directly attain the effect by the divine power which they modify, even though a quantitative contact with the subject of the effect, the human soul, is lacking. Thus the phantasm, a material thing, does not have any quantitative contact with the possible intellect but exercises its instrumental power by modifying the power of the agent intellect.

[119] Praesentia corporea, seu indistantia quoad quantitatem, dicitur contactus molis, qui obtinetur inter corpora contigua, id est quorum extrema sunt simul. Praesentia vero spirituum, qui in corpora agunt, dicitur analogice contactus, seu contactus virtutis, ad designandum indistantiam virtutis agentis spiritualis in passum corporeum (F. X. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae*, II, p. 106).

The opponents of the theory of efficient instrumentality believed that the common doctrine of reviviscence presented an insurmountable objection to this theory. According to the doctrine of reviviscence when some of the sacraments are received with an obstacle to grace, if the sacrament be validly received, grace is produced when the obstacle is removed. The question then arose: how can the sacraments produce grace efficiently when the rite has ceased to exist? While the problem is too complex to be given a full treatment here, a most satisfactory solution to this problem was offered by Father Marin-Sola, O. P.[120] His explanation, which its author claims is merely a perfecting of the doctrine of John of St. Thomas, is that every sacrament produces some physical modification in the Baptismal character in which the sacrament virtually endures. In the case of Confirmation and Holy Orders this modification is perpetual and indelible, and hence these sacraments can always revive. In the case of Matrimony and Extreme Unction this modification is temporary, and, as long as it remains, this modification can be elevated by God to be the instrument for the efficient causality of grace. Since the modification produced by Holy Eucharist and Penance is transient, these sacraments cannot revive. This theory is founded upon the fact that the Baptismal character is a passive physical potency for the reception of the other sacraments and it is modified through their reception as a physical potency through the reception of its proper act.

Conclusion. Thus the sacraments possess the necessary conditions for being efficient instruments in the production of sanctifying grace: they receive an influx of divine power and modify the operation of the principal agent, God Himself, through their own proper operation and thus virtually attain the effect produced in the soul. In attributing this type of causality to the sacraments of the New Law, St. Thomas conformed his teaching to the most proper sense of scriptural and

[120] "Proponitur nova solutio ad conciliandam causalitatem physiciam sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscentia," *Divus Thomas* (Frib.), III (1925), 49-63.

patristic texts concerning sacramental efficacy and adequately distinguished them from the " weak and beggarly elements " [121] of the Old Law.

The fact remains, however, that despite their modification of the manner of operation of the divine power, the physical form of the material elements does not limit or measure the effect produced in the soul. There is no proportion between this effect and the physical form of the sacramental elements. Consequently, in order to explain this modification of grace, the efficient instrumentality of the sacraments cannot be divorced from its subordination to the sacramental signification which is the formal element to be considered. The limitation of this instrumental power is thus explained by its relationship to the sacraments as signs.

D. THE PROPER FORM OF THE SACRAMENTAL INSTRUMENT

Supernatural effects produced by God through the use of corporeal instruments do not necessarily leave in the effects which result from their instrumentality any mode commensurate to their natural forms. The only proportion that is required between the corporeal instrument which God employs and the effect to be attained is the *being* of the instrument. The natural form of corporeal elements in the sacraments cannot therefore limit or modify the divine power passing through them except as to the manner of operation. Consequently, if the sacraments do produce a new mode in the sanctifying grace received through their instrumentality, they must in some way exercise a determining causality upon the divine power so that there will result in the effect a commensuration to the proper instrumental form.

It has been established that according to the doctrine of St. Thomas the sacraments are true efficient instruments in the production of sanctifying grace. It will now be our endeavor to establish that when such instrumentality is joined to a prac-

[121] Gal. 4: 9.

tical sign of the supernatural effect, as is the case with the sacraments, the causality of the sign is not limited to the order of extrinsic formal or final cause, i. e., the order of signification, but by reason of their conjunction in the sacramental artefact the signification is the proper form of the sacramental instrument and exercises a determining causality in the order of efficiency. Since, as has been shown, such an instrumental form, in limiting the efficiency of the principal agent, produces a new mode in the effect, the sacramental instrument likewise produces a new mode in sanctifying grace by reason of its proper form, the signification. In order to demonstrate this argument it will be necessary to consider the nature and causality of signs as applied to the sacraments and the relation of signification and causality in the sacramental instrument.

Nature and Causality of Signs. A sign formally consists in an absolute relation, a relation *secundum esse*, to the thing signified. Insofar as the sign is natural this relation is predicamental; if the signification be imposed by some agent exterior to the sign, the relation of the sign to the thing signified is one of reason.[122] But whether the relation of the sign to the thing signified be predicamental or of reason like every absolute relation it presupposes in the sign some foundation for the relation. That foundation in the sign is its representation to a cognoscitive faculty, a transcendental relation. This distinction between the absolute relation in which the sign formally consists and the transcendental relation which is its fundament is most important in reference to the causality of a sign. The absolute relation in which the sign formally consists possesses no causality; its whole essence consists in its order to a term, namely, the thing signified. The causality of a sign therefore rests upon the transcendental relation, the fundament of the sign, which is signified *in obliquo*.

Three things are involved in making the presence of an object known to the faculty: 1) the production of the species, which

[122] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 2, q. 21, a. 1; pp. 647-650.

takes place in the potency from the object or extrinsic sign; 2) the excitation of the potency to this production; 3) the conjunction of this species with the potency to bring forth a concept of the thing signified. There is no doubt that some efficient cause is required for the production of the impressed species, the exciting of the faculties, the production of the expressed species, etc. The question which must be solved is how these acts depend upon the sign, that is, whether efficiently or merely objectively as upon causes which specify extrinsically.

St. Thomas seems to have answered this question very clearly in one brief statement: "The efficient principle of knowledge is not signs, but reason proceeding from principles to conclusions."[123] His response is based upon two facts. First, an object, precisely as it manifests itself to a potency, is only in the order of extrinsic formal causality. The efficiency by which the sign is applied to the potency is from the knower. If the object possesses any power to impress itself on the potency, this power is material and accidental to it precisely as object.[124] The second fact is that the sign possesses the same type of causality as the object, insofar as it stands in the place of the principal object signified. It is for this reason that some signs are called instrumental, not because they are an efficient instrument but as an instrument in the order of formal cause, i. e., not informing as a species within the knowing power, but as extrinsically representing an object. A formal sign, which inheres in the potency, likewise does not enter into the order of efficiency precisely as sign, but remains in the order of formal causality. Thus the causality of both an instrumental sign and formal sign, precisely as they are objects known, is that of extrinsic formal cause. Their conjunction with the efficient cause for the excitation of the faculty is accidental to their formal causality and pertains to them as they are physical realities.

[123] *De Verit.*, q. 11, a. 1, ad 4.

[124] F. X. Maquart, "De La Causalité du Signe," *Revue Thomiste*, XXXII (1927), 52-53.

Is there any essential difference between the causality of a purely speculative sign and a practical sign? A practical sign differs from a speculative sign in that the former is derived from the practical intellect whereas the latter is derived from the speculative intellect. Since the practical intellect operates by directing to an end to be attained exteriorly, the practical sign manifests the thing signified as something to be accomplished by the one who institutes the sign. Thus a traffic light manifests the will of the legislator that vehicles approaching a determined intersection shall stop. Whether the sign itself should be instrumental, either morally or physically, in the production of the effect is extrinsic to it as sign, since the whole purpose of a practical sign is to manifest exteriorly the manner in which the practical intellect interiorly considers the thing signified, i. e., as an end to be attained. The traffic light does not cease to be a sign merely because certain motorists ignore it. The causality of the practical sign is therefore essentially that of the speculative sign, namely, extrinsic formal causality.[125]

The example of a practical sign which we have used is termed a moral instrument insofar as it manifests the will of the legislator to a citizen subject to his jurisdiction. In this case it binds the driver morally to obey and as such enters into the order of final causality. The only example in the natural order of a sign being used as an efficient instrument in the production of an effect seems to be the unique example of the phantasm in the order of cognition.[126]

The Sacraments as Practical Signs. As St. Thomas indicates, the term " sacrament " as it is used in the present context is to be taken as a *sign* of something sacred.[127] That the term has been so accepted traditionally cannot be proved by any *a priori* reasoning but can only be determined by its usage in Sacred

[125] *Ibid.*, pp. 54-57.

[126] John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 4, q. 10, a. 2; pp. 306-308.

[127] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 60, a. 1.

Scripture and by the Fathers.[128] This usage is confirmed, however, by the very nature of the sacraments for they are essentially expressions of man's faith. Because man is led to the spiritual through material things, the sacraments must be sensible and external. Since the cause of sanctification is rather an internal and hidden operation, the sacraments should more properly be placed in the genus of sign rather than of cause.[129]

Moreover, the sacrament is a practical sign, " a sign of a sacred thing insofar as it sanctifies men." [130] In the institution of the sacraments God did not merely intend the representation of something sacred, which we would call a sacramental, but ordained that through their use the sanctification would actually be bestowed upon the recipient. Hence the sacraments possess the causality proper to practical signs, extrinsic formal causality, plus the moral instrumentality resulting from the divine decree to grant the grace signified by their use. As the traffic signal is the *occasion* for the operation of the driver to stop so the sacraments of the Old Law were merely the *occasion* for the bestowal of grace by God.

All will concede that a sacrament is not a mere natural sign, i. e., founded wholly upon some natural connection between the sign and the thing which it signifies. There is certainly no such connection between the sensible element of the sacraments and the supernatural effect which is signified. Consequently, the sacrament is a conventional sign, *signum ad placitum*. The relation which exists between the sign which is the sacrament and the effect signified is solely from their institution by God and as such is formally a relation of reason. This should not prove surprising if it be borne in mind that the sacraments are artefacts which result from the imposition of a signification upon a sensible object. Thus the sacrament pertains formally to the genus which results from that signification and not that to which the matter pertains. Every

[128] Doronzo, *De Sacramentis in Genere*, p. 41.
[129] Hugon, *De Sacramentis in Communi*, q. 1, a. 2; p. 10.
[130] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 60, a. 2.

artefact pertains to one genus absolutely and, as such, is in the genus of the matter; but formally it pertains to the genus which belongs to it by reason of its artificial form.[131] Thus the ablution of the water in the sacrament of Baptism absolutely pertains to the category of action, but formally, as a being of reason, to the genus of sign.

While the material element of the sacrament lacks any ordination to the effect produced, Christ did not leave the choice of the material elements to chance. He chose those which possessed some analogy to the spiritual effect which they were chosen to signify, such as water in Baptism, etc. It is for this reason the sacraments are said to be symbolic conventional signs. Many have erred concerning the nature of the sacraments by confusing this natural aptitude of the material elements to signify with the signification which arises from their institution as sacraments.

The sacraments, then, are instrumental practical signs which possess the causality proper to such signs plus the moral instrumentality resulting from the divine decree of their institution.

Relation of Sacramental Signification and Causality. The sacraments of the New Law are efficient instruments as well as practical signs. As we have seen, it is accidental to the order of signification whether the sign be a cause of the thing signified; it is likewise accidental to the order of efficiency whether the causality be exteriorly manifest. Signification and efficiency have no essential co-relation; they are essentially in disparate orders. In the sacraments, signification and efficiency are at least physically related by their accidental conjunction in a common subject: both are spiritual uses of a sensible reality.[132] The signification is the imposition of a relation of reason on the sensible reality; the efficient instrumentality draws the sensible reality into a real relation with the effect produced. Does the relation of these two orders, however, remain accidental in their sacramental conjunction?

[131] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theol.*, t. IX, d. 22, a. 1, nn. 24, 25; p. 11-12.
[132] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 61, a. 1, ad 1.

The relation of these two orders in the sacraments of the New Law can be considered in a twofold manner. First, insofar as the sacraments are in the genus of sign, they also must have a specific difference within that order. Accordingly, this difference is due to the fact that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify the giving of grace by God, but they signify this giving as being accomplished in and through the sacraments. Causality is thus said to pertain to the sacraments of the New Law essentially insofar as it is required to confirm the truth of their signification.[133]

According to a second manner of consideration the relation of causality and signification is taken precisely as the sacraments were instituted by Christ not only to signify but to cause grace. The causality of grace cannot enter into the order of sign to become a specific difference, for to cause grace is hidden action. To cause grace *sacramentally*, i. e., as sensibly manifest by the signification and subordinate to it, nevertheless pertains essentially to the sacraments of the New Law by reason of their institution by Christ.

Therefore the institution of Christ joined these two [signification and causality] so that they would be a particular kind of sign, having efficacy from His passion and participating in its instrumental causality of grace. And given this institution, or supposing it, it is essential to our sacraments to be signs as well as causes; though the former is the generic element. Whence that institution, though it established both [namely, the formality of sign and cause] as it is the institution of a sacrament, intended it to be only a sign. Nevertheless this institution simultaneously ordained the sign to be a cause, and the institution pertained to both aspects, not by force of its sacramental essence [i. e., by reason of its being a sign] but by reason of its peculiar institution. And, although that which is used to cause in the sacrament is not the form or essence of a sign, but that which is natural and sensible in a sacrament, it therefore belongs essentially [to the sacrament] by reason of its matter. . . . Whence our sacraments have a twofold analogue to the name sacrament, that of sign and of cause, though the notion of cause is subordinate to

---

[133] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theol., loc. cit.*, n. 119; p. 86.

the notion of sign and they are called sacraments in a unique manner.[134]

Consequently, although the sacraments are causes by reason of their material element, the natural form of the element is not the proper form of the sacramental instrument. The proper operation of water in Baptism, while required for the sacramental instrumentality is not the proper form of the sacrament as it is only the form of the material element. The proper form of the instrument is therefore derived from the signification. Since the action of an instrument is diversified by the operation of its proper form, the signification diversifies the instrumental activity and constitutes the sacraments as diverse instruments.

For example, the artisan who combines metal, wood, and wire to construct a piano does not unite their natural forms into a new physical essence, but acquires an artificial unity through the imposition of an artificial form. While the musician who plays the piano depends upon the proper operation of the natural forms of the various elements, e. g., resistance, vibration, etc., it is not the natural forms of these elements which are the ultimate determining factor in the instrument, but the artificial form which unites them into a unique artefact. The same elements united by a different artificial form would produce sound distinct from that of piano music. So also in the sacraments, while the operation of the physical elements is necessary that the sacrament be a cause, their forms are not the proper form of the instrument. Their instrumentality receives its ultimate determination and they are constituted diverse instruments by reason of their essential unity and subordination to the artificial form which is the sacramental signification.

Principle II: The Sacraments Are Diverse Instruments

Instruments are diversified by their proper forms. Artefacts used as instruments diversify the activity of the principal

[134] *Ibid.*, n. 15, p. 8; n. 16, p. 9.

efficient agent, not by reason of the natural form of the material elements of the artefact, but by their proper form which is the artificial form induced by the maker of the instrument.

The sacraments are both practical signs and efficient instruments. While in the sacraments of the New Law these two orders are only accidentally united in the physical order, by reason of the institution of Christ they constitute an artificial unity or sacramental instrument in which they are essentially related and whose proper form is the signification. Thus, insofar as the sacraments have a diverse signification, they are diverse instruments.

III. Conclusion and Summary

Conclusion. In considering the nature of instruments it was pointed out that their use by men is due to the inability of human agents to attain particular ends without the assistance of the operation of other things. Because created agents are necessarily limited by the proper operation of the instrumental form, such agents are guided in their choice of instruments by the proportion of the instrumental form to the end to be attained. God's power, as has been seen, knows no such limitation by natural forms. This is especially true in reference to supernatural effects, since natural forms have no positive proportion to such effects. In confecting the sacramental artefact, however, God has given this unique instrument, not a natural form, but a supernatural one, and it thus bears a true proportion to the effect produced through its instrumentality. The divine power in employing the diverse sacraments to sanctify men is limited by their diverse signification. By analogy, as the natural form of the created instrument limits the efficiency of the finite agent and produces a corresponding mode in the effect, so the supernatural signification of the sacramental instrument limits the efficiency of the infinite Agent and produces a corresponding mode in sanctifying grace.

Thus we find here, deliberately willed by God, one of the conditions of that instrumental causality, to which our defective

activity is necessarily subject, and in accordance with which the instrument imprints its own special mark on the ensuing effect. The sacraments, being essentially signs, stamp their own likeness on the soul in producing what they signify. In that respect, it must be remarked, they differ from every other form of divine activity.[135]

Though each of the sacraments essentially signifies the bestowal of sanctifying grace, this grace, as the signification indicates, is patterned to suit the recipient in accordance with his condition and needs in the Christian life. As there are, according to the enumeration of St. Thomas, seven special acts of the Christian life: life, strength, conservation, healing, restoration, power and propagation, so there are seven distinct modes of sanctifying grace, each the result of a distinct sacrament.

Summary. Our purpose has been to demonstrate that the theory of sacramental grace as a mode of sanctifying grace is not only in conformity with the known teaching of the Angelic Doctor concerning the nature of this grace but is in complete harmony with his doctrine concerning sacramental signification and causality.

In order to accomplish this end it was necessary, first of all, to study the writings of St. Thomas to determine as precisely as possible his teaching regarding sacramental grace. Our study of these texts led us to the conclusion that, although he did not explicitly describe the precise nature of this grace, he taught that it makes a real addition to sanctifying grace; is really distinct from the latter grace; is diversified by the diversity of ends to which it is ordained; and, finally, that it is permanent and intrinsic.

The problem which confronted his commentators in trying to find the nature of this grace was to explain the diversity of sacramental effects while safeguarding the unicity of sanctifying grace. Moreover, in doing so, if their doctrine was to be truly a Thomistic doctrine, it had likewise to preserve the known teaching of St. Thomas concerning the qualities of this

[135] Héris, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

grace. The theory of sacramental grace as a mode of sanctifying grace is generally regarded as the only theory which successfully fulfilled these requirements.

Our main task was the solution of a problem which seems somewhat neglected by those who have espoused this theory of sacramental grace: can the existence and diversity of the modes which constitute sacramental grace be explained through the known principles of Thomistic sacramental theology? In answering this question it was essential to explain how mode was necessarily connected with instrumentality. This involved a consideration of the nature and origin of modes and the role of efficient instruments in their production. Secondly, it was necessary to expound and defend the teaching of St. Thomas that the sacraments are true efficient instruments in the production of sanctifying grace. Finally, since divine power is not limited by natural forms, it was necessary to explain how this instrumentality when united by the sacramental essence to the practical sign of the supernatural effect has for its proper form the signification. The sign, having a direct proportion to the supernatural effect, leaves in the sanctifying grace produced through the sacramental instrument a mode commensurate to the signification.

As the following conclusions indicate, the theory of sacramental grace as a mode of sanctifying grace preserves the teaching of St. Thomas concerning this grace and is the logical consequence of his doctrine on sacramental signification and causality.

1. The doctrine of an intrinsic mode accounts for the existence of formally distinct sacramental effects. In the genus of sacramental grace, the intrinsic mode of sanctifying grace caused by the various sacraments is something formally distinct and hence constitutes an accidental species.

2. This doctrine explains how there can be a real distinction between sacramental grace and sanctifying grace without destroying the essential unity of this latter grace. The distinction

between a mode and the subject it modifies is not a numerical one, *ut res a re*, but an inadequate distinction. There is no reason therefore to suppose the existence of entitatively distinct habits to explain the reality of this distinction.

3. The addition which sacramental grace makes to sanctifying grace according to this teaching is both a real and a positive one, namely an intrinsic mode, and furnishes a basis for the distinction between sacramental and extrasacramental justification.

4. This mode, being both intrinsic and permanent, explains how sacramental grace can accomplish the special acts necessary in the Christian life and the removal of the defects of sin which have a permanent effect upon man's nature. Nor does this doctrine exclude the conferring of actual graces at the proper time for the performance of other actions necessary in attaining the ends of the various sacraments.

5. Although St. Thomas did not elaborate on the nature of this grace, the doctrine of an intrinsic mode is intimately joined to his teaching regarding the nature of sacramental signification and causality and gives meaning to his statement that the sacraments cause what they signify. The mode is, in the effect produced in the soul of the recipient, the very link between these two facets of the sacramental reality.

ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies,
St. Rose Priory
Dubuque, Iowa

THE NATURAL, TERRESTRIAL END OF MAN

THIS article is written to establish the existence in the philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas of a coherent teaching on the natural end of man. That teaching is to this effect: that man has a natural, terrestrial, ultimate end (Aristotle) which, although supremely good in the natural order, is imperfect relatively to man's supernatural end (Aquinas).

This position is one that is almost native to the balanced Christian intellect. Even recent Catholic critics of the natural end of man [1] have not directly questioned it. They have been concerned to show that man has no natural end in the *next* life. There is no discussion here of any such end. What is proposed here is that man has a natural end achievable in the present life. It is assumed that he has a supernatural end achievable in the next life.

I. Aristotle

1. *Man has a natural, terrestrial end.*

That man has a natural end in this life, and that its constituents are rationally determinable, are two of the major conclusions of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.* The existence of some ultimate end in this life is the point of Book One; the final determination of the constituents of that end is the point of the last half of Book Ten. Most of the intervening books are concerned with the means to that end, namely, intellectual and moral virtue.

That the end of man envisioned by Aristotle is natural, not supernatural, is but a corollary to the fact that he is a pagan, and not of the Judaic-Christian dispensations. That this end should refer to the present life, unlike the closing myth of

[1] Henri de Lubac, *Surnaturel* (Paris: Aubier, 1945); Joseph Buckley, *Man's Last End* (St. Louis: Herder, 1949).

Plato's *Republic,* arises from Aristotle's uncertainty about any future life.[2] Better, he would judge, to be clear about the meaning and purpose of this life of which one is sure, than to occupy oneself analyzing an end postulated in some future life of which one is unsure. There is much to be said for this hard-headed attitude, granted his religious situation. It is therefore within the framework of the natural and terrestrial that Aristotle establishes the existence of some end for man.

a) *The existence of the end:*

Aristotle's argument proving the existence of a natural, ultimate end in this life is characteristically pointed. A means is chosen for the sake of something else, but an end is chosen for its own sake. If there were no end, but means only, then everything would be chosen for the sake of something else, to infinity [3]—so that nothing would ever be chosen. Rephrased, the argument is this: a means is a relative thing. There can be no means except as bearing on some end. If nothing is loved for its own sake (end), then nothing will be loved for the sake of it (means). To say that there is no end, is to imply there are no means, for the end is the reason of the means. That we employ no means is so clearly contrary to human experience as to need no comment.

Any objection based on intermediate ends misses the point. Such an end partakes of the formalities both of end and of means: it is desired both for its own sake (end) and in reference to a further end (means). Insofar as it is itself an end loved for its sake it justifies the argument of the preceding paragraph: there is some end. Insofar as it is a means it also bears out the preceding argument, because a means is loved in reference to a further good loved for itself alone. As means implies end, so the intermediate end implies an ultimate end.[4]

[2] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* I, II; 1101^{b} 22-1101^{a} 8; *De anima,* I, 4; 408^{b}, 18-29; II, 2; 413^{b} 24-27.

[3] Aristotle, *Ethics,* I, 2; 1094^{a} 17-21.

[4] *Ibid.,* I, 7; 1097^{a} 30-35.

b) *There is only one end:*

However many constitutive goods may enter into this ultimate end, it is itself one only. For the ultimate end is the realm of the good in itself, loved for itself. So if wisdom is good and lovable in itself, and virtue is good and lovable in itself, and friendship is good and lovable in itself, then happiness, the end, is not any one or two of these things, but all three: and not these three alone but these together with whatever else may enter into the good for man. For the good that is the end, or human happiness, is that collectivity of all things humanly good. Since it is all-inclusive it can have no competitor.[5]

c) *All men have the same end:*

Man's end is one not only in the sense that there is no plurality of ultimate ends for any given man, but also in the sense that all men have the same end. That is, "happiness" has an objective meaning. It is true that some men locate terrestrial happiness in wealth, others in pleasure, still others in power, a few in virtue, and so on. But a philosophical analysis is not a sociological report. What men do in fact seek as their end may have regrettably little correlation with what their nature objectively requires.

All men do have the same specific nature, and therefore the same set of needs. All men, for example, need to move about in air rather than under the water. Hence what is fatal to a fish is good to man. Similarly, all men need food to eat, love to respond to, virtue to practice, truth to think upon, a society predicated upon the responsible freedom of each. Because we all have the same nature and, consequently, the same objective needs, it will be the same set of good things (happiness, the end) which will satisfy those needs.[6]

2. *The constituents of the natural end.*

a) *The goods:*

What is that set of good things which constitutes man's end

[5] *Ibid.*, I, 7; 1097^{b} 18-22. [6] *Ibid.*, I, 7; 1097^{b} 23-1098^{a} 17.

by satisfying the objective needs of his nature? Looking at man roundly, as intellect, will, heart and body, it is clear that he needs, and that as a result his end must include, wisdom and the other intellectual virtues; the moral virtues; love, friendship, honor, some degree of power and the other social goods; reasonable bodily pleasure and health; and the financial means to sustain modestly the kind of life here described. He needs, to be brief, goods of soul (intellectual and moral virtue); social goods (friendship and the good society); goods of body (pleasure and health); and external goods (moderate wealth). The collectivity of these is his end achieved.[7]

b) *Hierarchy:*

But man's end is not an indiscriminate collection of these goods, it is the hierarchically ordered collection of them. For man is a tension of diverse powers which are in themselves not co-ordinated but hierarchically ordered. The powers of his nutritive life are subordinate to those of his animal life; [8] the powers of his animal life are subordinate to those of his rational life; [9] and among his rational powers intellect is superior to will.[10] The goods corresponding to these grades of life have, as constituents of man's terrestrial end, a corresponding hierarchy. External goods, such as wealth, are subordinate to his vital needs, such as health; any reasonable man cheerfully pays for medical care. The goods of his vegetal life are in turn less important than the reasonable demands of his animal life, such as bodily pleasure: those partial to vitamin pills may postpone them to continue the keen joy of a tennis game. Animal passions in turn are evidently subordinate to the will: one may yield to desire only to the degree that it is morally commendable to do so. The will in its turn is subordinate to the intellect, in the way the appetitive is subordinate to the cognitive, namely, as that with a less extended object (being as good) is sub-

[7] *Ibid.*, I, 8; 1098^{b} 9-1099^{b} 8; X, 8; 1178^{a} 8-1179^{a} 33.
[8] *Ibid.*, I, 7; 1097^{b} 34-1098^{a} 2.
[9] *Ibid.*, I, 7; 1098^{a} 2-5.
[10] *Ibid.*, X, 7; 1177^{a} 12-23.

ordinate to that with a more universal object (being as true).[11] Hence rational goods are superior to moral goods, the contemplative life to the active.

Aristotle's view of the constituents of man's natural, terrestrial end may be summarized as follows:

1. External goods		wealth
2. Goods of the body	as nutritive	health
	as sentient	pleasure
3. Social goods		love, friendship, honor, power, etc.
4. Goods of the soul	as will	moral virtues
	as intellect	contemplation and other intellectual virtues.

Happiness on this earth consists in attaining each of the goods appearing at the right of the above diagram; and attaining them in the order indicated (ascending importance). It is not any single good, such as contemplation, which is the end, but the hierarchically ordered collectivity. Wealth, in itself a means, must be counted as a constituent of the end on the realistic assumption that it is indispensably implicated in some, if not all, of the other constituents. However otherwise noble he may be, the destitute beggar is not the model of human joy.

3. *Essential and integral happiness.*

Virtue, both intellectual and moral, occupies a position of unique importance among the goods which constitute happiness. Whenever happiness is defined in the *Ethics*, it is defined in terms of contemplation and moral virtue: happiness is operation of soul springing from the perfection of virtue.[12] The seventh chapter of the tenth book all but identifies perfect happiness with contemplation,[13] and the eighth chapter of the same book seems to equate human happiness with moral virtue.[14] Moreover, four complete books—almost half on the

[11] *Ibid.*, VI, 2; 1039ª 21-32.
[12] *Ibid.*, I, 7; 1098ª 16-18; I, 13; 1102ª 5; X, 7; 1177ª 12.
[13] *Ibid.*, X, 7; 1177ª 18.
[14] *Ibid.*, X, 8; 1178ª 8.

Ethics—are devoted to an analysis of virtue. The conclusion is inescapable: essentially happiness consists in contemplation (the highest of the intellectual virtues) and moral virtue.

Yet integrally considered, happiness includes also the social goods, goods of body and external goods, such as a modicum of wealth. Not only are these good for man in themselves, and therefore necessarily included in his end, but they are indispensably required for contemplation and virtue. It is obvious, for example, that the life of moral virtue presupposes the social goods: it is hard to conceive justice where there are no fellow men. Equally, it supposes wealth; the poverty-stricken cannot be generous. It supposes also health: the sickly cannot be courageous in warfare for they will never be admitted to basic training. Even the contemplative life presupposes minimum means, such health as to sustain thought, friendships to spark and to encourage the more or less solitary responsibility of thought.[15] Pleasure is inseparable from the acquisition of any good, even the intellectual and the moral.[16] If goods of soul are essential happiness, all the others—social, bodily, external—are still required for the integrity of happiness.

In the light of this distinction between essential and integral happiness, the problem,[17] whether happiness is predicable only of human life as a whole, or of its separate moments, becomes soluble. If happiness means integral happiness, this is predicable only of life as a whole. One cannot, for example, be engaged in philosophic contemplation and, at the same time, be generously helping another. The reason for this is that human life is successive, not simultaneous. Hence its perfecting crown, the collectivity of all human graces, is also successively attained.

But if, on the other hand, happiness means essential happiness, the life of wisdom and virtue, then it is predicable of each moment of one's adult life. For intellectual and moral virtue, once acquired, are permanent qualities of the soul, shaping our

[15] *Ibid.*, X, 7-8; 1177[a] 11-1179[b] 33.
[16] *Ibid.*, X, 5; 1175[a] 22-1176[a] 29.
[17] *Ibid.*, I, 10; 1100[a] 10-1101[a] 20.

attitudes and actions at each moment, including the moment of the loss of the lesser goods required for integral happiness.

4. *The primacy of contemplation.*

Granted that happiness is essentially virtue, which kind of virtue is it—moral, intellectual, both? If both, in what order? Plato had answered that question in the myth of the cave.[18] The fulfilled human life, he had said, has two moments: contemplation followed by action. After having withdrawn to the vision of the pure " sun " of intelligibility, the form of the Good, one must return to this shadow land of terrestrial compromise between reality and unreality, in order to lead one's fellow man to the vision one has oneself already enjoyed; or, failing that, to lead him to a life not inconsistent with that vision. For Plato there is no " either-or " as between contemplation and action, which latter is the realm of virtue. It is rather a question of action based on contemplation.

Aristotle's eventual answer agrees with Plato's. But the various steps in reaching that agreement are of moment. Characteristically, the first part of Aristotle's answer is highly analytical. That first part is this: in the order of specification, the contemplative life is superior to the active. His reasons are two. First, reason is higher than will, with the result that the life of reason is higher than the life according to will. Especially is this the case when it is a question of reason's highest perfection, namely, wisdom or contemplation. Second, the object of the contemplative reason is the highest being, whereas the object of moral virtue is the specifically human, either one's self (courage and temperance) or other men (justice). In brief, happiness means the perfection of man's specific nature. But man is specifically intellectual. Hence his happiness, his end, lies in intellectual fulfillment, of which the highest instance is wisdom or contemplation.[19]

This conclusion is no instance of a philosopher's complacent self-satisfaction. It is rather a call to an intense effort of sus-

[18] Plato, *Republic*, VII; 514-521.
[19] Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7; 1177[a] 12-19.

tained concentration, a demand that one free oneself from laziness, from devotion to pleasure, from love of routine, from established habits of thought. We must not, Aristotle warns us, heed those who counsel homocentricity, who urge that the proper study of man is man. We may be merely human, merely mortal, but there is that in us, namely, the contemplative reason, which is supra-human, and we must tense ourselves to live according to it.[20]

Not infrequently Aristotle is his own best critic because in him genius for philosophical analysis is balanced by a strong strain of empirical common sense. So, having called men to the contemplative life in the name of an analysis of their nature, he immediately adds a reservation. To live according to contemplative reason is life not according to man's composite nature, but according to a supra-human element of that nature. It is divine rather than human life.[21] The kind of life specifically suited to man's composite nature is the life of *moral* virtue, and this is happiness in a secondary sense.[22]

Of man as intellect (man in the order of specification) contemplation is the proper end. Of man as man (man in the order of exercise) the life of moral virtue is the proper end, as is clear from the facts of life; for these are the court of final appeal in practical matters.[23] This neat distinction—man as intellect and man as man—is suspect by virtue of its very neatness. For is not man, in his very manhood, intellectual? Must there not be some meeting point of the two ends, contemplation and virtue?

Prudence is the meeting point. Moral virtue is based on prudence,[24] so that prudence is materially moral. But it is formally intellectual. It requires wisdom or contemplation both at its beginning and at its end. At its beginning, because knowing how to achieve the end (prudence) presupposes knowl-

[20] *Ibid.*, X, 7; 1177^{b} 30-1178^{a} 1.
[21] *Ibid.*, X, 7; 1177^{b} 25-30.
[22] *Ibid.*, X, 8; 1178^{a} 8-10.
[23] *Ibid.*, X, 8; 1179^{a} 20.
[24] *Ibid.*, X, 8; 1078^{a} 16-18; VI, 5; 1140^{a} 24-1140^{b} 30.

edge of man, of his end, and of his present metaphysical situation, all of which pertain to contemplation. At its end, because prudence, through morally virtuous action, leads to that happiness of which contemplation is the highest constituent.[25] Hence the life of moral virtue flows from and to the contemplative life through prudence. In Aristotle, as in Plato, happiness is a morally virtuous life based on contemplation. Yet there is order between the two. Contemplation is prior to moral virtue in the order of specification, and moral virtue is prior to contemplation in the order of exercise.

5. Is the natural end attainable?

An end normally unattainable is no end at all. Is it concretely possible for most adults to have a sufficiency of economic goods, to have health, reasonable pleasure, love, honor, esteem and the other social goods, moral virtue and contemplation? And to have each in the right proportion, relatively to each other good? Can the insane contemplate? Can the emotionally maladjusted secure the social goods? Can the incurably ill be healthy? Can the proletariat have sufficient economic goods? Is the Aristotelian end an end?

It is clear that whole groups of persons are excluded from one or other of the goods required for integral happiness. The ill are not healthy, the poor are not moderately wealthy. To put the matter another way, the possession of integral happiness depends, in part, on factors beyond our own control. Whether one is honored and loved (social goods) depends, in part, on the generosity of others. Whether one has health depends, in part, on the pooling of medical research, and the availability of medical services. Whether one has modest wealth depends, in part, on the economic organization of society. Other people, society at large, and chance [26] play a large part in the achievement or non-achievement of integral happiness.

[25] *Ibid.*, VI, 12; 1144a 4-11.
[26] *Ibid.*, I, 10; 1100a 10-1101a 20.

But the achievement of essential happiness, of the contemplative spirit and of virtuous habits depends upon oneself,[27] at least when one surrounds it with the qualification Aristotle was careful to employ; namely, that each of us must live according to the noblest element of his nature so far as that is concretely possible in each individual case.[28] To develop a contemplative bent of mind so far as our native endowment permits—this is open to all, even to the retarded, and even to the insane during their lucid periods. To be virtuous according to our capacities—even the least gifted of men knows this to be in his power. Integral happiness is, taking life as a whole, to be hoped for; but essential happiness is to be attained by one's own efforts. Each may achieve this end in a way filling up his individual nature. The degrees of essential happiness are objectively varied, but each is subjectively satisfying.

More than that. The absence of integral happiness is but a sterner call to the acquisition of essential happiness. Essential happiness can transform the absence of integral happiness into strength, gentleness, compassion. One cannot avoid separation from those one loves; but the lonely are not necessarily joyless. There are happy men who have heart trouble. One can be worried about finances, or better, two can be, and yet live joyously. It is unrealistic to deny that lesser goods enhance essential happiness. It is pathetic to deny that, where intelligence and moral strength are found, vigorous joy is possible however calamitous other factors may be.[29]

There is one lingering doubt—a doubt of which Christians, not the least among them St. Thomas Aquinas, were later to make capital at Aristotle's expense. It is this: happiness, the end, should exhaust the thirst for good; it should be something which definitively quiets desire.[30] Now, suppose we had attained the Aristotelian end: would our desiderative capacities have been quieted? Suppose we had attained to that ordered set of goods which is integral happiness: would it constitute an

[27] *Ibid.*, X, 7; 1177[a] 28-1177[b] 1.
[28] *Ibid.*, X, 7; 1177[b] 30-1178[a] 1.
[29] *Ibid.*, I, 19; 1100[b] 18-20, 28-33.
[30] *Ibid.*, I, 10; 1101[a] 18.

ultimate end? When we have attained what Aristotle proposes, is it happiness that we have attained?

One must distinguish. Such a man would have human happiness, but not absolute or supra-human happiness.[31] This simple distinction is pregnant with wisdom. It implies, first, that happiness is an analogical, and not a univocal, concept. The happiness of a rational spirit which is the form of a body is not univocally identical with the happiness of a pure spirit. Man must look for *human* happiness, not for angelic or divine. It implies, second, that a certain discipline of the will in the matter of happiness is called for. So long as one stays within the natural order, and for obvious reasons Aristotle was committed to staying there, velleities for supra-human happiness must be treated with the same sternness that is accorded other velleities. To desire the concretely impossible is madness. To rejoice in the concretely attainable, which in this case is the full perfection of human nature, is a part of wisdom.

This distinction between human happiness and absolute happiness implies, finally, that the Aristotelian happiness is one proportioned to human nature. It is nothing less than perfect *human* happines. To allege that a proportionate end is not an end because it is proportionate could elicit only one Aristotelian response—the silence of scorn.

II. St. Thomas Aquinas

1. *The criticism of the natural end.*

St. Thomas seems to be opposed to the position that man can have an ultimate end which is natural and terrestrial. No created good, and no set of created goods can, he argues, constitute happiness. For happiness connotes the definitive quieting of desire. Now what the will desires is goodness itself which can be found not in any created good or set of created goods, and only in God. Since God alone can satisfy man's will, He alone constitutes man's happiness.[32] Analyzing the

[31] *Ibid.*, I, 10; 1101[a] 19-20.

[32] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 2, a. 8.

Aristotelian view that man has a natural, terrestrial end consisting not in absolute happiness but in happiness proportioned to human nature, Aquinas remarks that, given such a view, it is small wonder that great minds such as Aristotle's suffered from the confinement of this opinion.[33] For even if the end Aristotle proposed were achieved, restlessness would prevail in man, since such an end would not fill up his need for absolute goodness. A limited set of limited goods cannot satisfy man's will; it is, therefore, no end.

This argument rests on the nature of the will, in which connection it is useful to recall a few of Aquinas' own reservations. The intellect is, of its nature, made for truth; but it is not, solely of its own natural powers, made for the Beatific Vision. Similarly the will is, of itself, ordained to goodness; but it is not ordained, solely of its own natural powers, to the Trinity as It is in Itself. The desire of the will for goodness itself is natural, innate, necessary. But the desire of the will for the vision of God as He is in Himself is, on the contrary elicited, free, conditioned and inefficacious.[34] At the very least, then, the natural desire of man's will for good cannot be arbitrarily identified with the desire for God. So momentous a question is not to be settled by a brief sentence or two from Aquinas: his whole attitude to the natural end must be explored. That attitude was well summarized by the late Father Walter Farrell, O. P. in a little-noted article a decade ago.[35] Man's last end in the natural order cannot, Father Farrell pointed out, consist in the contemplation of God, for this is supernatural. The exercise of the natural speculative virtues is the highest natural good, but cannot be the natural end, because it it *a* good, not *the* good. Similarly the common good is the highest social good, but not the natural end because it too is a partial good. The natural terrestrial end of man, natural happi-

[33] *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 48.

[34] Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *The One God* (St. Louis: Herder, 1943), pp. 318-325.

[35] Walter Farrell, "The Person and the Common Good in a Democracy," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XX (1945), 42-43.

ness, must consist then in the successive possession of all the things good for man over his whole life, by means of virtue.

2. *Man has a natural, terrestrial end.*

That man has a natural, terrestrial ultimate end as well as a supernatural, celestial ultimate end is the constant teaching of Aquinas. Man's happiness, his end, is, Thomas proposes repeatedly, twofold. One end is natural: that is, it is proportioned to human nature, and it can be be obtained by man's own effort. The other end is supernatural: that is, it altogether surpasses man's nature and can be obtained only by the power of God.[36] The first is studied by the philosopher, the second by the theologian. It is in this way principally that moral philosophy differs from moral theology. Moral philosophy ought to be a natural ethics directed to a natural end, whereas moral theology ought to be supernatural ethics directed to a supernatural end.[37]

To say that man's end, which is happiness or beatitude is of two kinds is not to imply that the natural end is ultimate in precisely the same sense that the supernatural end is ultimate. The concept of happiness as applied to nature and supernature, and also, within supernature, as applied to God and created intellects, is not univocal but analogical. Consider a parallel case. The intellect has two objects, adequate and proper. The adequate object of the human intellect, that is to say, the object of the human intellect *as intellect* is being. But the proper object of the human intellect, that is to say, the object of the human intellect *as human* is the quiddity of corporeal substances. Similarly the object of human happiness *as happiness* is the Beatific Vision. But the object of human happiness *as human* is that hierarchy of goods which Aristotle proposed.

[36] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 1; cf. also I, q. 62, a. 1.

[37] *I Ethic.*, lect. 9; cf. also *de Verit.*, q. 14, aa. 2, 3. One is not unmindful that so notable a Thomist as M. Maritain has, by proposing what he calls "moral philosophy adequately considered" called this way of understanding of St. Thomas into serious question. The evaluation of M. Maritain's position is, however, a problem distinct from the present one.

Thus Aquinas makes his own Aristotle's capital distinction between absolute happiness and proportionate happiness, applying the first to the supernatural, celestial end and the second to the natural, terrestrial end.[38] It is because the natural end is proportionate to man's nature that it can be achieved by his own efforts.[39] That man has a terrestrial ultimate end, proportioned or connatural to him, as well as a supernatural ultimate end is amply evident in numerous other places in Aquinas.[40]

3. *The constituents of man's natural, terrestrial end.*

a) *The goods:*

St. Thomas proposes no angelistic view on the terrestrial end as consisting exclusively in some kind of contemplation. He agrees [41] rather with the soundly humanistic view of Aristotle,[42] Cicero [43] and Newman [44] that food is better for a hungry man than metaphysics: and even happy men become hungry—perhaps especially happy men. Happiness is an ordered collectivity of goods, humble and sublime, answering the enormous diversity of human needs.

First he makes it quite clear that the natural end, terrestrial happiness, consists not in any single good, but in an ordered collection of good things. It has parts,[45] each part being one of those goods which collectively constitute happiness.[46]

Next he spells out the precise collection of good things which constitute this end; namely, external goods, such as wealth; goods of body, such as health; and goods of soul, such as

[38] *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 48; cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4.

[39] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 5, a. 5; cf. also *de Virtut. in Comm.*, q. unica, a. 10, ad 1.

[40] For example, *de Verit.*, q. 27, a. 2; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 23, a. 1; I-II, q. 62, a. 3; q. 91, a. 4.

[41] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 32, a. 3.

[42] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 982^{b}, 22-24.

[43] Cicero, *On Moral Duties*, I, 4.

[44] John Henry Newman, *Idea of A University*, V, 3.

[45] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 2, a. 2.

[46] *Ibid.*, a. 6.

contemplation and moral virtue [47]—substantially the same set of goods Aristotle proposed.

Aquinas establishes the necessity of including each of these goods among the constituents of happiness. Contemplation, or wisdom, is required, and required in the very first place, for the obvious reason that man is an intellectual substance.[48] But the natural end also requires the more specifically human happiness of the active life; that is, of the life of moral virtue. The contemplative life is primary, the active life of virtue is secondary, terrestrial happiness [49] because man's intelligence is practical, and therefore action—directive, as well as speculative. But the practical is subordinate to the speculative. Happiness must include also the social goods, particularly human love, as its third element. The happy man needs friends not for the sake of utility or of pleasure, but he needs them because the generous love of others, for their own sake, is one of the implications of human nature. He needs them in order that he may be good to them; be strengthened himself by their excellence and love for him. One needs human love to sustain either the active or the contemplative life, and certainly to sustain the life which partakes both of contemplation and of action.[50] The integrity of human terrestrial happiness calls also for goods of body and for modest wealth. Bodily well-being is needed because happiness is operation according to the perfection of virtue, both intellectual and moral. But bodily imperfections can hinder every operation of virtue.[51] Wealth is an instrumental constituent of the natural end, to supply the needs of a well-disposed body, to enable him to fulfill social obligations, to establish such moral virtues as generosity as concretely possible, and to free him, so far as necessary, for contemplation.[52]

[47] *Ibid.*, a. 7, ad. 1.
[48] *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 5; cf. also *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 44.
[49] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 5; cf. also *de Verit.*, q. 18, a. 7, ad 7.
[50] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 8.
[51] *Ibid.*, a. 6; cf. also q. 3, a. 3 ad 3; q. 4, a. 5.
[52] *Ibid.*, q. 4, a. 7.

b) *The hierarchy of the goods:*

As in Aristotle, these categories of goods are required not coordinately, but according to a hierarchical ordering, corresponding to the hierarchy of human powers. Contemplation is first, and moral virtue second.[53] Social goods, such as friendship, are third,[54] then goods of body[55] and finally external goods.[56] That goods of body are superior to external goods is clear from the fact that life is superior to non-life. That social goods are superior to bodily goods follows from the superiority of the human to the merely vital. Virtue is superior to social goods by as much as the moral order exceeds the social. Contemplation is, in the order of specification, superior to virtue because intellect is superior to will.

c) *Integral and essential happiness:*

Goods of soul are more immediately constitutive of the natural end than social goods, goods of body or external goods. For these latter are good not only in themselves but also instrumentally, as being required for contemplation and virtue, as is clear from the way Aquinas established their inclusion in the complete natural good. It is the good of the soul, wisdom and virtue which constitutes happiness essentially.[57] Hence all the other goods pertain to the integrity, not to the essence, of happiness, which is why happiness can be retained even in their absence.

d) *Primacy of contemplation:*

The position of Aquinas on the relative dignity of the two goods of the soul, contemplation or wisdom, and virtue, is as complex as Aristotle's position on the same question.

In the first place, in the order of specification contemplation is superior to moral virtue, the contemplative life superior to the active life.[58]

In the order of exercise, however, the active life, the life of

[53] *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 5.
[54] *Ibid.*, a. 8.
[55] *Ibid.*, a. 6.
[56] *Ibid.*, a. 7.
[57] *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 7, ad 1.
[58] *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 44.

moral virtue, is more specifically human, and in that sense more suitable to man, than the contemplative.[59] Nobler, however, than either the contemplative life or the active life is the mixed life: the life of action, of moral virtue, springing from contemplation. Hence while contemplation is prior to action, the union of the two is higher than either separately.[60]

4. *Relation of the natural end to the supernatural end.*

a) *The natural end is objectively inferior to the supernatural end:*

It is already clear that St. Thomas teaches that, however excellent the natural end may be, considered in itself, still it is highly imperfect as compared to the supernatural end. "Imperfect happiness" is the usual Thomistic synonym for the natural end. This is, of course, an obvious corollary from metaphysics. The creature is real, does exist; yet comparatively to God is as if it were not. Similarly the creature's connatural end is genuinely excellent; yet comparatively to God who is the creature's supernatural end, is as if it were nothing. What is highest in the natural order may still be incommensurable with the supernatural order. It is easy to stress the goodness of the natural end and to neglect its relative poverty and thereby to run the risk of moral homocentrism. It is also easy to stress the relative nothingness of the natural end and to neglect its superlative natural goodness, and thereby to run the risk of denying a natural moral order. The balanced position, which is the position of Aquinas among others, is this: that the natural end is a genuine end, the highest natural value of human life, embracing in ordered fashion every human good; and yet that same end is imperfect relatively to that Divine Happiness which God has gratuitously invited men to share. The natural end is true *human* happiness, but not happiness according to its absolute character—an Aristotelian distinc-

[59] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 4 and ad 4; II-II, q. 51, a. 1, ad 2; *de Verit.*, q. 18, a. 7, ad 7.

[60] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 182, a. 2.

tion [61] which Aquinas never tires of repeating. *Human* happiness is natural and terrestrial, whereas *absolute* happiness is supernatural and celestial.[62]

The natural end is to the supernatural as the imperfect to the perfect. It is simply not absolute happiness, but it is human happiness. That man should have been invited to live hereafter a life of absolute hapiness overshadows without obliterating the fact that he is also invited to live here a life of human happiness.

b) *Yet the natural end is genuinely ultimate:*

Granted that man's natural end, which is terrestrial happiness, is objectively inferior to that Beatific Vision which is his supernatural end, then is the natural end, which Aquinas habitually calls " imperfect happiness," an ultimate end? How can the imperfect be ultimate? One can sharpen the question even further. Does the phrase " imperfect happiness " have any meaning? Would not the imperfectness of imperfect happiness cancel out the happiness of it? Would not the degree of happiness wanting to imperfect happiness make us so unhappy as to poison the presumed happiness?

The phrase " imperfect happiness " bears analysis. For a thing may be imperfect either in itself or relatively to some other, and higher, thing. A horse which has hoof and mouth disease is imperfect in itself. But a perfect specimen of a horse is still imperfect relatively to man, inasmuch as it lacks intelligence.

Now the natural happiness which is man's terrestrial end is perfect relatively to him whose end it is. That is to say, it is happiness proportioned to the nature of man. It is happiness, as Aquinas repeatedly points out, *as human.* The same happiness is imperfect from another point of view; namely, relatively to that super-human, supernatural happiness which is naturally proportioned to God alone. This latter is happiness as happi-

[61] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 10.

[62] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 6 and ad 1; q. 5, a. 3 and ad 1; *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 4, ad 3; *I Ethic.*, lect. 16.

ness, not as human. Hence the phrase " imperfect happiness " does not imply that something is lacking to make man happy, but only that something is lacking to make God happy: and, of course, to make man happy insofar as he is, not man, but man participating in the nature of God. It would be absolute falsehood to pretend that man as he is, fallen but redeemed, could find perfect happiness in the natural end. It would, equally, be absolute falsehood to pretend that this incapacity for happiness in the natural end arises from man's nature, for it arises from super-nature in him.

Because man is relatively imperfect—not being itself, but a *human* being—so his natural end is relatively imperfect—not happiness itself, but *human* happiness. But this end is ultimate, absolutely ultimate, in the natural, human order. The relative imperfection of man's natural end is no more an argument against its ultimacy than the relative imperfection of man's being is an argument against his existence. That this is Aquinas' position can be made clear from four arguments.

i. *The argument from the natural moral order.*

There can be no doubt that Aquinas held the existence of a natural order of morality: natural law, natural virtues, natural duties and rights. This natural morality is discoverable by reason, and is analyzed by philosophers. There can be no doubt, either, that Aquinas viewed the whole moral realm as suspended from the end. Morals is a series of corollaries from the principle of finality. Unless there be an achievable end, there is no morality. Thus he sums up all of morals as a study of the end of man, the means to that end, namely, human actions and the principles of those actions, both intrinsic, namely, passions and habits and extrinsic, namely, law and, in the case of supernaturally good acts, grace.[63]

Now if there is a natural moral order, then there is a natural end, since any moral order flows from its end. It will not do to hedge by saying that there is a natural moral order with

[63] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, the end, qq. 1-5; human actions, qq. 6-21; passion, qq. 24-48; habits, qq. 49-89; law, qq. 90-108; grace, qq. 109-114.

a natural end, which however is only an intermediate end. For an intermediate end is not an end, simply speaking, it is a means—end. Hence any moral order which flows from it is as precarious, as ambivalent as the end itself. An end which is not altogether an end can be the foundation only of a morality which is not altogether moral. Either there is a natural ultimate end and as a result a natural moral order, or else all non-believers in the supernatural end are condemned to moral scepticism. A stable natural moral order presupposes a natural end that is stably an end.

ii. *The argument from Limbo.*

That a purely natural end is most genuinely an end, in millions of cases the *only* end, is clear from Aquinas' treatment of infants who die before baptism can be administered, and who therefore do not enjoy the Beatific Vision. Speaking of these souls Aquinas points out that a rational person is not saddened by the lack of that which is in no way due to him, by the lack of that which altogether exceeds any proportion to his nature. Most adults do not grieve over their incapacity to fly like a sea-gull or to exercise the political power of an emperor. One is saddened only by losing that for which he has an aptitude. Hence the unbaptized infant's state is one of pure rejoicing in what he has, namely, possession of the end in a way suited to a separated soul.[64] They are not saddened by the lack of the Beatific Vision because, quite simply, they do not know what they are missing. That man was created for this vision of God is an item of supernatural, not of natural knowledge. It pertains to natural knowledge to know that man was made for beatitude, that is, for the attainment of perfect good. But perfect good can, and in the case of unbaptized infants does, have a purely natural, yet completely satisfying meaning.[65]

This argument, taken in itself, does not establish that natural terrestrial happiness is a genuine end for those who achieve moral responsibility. What it does emphatically establish is

[64] *II Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2. [65] *De Malo*, q. 5, a. 3.

this: that there is no contradiction between "happiness" and "imperfect"; further, that there is no contradiction between "imperfect happiness" and "ultimate end." If there is no contradiction between these notes, then it is at least possible that natural, terrestrial happiness should be a genuine ultimate end, since for some—unbaptized infants—natural happiness is the only ultimate end.

iii. *The argument from the proportion between end and nature.*

The natural end of each thing corresponds to the nature of the thing: the happiness of a man is not the happiness of an angel or of a dog. Hence the connatural happiness of the Absolute Being is absolute happiness, but the connatural end of man is happiness, not absolute but human.

Man is an imperfect being. That is to say, there are grades of reality which man does not include within himself: he lacks, for example, the being of an angel, or of God. Even if he were perfect according to his kind or in his own order, he would still be imperfect, in the absolute order. Hence it is not a fact, merely, but a necessary fact that his end, his natural perfection, should be imperfect, should be happiness according to his kind or order but not absolute happiness. That which is ultimate in the human order is still imperfect in the absolute order. So the ultimate natural end or perfection of man is of necessity imperfect happiness. Philosophically viewed, the problem is not, how can imperfect happiness be man's ultimate end? For that is not a problem but a necessary truth. The problem is—given Christianity—how can an imperfect being possibly have perfect happiness as his (supernatural) end? And the answer is that, philosophically speaking, he cannot. It is not insofar as man is human that perfect happiness is his ultimate end, but insofar as he is divinized, a sharer in the divine nature. From the philosophical point of view man's ultimate end could not be anything except imperfect happiness.

iv. *The argument from Aquinas' language.*

Whatever problems the fact may create, it is a fact that

Aquinas speaks habitually of man's twofold ultimate end; of his twofold felicity; of his twofold ultimate good; of his twofold happiness. He simply does not speak, when discussing man's natural end, as if that end were a means, or a proximate end, or an intermediate end. Always it is treated as an ultimate end. Each of these ends, the natural and the supernatural, is in its own order ultimate: though, as has already been pointed out, "ultimate end" is predicated of the natural and the supernatural not univocally, but analogically.

c) *The ordination of ends.*

Granted that St. Thomas does hold the natural end to be genuinely ultimate, there is still the puzzle of how he can do so. Does he not himself hold that it is impossible for man to have more than one last end? For, he argued, the ultimate end must so satisfy man's desiderative capacities as to leave nothing desirable left, else it is not ultimate. Hence there cannot be two last ends unrelated to each other, two last ends without any ordination between them.[66]

Now if Aquinas teaches on the one hand that man has two ultimate ends, and on the other hand that two last ends not ordained to one another are impossible, then this conclusion seems inescapable: that the natural end is somehow ordained to the supernatural end. The problem then becomes this: how can an end which is genuinely ultimate in the natural order be ordained to some further end in the supernatural order?

When the problem is phrased in this way it becomes clear that we are facing a particular instance of a more general problem, the problem of how the natural order is related to the supernatural order.

The general principle of that relationship is that the supernatural does not destroy but perfects the natural. That is, as applied to the present problem, the existence of the supernatural end does not wipe out the natural end, but includes it eminently; that is, includes it formally, affirms it, reinforces it, while transcending it. The supernatural end includes the natural end formally in three different ways. First, as Augustine

[66] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 5.

pointed out,[67] the supernatural end in the next life includes formally all those ordered natural goods which collectively constitute natural happiness. Second, the supernatural end achievable in the next life, by being sought in this life through appropriate supernatural means, aids in the achievement of the natural end. Third, the man who attains in this life the natural end thereby disposes himself, so far as human nature of its own effort may, for the descent of the supernatural, even though he be unconscious of that disposition. The man, for example, who has achieved human wisdom is surely wise enough to have discovered, with Socrates,[68] that human wisdom is largely a discovery of one's ignorance and, therefore, he is open to the possibility of a Revelation from Wisdom Itself. Such a man is in a position to see that faith is not rational, because it *is* suprarational, but not anti-rational.[69]

Yet it cannot be said that the natural end is a means to the supernatural. To say this is to claim at once too little and too much. Too little: because if the natural end were a means to further end, the former would be only an intermediate, not an ultimate end. Too much: because the natural can never be a means to the supernatural as end, since the supernatural is entirely gratuitous.

The more exact thought of Aquinas is this: the natural end is to the supernatural as the imperfect is to the perfect; as that which participates to that in which it participates. The natural end is a disposition to the supernatural end, which means that when a man has achieved fully his terrestrial end then is he most open to the supernatural order. To have achieved *human* happiness is to have discovered that the perfection of human nature is openness to *absolute* happiness. To be thoroughly human is to have cast aside homocentricity. For the perfection of the relative is precisely to be relatively to the absolute.

Manhattan College,
New York, N. Y.

JAMES V. MULLANEY

[67] Augustine, *City of God*, XIX, 10.
[68] Plato, *Apology*, 29.
[69] *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 6.

POETRY, AN IMITATION OF NATURE

Thomistic Principles Clarify an Age-old Problem in Aesthetics

IN aesthetics, as in other fields of practical philosophy, so much ink is spilled over theoretical problems that most readers find their ideas left in a very muddled state. One of the main bones of contention among the critics is the question of Imitation of Nature. Does art really imitate nature, and if so, how? Aristotle, following Plato, popularized the term long ago. Hundreds of critics have used and abused it since. The question is still a burning one: What does Imitation of Nature mean? Is it even philosophically possible to find out?

The answer now, as ever, is to be found in that vast and comprehensive legacy of thought left to us by St. Thomas Aquinas. Thomistic thought in some practical fields—especially in that of ethics and moral conduct—is very specific, not only in laying down general norms but in drawing their applications. In others, a short and busy life left him time only for a systematic treatment of principles, with their application relegated to others. On still other important points of practical philosophy St. Thomas' gems of wisdom are hidden away in an *Ad secundum,* to be ferreted out by the specialists. St. Thomas' reflections on art fall under these two latter heads. In bringing them to bear on the problem at hand it is the author's intention to find concrete applications for them in the field of poetry. It is to be kept in mind, however, that a few faulty applications of these principles do not damage the status of the principles themselves.

I

Imitation of Nature, as an aesthetic question, should first be approached from the historic point of view. Only by seeing what authors have thought and said on the matter can we

realize the force of the problem and evolve our own solution of it.

Plato, with his theory of participation of forms, was the first to venture an opinion on imitation and the artist. It was far from sympathetic, sad to say, although Plato himself was a literary genius. The natural world, said Plato, is only a distant imitation of the subsistent forms. Art, therefore, is the imitation of an imitation—thrice removed from reality!

Aristotle's *Poetics* did not treat the problem quite as conclusively as we might wish, since it dealt only with narrative and dramatic poetry. The Stagirite here lays down the norm that both tragedy and epic are an imitation of men acting. There is a full development of this point, of course, but it is not quite universal enough to be applied in detail to all arts. It is rather in the second book of the *Physics* that Aristotle comes to grips with this larger problem. His statements are the basis of St. Thomas' close analysis, which will be considered shortly.

Longinus, in his essay *On the Sublime,* introduced imitation under a new guise. Imitation, for him, meant following in the footsteps of genius. Three rules sum up his ideal very neatly: strive to rival the greats; imagine how Homer or Sophocles would have expressed your idea; try to envision Homer or some other great poet listening to you recite your poem.

Horace's outlook on poetry in general, and imitation in particular, was typically shrewd and practical rather than broadly philosophical. But some of his Renaissance descendants opened a Pandora's box to all future literary critics, and art critics in general. Julius Scaliger, for example, was of the opinion that " poetry adds a fictitious element to the truth " and that it " fashions images of those things which are not, as well as images more beautiful than life of those which are." [1] Sir Philip Sidney argued that the poet " doth in effect growe another nature, in making things either better than Nature

[1] Scaliger, *Poetics.*

bringeth forth, or quite a new formes such as never were in Nature." He goes on to speak of the poet as one who "goeth hand in hand with Nature, not inclosed within the narrow warrant of her guifts, but freely ranging onely within the Zodiack of his owne wit."[2] Marco Vida told the budding writers of his day that to imitate was to extract, with slight changes, the best verses and most striking images of the ancients. Unfortunately, he was more than taken at his word by the minor writers of the period. The only dissenting voices among the critics of this age seem to have come from the French Pleiade poets, Ronsard and Du Bellay. They are sensible souls who looked to the substance of poetry and were not tripped up by accidentals.

In Neo-Classical days, Alexander Pope and Boileau dictated the tastes of the times. Not only literature but, as always, painting and music followed the leaders of the day. Pope's attitude was that "Nature and Homer are the same." He urges: "Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem; To copy Nature is to copy them."[3] Pope had too much common sense to carry this to an extreme; but not so with many of his contemporaries. They make a fetish of the works of the "ancients," leading Swift to his stinging ridicule of *The Battle of the Books.*

Thus was laid the stage for Edmund Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition,* which reacted and counter-attacked vigorously. If imitation is what Pope and Dryden said it to be, I'll have none of it, said Young in effect; "Imitation is inferiority confessed." Soon a much more radical reaction than Young's set in. The young Romantics, exulting in their own imaginative powers, determined to break all bonds of artificiality and spring to the open woods. When Jean-Jacques Rousseau sounded the call of "back to Nature," it was taken up not only by the poets Victor Hugo, Shelley, and Keats, but it was also triumphantly echoed in the critical writings of Wordsworth, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, and a host of others. A

[2] *An Apologie for Poetrie.* [3] *Essay on Criticism.*

glorious era of nature-poetry set in, but there was also a sinister and blighting emphasis on unredeemed man.

In modern times so many ways of imitating Nature have been devised—Impressionism, Expressionism, Naturalism, Imagism, as well as Cubism and Surrealism in painting—that both critics and readers are left in utter confusion as to what styles are good, which are even justified, and just what Imitation of Nature really is. To clarify these issues it is necessary to resort to the writings and commentaries of Thomas Aquinas.

II

Imitation of Nature, in both St. Thomas and Aristotle, has a double meaning. The first is Imitation of Natural Beings, μιμήσις τῶν ὀντῶν. The second is Imitation of the Process of Nature, μιμήσις τῆς φυσεῶς. This imitation in the first sense may be considered imitation of specific natural forms in their *esse*. In the second sense one may look on it as imitation of the motive process, the universal *modus fiendi* of all natural forms. The second sense follows necessarily from the first, since *fieri est via ad esse*.

St. Thomas' comments on imitation of natural beings are scattered through his many works and must be gathered sedulously by the philosopher of art. On the other hand, a very exact analysis of how art imitates the process of nature is compressed into his commentary on the second book of Aristotle's *Physics*. It but remains to apply this to the field of poetry.

A consideration of Art as an Imitation of Natural Beings will have to be as multifold as Nature itself. From the start it is plain that arts of man will have to imitate material nature, since his knowledge is limited to forms received in matter (at least, his immediate knowledge). Human arts, therefore, will have to deal with singular embodiments of the universal. The artist will have to draw on past observation of the world about him. As St. Thomas says, expanding Aristotle's notions.

The reason for art's imitating nature is found in the fact that knowledge is the principle of artistic operation; and since all of our knowledge is received from sensible and natural objects, through the senses, we must form our artifacts in the likeness of things found in nature.[4]

In another, more God-centered approach to the question, St. Thomas shows that when the artist imitates the creative act of God, he imitates it according to those creations of God with which he is already familiar.

If some teacher of an art were to make a work of art, it would be the duty of his disciple, who has learned the artistic habit from him, to study his product, so as himself to work after its likeness. And so the human intellect, to which a light of intelligence is communicated from the divine intellect, must be informed by inspection of natural creations, in order to operate in a similar manner on its own products.[5]

Even Holy Scripture speaks to mankind through images and metaphors telling its readers of the "hands of God" and of the heavenly songs of the angels. How much more so will a strictly human art speak to the mind through sensible realities, and thus raise men up to universal knowledge and even to natural wisdom by intimate contact with the world about them. The poet, who is using a potentially universal instrument, words, as his medium, will inevitably break forth with a blunt statement of the universal. He will do this, however, as a climax and but briefly, thus avoiding the shoals of didacticism. Some of the most unforgettable lines of Shakespeare, for example, are those quick, piercing insights of reality that serve

[4] "Eius autem quod ars imitatur naturam, ratio est quia principium operationis artificialis cognitio est; omnis autem cognitio nostra est per sensus a rebus sensibilibus et naturalibus accepta; unde ad similitudinem rerum naturalium in artificialibus operamur." *II Physic.*, lect. 4. (All translations are the author's own.)

[5] "Si enim aliquis instructor alicuius artis opus artis efficeret, oporteret discipulum, qui ab eo artem suscepisset, ad opus illius attendere, ut ad eius similitudinem et ipse operetur. Et ideo intellectus humanus ad quem intelligibile lumen ab intellectu divino derivatur, necesse habet in his quae facit informari ex inspectione eorum quae sunt naturaliter facta, ut similiter operetur." *Prologue to the Commentary on the Politics.*

to crystallize a character or lay bare the issues of some episode, and which have become aphorisms of every age since.

To insist on the pictorial element of poetry, however, is by no means to call it little more than an enlightened photography. One is reminded, on the contary, of the devastating comment of Cezanne on the painting *Laboureur Nivernais*: "It's horribly like the real thing." [6] The artist holds the world in his brain as if it were a great kaleidoscope, which he can shake into any formation and shape he pleases. Nature herself, as St. Thomas reminds us, cannot do this. It can produce one product in only one way.

> Every swallow fashions its nest in the same manner, and every spider follows the same pattern in spinning its web, which would not happen if they operated consciously and from art, for not every builder constructs his house in the same fashion, since an artificer can decide about the form of his product and vary it.[7]

Pictorial matter and details must never be allowed to fascinate and absorb the poet, so as to impede the main idea ("idea" not in an abstract but in a concrete sense) from blazing through the accidents of matter to the mind of the reader. This is what has happened to all the sensists, phenomenologists, and ultra-realists who have ever set pen to paper. By luxuriating in color or form, by lingering over the details of physical agony, they animalize the soul of things instead of spiritualizing the body. As Père Longhaye puts it: "In default of realities, we have the realist description." [8] In his question on Ceremonial Precepts, in the *Prima Secundae*, Saint Thomas emphasizes the fact that exterior ritual and symbol are not an end in themselves but must be used as instruments to join man to God by the interior powers (q. 101, a. 2). Thus the bare realities of the natural world should not obscure its higher

[6] Quoted by Jacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism*, p. 147.

[7] "Omnis hirundo similiter facit nidum, et omnis araneus similiter facit telam, quod non esset si ab intellectu et arte operarentur: non enim omnis aedificator similiter facit domum, quia artifex habet iudicare de forma artificiati, et potest eam variare." *II Physic.*, lect. 13.

[8] L. Longhaye, S.J. *Théorie des Belles-Lettres*, ch. V.

meaning and real symbolism for us. We must see through to the soul in things.

But just what is this " soul in things? " Such a term sounds dangerously pantheistic. At best it seems to cloud rather than clarify the issue. We must recall Aristotle's concept, however, in which Nature, as it " ought to be " instead of " as it is " (taken in the sense of pure photography), is taken as the object of the poet. Poets express a secret which Nature has communicated to their own souls. Many other souls have caught this secret, too, but only the poet (plus the artist and the musician) are able fully to express it. Browning has caught this truth in the words of Fra Lippo Lippi:

> Take the prettiest face, is it so pretty
> You can't discover if it means hope, fear,
> Sorrow or joy? won't beauty go with these?
> Suppose I've made her eyes all right and blue,
> Can't I take breath and add life's flash,
> And then add soul and heighten them three-fold?
> . . . We're made so that we love
> First things we have passed
> Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see:
> And so they are better, painted—better to us,
> Which is the same thing. Art was given for that:
> God uses us to help each other so,
> Lending our minds out.

Browning has hit it off; poetry helps us to see sharply and to love mightily the simplest perfections of God's world. As Hopkins put it, in *God's Grandeur,* " there lives the dearest freshness deep down things."

To discuss the question less enigmatically it may be said, first of all, that the artist takes the external world, not merely in itself but as related to man. Without sacrificing a blade of grass or a drop of dew, he fits them into the harmony he sees between man and the universe made for man. Nature, even in its stormy and destructive moods, is linked to man through original sin. In all its attitudes—sombreness, gaiety, tension, the hopefulness of spring, the fulfillment of summer, the blight

of winter, external Nature has a definite causal influence on man's spirit and an ontological sympathy with his moods.

Man's spirit itself is, to be sure, the focal point of poetry. It is because such dramas as *Othello, Macbeth,* and *Hamlet* lay bare the inner workings of man's moral nature that they are classed among the masterpieces of all time. "Know thyself" is a dictum as appropriate to natural contemplation as to supernatural. The best dramatic characters have a universality which helps them win their way into the audience's interest without losing that personal uniqueness proper to every man in the ratio that his life is intense.

It does not suffice, however, for poetry to be merely of this world. Somehow, somewhere, God must be included, at least implicitly. The reason, God's causal influence on the world, is obvious. If we overlook Him we distort the meaning of things. Hopkins grasped this idea with all its depth and power, making it not only the motive for all his poetry but the central theme for some of His greatest creations, as *Pied Beauty, God's Grandeur,* and the incomparable *Wreck of the Deutschland.* To Hopkins, a field of grain in harvest time, or a skylark on the wing, or a speckled trout in a stream meant but one thing: Give glory to God; "praise Him."

III

So much for Art (and particularly Poetry) as an imitation of the beings of Nature; now a word remains to be said about it as imitation of the process of Nature. Here St. Thomas can be of much more help, since he lays down principles much more clearly defined. His starting point is Aristotle's definition of Nature: "Nature is a source of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs essentially." [9] Art, too, must therefore contain a principle of motion and rest relative to that being whose perfection is its concern. We find this, by analysis, to be true. Between Art and Nature there is only this difference:

---

[9] *Physic.*, II, c. 1.

Natural objects differ from non natural objects only in this, that they have the principle of their motion in themselves."

The difference is considerable, of course. Nature is an intrinsic principle, moving a being from inside; Art is an extrinsic principle, working on the being from without. Given this similarity, however, it is well to proceed to a more detailed comparison of Nature and Art according to the four causes, remembering that what is said of Nature will be applied analagously to Art.

In natural beings the substantial form is active principle of all motion to their own fulness of development. The artefact, on the other hand, being a *per accidens* nature, does not order itself to produce its own proper effect, but rather is an instrument ordered by the more universal cause, the artist. In producing its own proper effect, the printed or sounded word of a poem, for instance, also carries a higher *intentio* or *esse fluens* impressed on it by the poet. By a confluence of these particular causes the poet attains his own higher end and is thus the real efficient cause.

Nature, in corporeal beings, is the substance considered as final cause, both *in intentione* and *in executione*. Naturale means *aptum natum*, i. e., a natural being has an ingrained aptitude and tendency to a certain self-perfection. This self-perfection, or *finis*, is "the essence of that which is coming to be," as Aristotle said.[20] It will follow, then, that just as Nature is *propter aliquid*, so Art will be also. That means—to take an example from poetry—that the poet orders his words to convey a certain form (a universal form embodied in particular matter) to the reader[21] of the poem. It is sufficient that the reader be the poet himself, still, some reader must be presupposed. Thus every poem has a specific finality imbedded in it, and the finality is aimed at a human intellect able to grasp it. St. Thomas explains this:

---

[20] "Naturalia . . . non differunt a non naturalibus nisi quantum habent principium motus in seipsis." *II Physic.*, lect. 1.

[21] *Physic.*, II, c. 7.

[21] Hopkins prepared his poetry rather for hearers than readers, thus aiming to actualize the full potency of words, i. e., sound as well as meaning.

We are, in one sense, the end of all products of art . . . because, as it is said in metaphysics, " that for the sake of which " something happens can be taken in two ways, namely, the one for whom it happens (*cuius*) and the purpose for which it happens (*quo*); so the end of a house, in the first sense, is the inhabitant, and in the second, the dwelling therein.[13]

St. Thomas makes it very plain that neither anything natural nor anything artistic can produce its proper action *casu*, by chance. Thus the poet who dabbles in ambiguous meanings is defeating his own purpose. Further, the dramatist who introduces a *deus ex machina*, e. g., a surprise event to help untangle the complication of his plot, is contravening one of the first laws of art.

As for the formal cause in natural beings, it is distinct from their nature by a distinction of reason. It is looked on as the principle giving *esse* to the supposit. However, substantial form has an important place in the discussion of Art and Nature because it is the cause of the actuality of a natural or artistic being at any given moment. At the beginning of motion it is incomplete; at the end, it is complete. From beginning to end there must be a logical and continual procession. " There is a development from prior to latter in both art and nature." [14] Aristotle's statement in the *Poetics* that every tragedy must have a beginning, middle, and end is not so inane, then, as would at first appear. It implies that the character of main dramatic interest must emerge from an initial state of moral potency, develop gradually under stress, until the final full-flowering at the climax. There is always a possibility of outside influences, *casus*, deeply disturbing or profoundly helping him; there is always liberty of will; but the seed of his moral development must have been present at the beginning.

The last of the four causes to be considered is the material

[13] " Nos sumus quodammodo finis omnium artificialium . . . quia sicut dictum est in philosophia prima, dupliciter dicitur id cuius causa fit, scilicet cuius et quo; sicut finis domus ut cuius est habitator, ut quo est habitatio." *II Physic.*, lect. 4.

[14] " Similiter ex prioribus pervenitur ad posteriora in arte et in natura." *II Physic.*, lect. 13.

cause. Since the artist imitates nature, and all natural beings (at least the material ones, with which we are directly acquainted) have matter, the artist, too, must deal with matter. Furthermore, he does not create the composite, form with matter, pure and simply, but must work with the matter that is given him. He must deal with a certain defined medium. The poet, for example, works with words in a certain orderly pattern. It is not erroneous to say that the artist is subject to the necessity of the matter.

> No disposition can be made of natural bodies and raw materials of an art without material principles able to be disposed in the corresponding manner; for a house could not stand, were the heavier parts not used as a foundation, and the lighter placed above. . . . We do not say that the end is necessarily such-and-such, because the matter is of a certain kind, but rather the contrary, i. e., because the end and the form is specified, there is need for the matter to be of a determined type.[15]

Thus it is that the artist must have technique, a habit of skill with his tools, whether they be words, or paints, or musical notes. This forms an integral part of his habit of art.

IV

Such, in brief outline, is St. Thomas' answer to the artist's perennial problem: What is Imitation of Nature? His answer is twofold: Imitation of natural beings and of the process of nature. We have his own specific words to this effect:

> It is necessary both that the very procedure of art imitate the procedure of nature; and that those things which are products of art, imitate those which are in nature.[16]

---

[15] "Non est dispositio facta in rebus naturalibus et artificialibus, sine principiis materialibus habentibus aptitudinem ad talem dispositionem: non enim domus convenienter constaret, nisi graviora in fundamento ponerentur, et leviora superius. . . . Non enim dicimus quod necessarium sit esse talem finem, quia materia talis est; sed potius e converso, quia finis et forma talis futura est, necesse est materiam talem esse." *II Physics.*, lect. 15.

[16] "Necesse est quod et operationes artis imitentur operationes naturae; et ea quae sunt secundum artem, imitentur ea quae sunt in natura." *Prologue to the Commentary on the Politics.*

It remains now only to give the question a final twist by saying, with St. Thomas, that Nature itself is nothing else than an art, and that the artist working from it is actually modelling off the product of a higher artist, God. "For Nature," says Thomas, "is nothing else than the unfolding of a certain art, which is divine, ingrained in things by which they are moved to a determined end." [17] Praise be, then, to the Divine Artist!

JAMES TORRENS, S. J.

Mount St. Michael's
Spokane, Washington

[17] "Natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum." *II Physic.*, lect. 14.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Robert R. Masterson, O. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. D., is professor of dogmatic theology at St. Rose Priory, Dominican House of Studies, Dubuque, Iowa, and professor of homiletics at Mount St. Bernard Seminary in the same city. He is an associate editor of *Cross and Crown.*

James V. Mullaney, Ph. D., is chairman of the Liberal Arts Program at Manhattan Colllege, New York City, and a frequent contributor to The Thomist.

James Torrens, S. J., Ph. D., has been assigned to Mount St. Michael's, Spokane, Washington, and at present is doing special studies at The University of San Francisco.

Joseph L. Lennon, O. P., Ph. D., received his degree from Notre Dame University and is presently professor of education at Providence College, Providence, R. I.

Henri Dulac, S. T. L., Ph. D., is a member of the faculty of St. Thomas College, St. Paul, Minn., and at present has Ford Foundation Fellowship at Harvard University.

James J. Davis, O. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. L., is professor of biblical languages at the Dominican House of Philosophy, St. Rose Priory, Springfield, Ky.

BOOK REVIEWS

Social Relations in the Urban Parish. By Joseph H. Fichter, S.J. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. 264 with appendix and index. $5.50.

Father Fichter's *Social Relations in the Urban Parish* is a volume certain to be discussed over rectory dinner tables for many months to come. It makes no pretensions to stylistic excellence, but it more than compensates for this in serious scholarship and painstaking documentation. Tribute must be paid to Father Fichter for publishing this fitting sequel to his work *Dynamics of a City Church.* The controversy provoked by the findings of this latter work, which somewhat beclouded the main issues of the study, probably will not ensue with the publication of this volume. The emotion-fraught criticism of the first study—some of it trivial, part of it valid, some of it tangential, but little of it constructive—tended more to inflame feeling than to clarify the problems emerging from the research. A creditable sociological study in its own right, interest in *Social Relations* is heightened by the author's conviction of the value of such study for the work of the Church (cf. Appendix), and for his sincere concern for finding the best means of carrying out that apostolic function amid the difficulties of the changing urban parishes in the United States. The last chapter in the volume on the ethical limitations of sociological reporting exhibits at once his respect and fidelity to the canons of scientific objectivity and his understanding of the moral restrictions placed upon the researcher in that delicate area where publication of data may lead to the damage of reputations. Indeed, the moral sensitivity of the author to the rights, feelings and reputations of the persons who are objects of sociological study and his application of ethical principles to his difficult area make this chapter well worth reading for anyone engaged in similar work.

Some of the things that Father Fichter has to say have been said before, and without the trappings of sociological jargon. That does not make them any less less worth saying, for it is often the obvious that is missed and little appreciated. The parish priest will discover many of his own personal experiences reflected, his generalizations substantiated and his observations corroborated in this scientific study. At the same time, he is sure to find more than one clerical sophism exploded and more than a few cherished misconceptions laid to rest. Best of all, he will be furnished with many new insights into some of the puzzling aspects of parochial life and will be challenged to think through previously held conceptions regarding the role of the parish in the sanctification of the laity.

Early in his study Father Fichter attempts to determine to what extent persons may be classified under the term " parishioner." He uses six criteria: baptism, place of residence, racial and national origin, intention, religious observance and social participation. On the basis of this last criterion, the author is of the opinion that the urban Catholic parish is not a formally organized group or association, but rather " a social unit which might be called a statistical population, a social aggregate or category." This opinion differs from that of Nuesse and Harte (*The Sociology of the Parish*, Milwaukee, 1951), but steers a middle course between those who look on the urban parish as a close-knit, well-integrated unit and those who consider it as no more than a haphazard collection and agglomeration of people.

Attempting to provide a typology of persons who participate in parochial life, the author roughly classifies them into nuclear, modal, marginal and dormant Catholics. The nuclear parishoner may be considered the ideal parishioner. He is most faithful in fulfilling his religious duties, most active and co-operative in parochial affairs, most integrated in the sense that he carries over into his other activities the high moral values contained in his religious convictions. Unfortunately, he is very much in the minority, constituting, according to the author, only 5.7 per cent of the white Catholic parishoners. According to the oft-quoted saying that the convert usually makes the best Catholic, we should expect converts to figure largely in this group. But in terms of the criteria of this classification, if converts make the best Catholics, they do not always make the best parishioners. The nuclear Catholic tends to be a " born Catholic." He is usually a member of a deeply religious family, has a slightly better education than the average parishioner, is a salaried or wage worker belonging to the lower middle class, and is marked by unwavering adherence to the principles of his faith in all phases of his life and conduct.

The modal parishioner is the ordinary " practicing " Catholic. His name is legion and it is from this group that those outside the Church often draw their picture of what the Catholic Church is and what it stands for. According to the profile presented by the author, certain interesting aspects of the religious life of the modal Catholic became evident. As a youth (10-19 years), he shows the highest degree of religious observance (Sunday Mass, monthly communion, Easter duty. He slackens off somewhat in his twenties until he reaches the nadir of religious vitality in his thirties. Fidelity to religious duties may suffer in the thirties because of the care of small children in the home, because a married couple with several children have chosen at this time to limit the size of their family by artificial birth control, because at this period a man is most concerned with " getting ahead " in his occupation or profession. The middle years (40-60) exhibit a decided upswing in observance, while the downward trend in the sixties makes the author feel that we can no longer give credence to the adage

that " religion interests only the very young and the very old." The women folk lose no face in this analysis, for on the basis of sex difference women are more faithful to religious practice in every category. Whatever reasons may be given for this, it is a fact that has long been recognized by popes, priests and people at large.

Unlike the nuclear Catholic, the modal parishioner has the tendency to compartmentalize his beliefs, and hence often fails to exhibit the high ideals of his faith in all areas of his activity. The conduct of the Christian should be but the natural expression of that inner all-embracing charity which should be the governing principle in all interpersonal relations. Unfortunately it is not always so with the modal Catholic. Indeed, his most conspicuous failure in the demonstration of charity is found in his relations with the Negro. " The modal white Catholic unites more readily, more cordially, and more permanently with almost any other person, whether Jew, Protestant, or atheist, than he does with his fellow-Catholic who is a Negro." Perhaps this fact is not so surprising, especially in Southern cities where there exists a system of racially segregated parishes. Nevertheless. it is a glaring inconsistency when prejudice triumphs over the bond of charity which should exist in Christ's Mystical Body. More incongruous, however, but something which has not as yet been made a subject of study, is the situation in some more Northern cities where Negroes have displaced the white population in deteriorated parish areas, but where little or no effort has been made to evangelize the Negro.

But if there is a rigid demarcation separating Catholics along racial lines, there is also a less obvious but no less real division among Catholics according to occupation, education and social class. This can hardly be considered unusual, since informal group life is centered around common interests and one does not ordinarily expect the professional person and the wage earner, the college man and the grammar school graduate to mingle on the same social plane—unless it is in the interest of some higher goal.

Happily, among Catholics (and only among Catholics) increased education is generally accompanied by more faithful religious observance. Nevertheless, Catholic college graduates sometimes have been accused by the urban parish priest of being slackers when it comes to a question of participation in parochial activities. This is due, it is said, to an assumed social and intellectual snobbery which makes the college graduate loathe to associate with those to whom he feels superior (*America*, " Feature X," LXXXV, No. 17, July 28, 1951). Perhaps a more valid reason is found in the fact that the various forms of group activity in both high school and college tend to pull the student away from parochial activities and to center his interests on the high school and college. With the college frequently located a great distance from the parish, with the broadening preoccupation with athletic teams, school dances, academic achievements, etc.,

it is not surprising that the parish and its activities become more and more remote to the student. This divergence from parochial life is continued after graduation when school ties are retained through various alumni associations. Moreover, the relationship with one's *alma mater* may cause friction in the parish when the graduate seeks permission to be married in his or her college chapel, or when it is insisted that a priest-teacher perform the ceremony. Many pastors feel that a parishioner's first loyalty should be to his or her own parish.

The situation, as the author observes, may be aggravated by the fact that both clerical and lay teachers in Catholic colleges are so far removed from the parish that their attitudes are largely supra-parochial. This in no way implies that they disdain the parish. It merely means that their work, their associations and their experiences " have been along the more universal lines of broader Catholicism." If the parish does not figure largely in their thinking, and this may be indicated in various ways, then one could hardly expect the college student to consider parochial activity of much importance.

Whether this explanation is valid or not, this study shows that Catholic college graduates are not active in parish affairs. Indeed, the author points out that those male Catholics who are most active in parish societies are " also either relatively unsuccessful in their economic pursuits or will participate only in those parochial activities which have a commercial aspect." In the opinion of such men, only the money-making enterprises have a real value for the parish and the highest praise they can give a priest is to call him " a real business man." Such a situation presents a challenge to the priest who is interested in utilizing the best talent in the parish for the common good of all parishioners. Of course, if the more educated members of the parish are called upon only to help out in bingo, cake sales and bazaars, one can readily understand their disinclination to participate and their tendency to seek other forms of activity commensurate with their needs, interests and education. In spite of all efforts, however, this study seems to provide enough evidence " to predict that the future life of the present Catholic student will be less and less parochial in the rigid narrow sense of the term."

The chapter entitled " Social Status and Religious Behavior " indicates that the modal Catholic in many instances is more influenced by the standards of the class to which he belongs than by the values inherent in his religious beliefs. This is evident in the racial attitudes held by some Catholics and by their failure to exercise the social virtues. As people rise in socio-economic standing, they tend to adopt the values of their newly attained status. They form new friendships, they engage in different kinds of social activities, their economic views change. While remaining faithful to religious observance, their thinking may be secularized to such an extent

that the social encyclicals of the popes are ignored and they become blind to the demands of social justice. In other words, such Catholics appear hardly different than non-Catholics, thinking and acting on some questions largely as their social status demands rather than their faith would indicate. As the author remarks: "The institutional environment has a much greater impact on human behavior than most Christians seem willing to admit."

The marginal Catholic is like a house divided. He is outside the Church, yet within the Church. He claims he is a Catholic, yet he does not want to live like one. He is pulled one way, then another. He does not strongly affirm Catholic teaching, yet he does not completely deny it. He is the kind who says, "You can't run a business on Gospel principles," or "You can't be a good Catholic and at the same time a successful politician, doctor, lawyer, etc." The marginal Catholic is frequently a material heretic and a moral relativist. Neither hot nor cold, he is a religious hybrid, a compromiser, a "split personality." According to the author's tentative estimate, he constitutes one fifth of our Catholic population. Seldom at Sunday Mass, more often than not neglecting his Easter duty, hardly ever thoughtful of a Catholic parochial school education for his children, the marginal Catholic is more deeply influenced by the secular standards of the society in which he lives than by the faith he half-heartedly professes. It is from this group that we find many who grumble and rebel against the Church for her stand on sex sins, birth prevention, divorce, etc., and who resent the authority of the priest, protesting that his activity should be strictly confined to the sanctuary. Because of his tenuous connection with the Church, the marginal Catholic presents a unique problem to the parish priest. He still holds on to many of the outward symbols of his religion, but internally he has become de-Christianized. He is immune from, indifferent to, or untouched by the principles he is supposed to believe. Always capable of returning to the full vigor of his faith and to the complete practice of his religion, he seems doomed to be submerged in the ever-widening gulf between the claims of his Church and the demands of a secularized society. The marginal Catholic taxes the ingenuity of the parish priest to devise fitting means in order to bring back this strayed sheep who has adopted many of the values of a pagan culture.

From the viewpoint of reclamation, the dormant Catholic poses an even more difficult problem. As time lengthens it becomes increasingly difficult to return to an institution one has rejected, to a Church one has renounced, to a practice one has abandoned. There are too many deterrents to such a course of action—emotional ties, social and business reasons, an habitual way of living, a bad marriage or any one of a host of considerations. But fallen-away Catholics can and sometimes do come back to the Church before they die. Perhaps this provides the basis for the saying: "It is hard to live by the Catholic faith, but it is easy to die in it." And so priests and

faithful often remark: "Once a Catholic, always a Catholic." It is a hopeful and optimistic viewpoint, but the truth of it is as difficult to ascertain as are the reasons for, and the amount of, leakage from the Church. The author of this work intimates "that a much smaller percentage of dormant Catholics ask for the priest at the end of life than are baptized or married in the Church." In other words, if some Catholics are dormant, it is with the kind of sleep from which frequently there is no awakening. Whatever the percentage of reclaimed dormant Catholics may be, this group of "lost sheep" constitute, according to the author, about thirty eight percent of the 21,754 white baptized Catholics who were the object of inquiry.

Because of the multiple factors involved and because of the tendency of people to rationalize their conduct, the attempt to discover why Catholics leave the Church is a hazardous occupation. But this work provides a tentative analysis. The wisdom of the bishops of this country in their insistence on the establishment of Catholic schools is seen in the fact that three-quarters of the dormant Catholics had received no parochial school training and had been taught little or nothing about their religion at home. In slum areas, families which have a low income and a high degree of family disorganization in the form of divorce, desertion, etc., usually make up the group with the largest number of dormant Catholics. Mixed marriages have always been notorious as a source of defection from the Church, but the author points out that they are "as often a source of conversion to the Church as they are a source of leakage from the Church." Then there are those who blame the behavior of priests and religious for their dereliction; while others point to the bad example of Catholics, the Church's growing policy of de-segregation, the teaching on birth control, the incompatibility of Church membership with social aspiration, or simply, especially with the very old, a gradual drifting away through tiredness, boredom or loss of interest. In any event, even though they join no other religion, dormant Catholics are lost to the Church. They engage in no parochial activities, have only slight contact with Church functionaries (at time of baptism and marriage), disclaim any membership in the parish and can be called Catholic only in the nominal sense by reason of baptism or by lack of enrollment in a non-Catholic sect. Unlike the marginal Catholic who is still in the conflict, the fallen-away Catholic has followed the line of least resistance. He has given up the fight; he has capitulated to the demands and has fully adopted the standards of a secularized society. He cannot avoid meeting other Catholics; he will be reminded of his former faith in many ways; he may be shunned and criticized by Catholic relatives and friends, but his former faith has little influence upon him.

Some interesting observations are provided in the chapter dealing with the position of the priest in the parochial system. The lot of the urban

parish priest is not an easy one. It is required that he function in many roles—as minister of the sacraments, preacher, leader, adviser, disciplinarian, comforter, administrator, business man, recreational director, educator, pastor and confessor. He must be in the world, but not of the world. He must be all things to all men, yet he must always retain the dignity of his priesthood. In days gone by and in less complicated environment, he often had close contact with families and individuals in the parish. He knew their virtues and their vices, their accomplishments and their aspirations, their sorrows and their disappointments. Because he knew his parishioners so well, his influence was directed and pervasive. The moral and social behavior of his flock was always subject to his scrutiny and consequently could not be but improved thereby.

Such a situation no longer exists. The priest-parishioner relationship has, to a large extent, become depersonalized. The demands of the ministry in our modern urban parishes exclude the possibility of close contact with parishioners. The parish priest has become more of a "rectory" priest. Office hours, appointments, multiple instruction of converts and those coming to be married are some of the devices used by the priest to facilitate the daily routine of the large city parishes. While the functions of the priest have increased, his personal contact with, and hence his influence over parishioners has diminished. As the author points out, residential mobility across parish lines may not have an adverse effect on faithfulness to religious practices, but it is definitely an obstacle to participation in parochial affairs and at best it makes contact with the clergy casual and sporadic.

It is an often-heard lament of the urban priest that he knows only a fraction of his parishioners. Many families will have moved into and will have moved out of the parish territory before the priest has an opportunity to meet them. The problem is complicated further by the tendency of many Catholics to put off or to neglect registering at the rectory when they take up new residence in the parish. Of course this lack of personal knowledge of parishioners is somewhat counterbalanced by the contact made and the information obtained in the parish census. But this is more often a hope than an actuality, for "very few large urban parishes can boast of a conscientious bi-annual census, in which the priests themselves call on every family in the parish." Parishioners sometimes complain that the priest seldom if ever visits their homes. They may chat with him on the street, but more often only catch a glimpse of him as he rides by in his car. Some may even charge him with visiting the homes of the more affluent members of the parish. These grievances indicate that only a small minority are cognizant of the manifold duties of a priest in a large parish and few seem to realize that his time is so absorbed by the many roles that he has to exercise that personal contact with the majority of

parishioners becomes a practical impossibility. To what extent the priest is responsible for this condition it is difficult to judge. One thing this study would seem to indicate: the more the priest assumes functions which lie outside his holy office, and which in many instances can be handled more efficiently by the laity, so much the more does the sacred ministry suffer and so much the more does he lose his effectiveness as a priest.

The preaching office is one phase of the priest's work which deserves consideration. The priest himself may possess a high degree of spiritual vitality. He may be an effective teacher in the parochial school, in the released-time program and in the catechism class. He may exert a powerful influence for good in the parish sodalities and societies, in private counseling and in the confessional. But the one place where he has the greatest and most sustained contact with his people is in the pulpit at Sunday Mass. After receiving the sacrament of Confirmation, few Catholic parishioners receive any formal instruction in the truths of their faith. Perhaps they read a Catholic newspaper or periodical occasionally, or listen to a Catholic radio broadcast, or attend a parish mission. For the most part, however, due to the pressure of business, family or social activity, or even laziness and indifference, the knowledge of the teachings of their Church remains at a somewhat juvenile level. Because of this condition, this reviewer believes there is more than an element of truth to the saying that if many people are going to be saved, they will be saved through the Sunday sermon; there is hardly any other occasion that they will hear anything about religion. This is not an ideal situation, but few would gainsay that it is the true one. The one aspect of the priest's behavior which is most talked about—either praised or criticized—is the Sunday sermon. Indeed, the very reputation of the priest, the esteem or disesteem in which he is held, the degree of his influence is most often reckoned according to what he says and how he says it at Sunday morning Mass. One wonders if the parish priest realizes or truly appreciates this fact: it should be a powerful antidote to lack of preparation in preaching.

In any event, while the priest, as the author observes, is the pivotal person in the parish, he is not solely responsible for the success or failure of parochial activities. He must possess at least a limited proficiency in the various roles in which he is cast, but the co-operation of the laity is essential for the success of any parochial enterprise. This organized co-operation of priest and people is obtained only when the goals sought are mutually esteemed by the parties concerned.

What is the validity of this work? Does Father Fichter claim that his generalizations are applicable to the Church in the United States or only to a segment of it? Does he allow the facts to speak for themselves, or are they strained into a mold in order to conform to his preconceived ideas? Are his interpretations sound, or are they vitiated by an arbitrary sub-

jectivism? Aside from its sociological value, in what manner can a study of this nature be helpful for the work of the Church?

Because of the criticism of his *Southern Parish*, the author is careful to point out that his findings are specifically applicable only to the members of those groups who were the subjects of his investigation. For instance, in the chapter dealing with the religious life-profile of southern, white, modal Catholics in a particular area, he states: "No claim can be made that a similar religious life-profile will be found among Catholics in rural areas, in national or racial parishes, in other regions, or even among white Catholics in other southern cities." Hence while it is possible for him on the basis of his study to offer a descriptive typology of church membership, he realizes that this can be predicated of other parishioners only when it is verified by further research. St. Thomas observes that the acquisition of moral science demands patient effort, attentive and prolonged observation of the character of men, and practical experience in the customs of human life (*I Ethic.*, lect. 4). What is true of ethics is no less true of sociological study of the parish. Armchair theorizing is fruitless unless tested by factual knowledge obtained through research. It is for this reason that Father Fichter and other social scientists laboring in the same field of parish sociology deserve commendation for their spade work at the grass roots level of Catholicism.

When the author moves into the more difficult area of setting up criteria, selecting and interpreting data and judging motives from outward activity, one may wonder if his opinions are not sometimes given the same weight as are his scientific conclusions. For example, there are undoubtedly elements in the success ideal prevalent in our culture which are incompatible with Christian principles, but who can say to what extent material affluence and commercial interests are detrimental to spiritual growth? Can we infer that a person who follows the customs of segregation in a particular section of the country in which he resides is thereby being unjust and uncharitable? Does religious and social reform require a reformation and repatterning of various social statuses and roles, and is class status of itself an obstacle to the spontaneous display of charity? Questions of this nature make the selection of data, and the interpretation based upon this selection, a delicate task, for, as the author remarks, any such selection "may result in a distorted picture so that the actual reciprocal relation between environment and individual may appear to be one-sided." In other words, the author is treading on risky ground when he proposes ideals and norms and then judges conduct according to those standards, because there is always the possibility that his criteria may be arbitrary, his behavioral data prejudicially selective and his interpretations tendentious. This should not, however, and does not prevent the author from attempting the task, and succeeding, I believe, to a great extent.

There are few priests in large cities who are not cognizant of the difficulties involved in exercising the ministry at the parish level. Any insights, information, clarifications or understandings which can be given to these hard working dedicated men so that they may become better instruments of God in the salvation of souls will be greatly appreciated. As the author points out, it is precisely in this area that social science can be useful. Guesswork has little value in comparison to factual knowledge; vague assumption is a poor substitute for verified generalization; personal opinion and subjective evaluation carries little weight in the face of empirical research and scientific explanation. The puzzled priest may wonder why he is not obtaining the co-operation of teen-agers in the religious and recreational program of the parish. A partial answer is provided in this study. The Holy Name Society moderator may feel frustrated in his efforts to attract members from the thirty-year age group or from certain occupational categories. A plausible explanation of this situation is offered by the author. Many other examples could be cited to show how the priest could utilize knowledge obtained through research to direct his energies, plan his strategy, extend his apostolate, mobilize the laity and penetrate into areas hitherto untouched by his ministry.

No one can deny the phenomenal numerical growth of the Church in the United States, but there are some who wonder if this correlates highly with proportional growth in church membership. Everyone will grant there is room for improvement. More and more research is needed in the sociology of the parish, for it is only by further study that one can answer the question posed by many priests: Is the parochial system, as it now operates in our urban American society, an adequate instrument for the salvation and sanctification of souls? The question admits of no easy answer; but if any answer is forthcoming, it will emerge from the facts garnered by the social researcher. The thesis expressed in Father Fichter's *Southern Parish* was that Catholicism will succeed or fail in reconstructing and integrating modern society on the basis of the strength or weakness of its individual parishes. Assuming that this thesis is correct, anything that will contribute to a reinforcing of the parochial system will be a boon to the Church. Indeed, with the accumulation of research and systematic interpretation of findings, the day may not be far off when courses in pastoral theology taught in our seminaries are supplemented by sociological studies of the parish.

This is in keeping with the prescriptions of the popes, especially since the time of Leo XIII. Stressing the necessity of an adaptation of the apostolate to the needs and conditions of our times, present and past pontiffs have suggested that the pastoral ministry be recast along certain lines. New ways of penetration and influence must be devised. The newly ordained priest should be trained in the methods and new forms of the apostolate introduced by our age. Environmental and cultural factors which shape the

thinking of the faithful will have to be weighed and the apostolate made more direct and personal in its scope. Secularism should be recognized as the principal obstacle to the success of the ministry and the help of the laity should be sought for the intensification of apostolic work. Finally, there must be a recognition of the various levels of social stratification so that the apostolate may be diversified according to the social milieu in which the priest must work. In a recent address to the pastors and preachers of his own diocese of Rome, Pope Pius XII warned them against superficiality in estimating the condition of the parish and urged them to employ more exact methods in their pastoral care of souls. Calling for " a statistical effort made with seriousness, exacting realism and quiet impartiality," the Holy Pontiff suggested that such research would be an effective antidote to clerical complacency and an accurate method of gearing the apostolate to the needs of the faithful.

With *Social Relations*, Father Fichter has produced a representative sociological study which should benefit the ministry, provide enlightenment to the laity and be a guide to those working along similar lines. Although marred by a few typographical errors (pp. 46, 134, 147, 185, 245, 246), this work avoids the occasional triviality, repetition and unnecessary detail which were found in his first study. This reviewer looks forward to the publication of more studies of this nature, because he feels that those who work, like Father Fichter, in this field of parish sociology can contribute much to the mission of the Church.

Joseph L. Lennon, O. P.

Providence College,
Providence, R. I.

Building a Philosophy of Education. By Harry S. Broudy. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. 495 with index. $5.00.

It has been alleged that most books on education read as if they had been badly translated from the German. Mr. Broudy's *Building a Philosophy of Education* does not. It is a very readable book written in an unpretentious and sometimes witty manner. He manages to be informal and simple without over-simplifying or talking down to his readers. Students of philosophy and of education will note the freedom from the stock phrases and the circumlocutions so often used by writers in both these fields. Mr. Broudy tries to avoid the use of expressions that everyone thinks he understands as well as a technical vocabulary that gives a professional air to a book but prevents its being read outside its field. He has written a book that can be understood by a college student regardless of the amount or kind of course he has had in philosophy or education.

For Mr. Broudy "education is the process or product of a deliberate attempt to fashion experience by the direction and control of learning." (p. 9) The philosophy of education could mean either the application of philosophy to education or a philosophical analysis of educational problems. The author here regards the philosophy of education as "the systematic discussion of educational problems on a philosophical level, i.e., the probing into an educational question until it is reduced to an issue in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, or aesthetics, or to a combination of these." (p. 20) His method, consistently followed in the book, is to examine the needs revealed in an educational problem, analyze various answers, and propose a solution. His solutions to the various problems ultimately make a coherent whole that responds well to the ends and principles from which the author works.

Briefly, the order of the book is such that Mr. Broudy begins with a discussion of the aim of education, the good life. Then in several chapters he takes up the means either given by the nature of things or to be chosen by man in order to realize the aim: the structure of human personality, the roles of government, family, and churches in education, the habits and skills to be acquired in school, the content of the curriculum, method, and the organization of an educational system. Part Two of the work treats the way that education is concerned with values: economic, hygienic, recreational, associational, aesthetic, moral, and religious.

Mr. Broudy forthrightly states that his general position in philosophy is Classical Realism, and a little reading shows that he is very much in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. However, he has carefully re-thought traditional teachings not to be original but in order to understand them, and that is certainly one of the primary tasks of a student of philosophy. Nowhere that I could see is Mr. Broudy trying to say something new and different just to make a new opinion, but he has nevertheless succeeded in turning out a genuinely original work, because he has thought about today's version of perennial problems and has given solutions in a way understandable today. He has taken account of modern educational psychology and the more basic contributions of John Dewey's Instrumentalism. Since Mr. Broudy is a professor in the State College in Framingham, Massachusetts. he is at home in concrete educational problems and is conversant with educational literature. It is therefore easy to see why his book is so well suited to students preparing to teach.

Chapters three and five present a great deal of philosophical matter and are fundamental to the rest of the book. Chapter three treats of natural and elicited appetite, analyzes the notion of self, and describes the freedom necessary for self-determination. The author examines many philosophical views that are influential today, e.g., those of James and Dewey as well as many common opinions that are widely held but are not always so

formally expressed. On the whole, the treatment of " reflective freedom " seems to be well done, although I do not think so much emphasis need be given to the role of symbols in free choice. Chapter five contains a good, though not very formal, discussion of knowledge with some notion of the formation of concepts. Special attention is paid to the Instrumentalist view which identifies the act of knowing with the process of problem solving. Mr. Broudy, of course, disagrees, since " each step of reflective thinking—defining the problem, framing hypotheses, evaluating and verifying them—would be meaningless and impossible unless we could apprehend certain qualities and relations directly and immediately, as the Realist insists." (p. 144)

The chapter on " Education in the Social Order " analyzes the claims of education to autonomy and the limitations to that autonomy. It is done with clarity and with good sense, even though one can be sure that citizens of one community or another might sometimes be inclined to modify the views presented here. Mr. Broudy summarizes the relation between the school and the state as follows: " It is the school's role to specify the curriculum, organization, and methodology. But the implementation of this program depends on factors beyond the school's power and jurisdiction. It is up to the government, speaking for the people, to decide how much of the resources it can devote to the accomplishment of the program; whether it can build a new gymnasium or not; whether it can buy the books and equipment indicated as desirable; and whether it can afford to educate everybody to the age of 18 and at what tuition. These decisions are made in specific situations with the citizens consulting each other in the light of the Common Good." (pp. 103-104) There is in the chapter an admirable delineation of the provinces of home and school in education. It is, for example, not the objective of the school to establish physical and emotional health in the child, although the school may be one among the multitude of influences on those habits. The fundamental role of the school is the perfection of the skills and habits of knowing. As for a church's part in education Mr. Broudy has a good description of the Naturalist point of view, and he appreciates that the modern attitude of ignoring religion is perhaps worse than the violent anti-clericalism of the eighteenth century. In general, it seems that the section on churches and education is well done. A Catholic would have to make clear that the Church is competent to judge matters of revealed fact and not merely to make interpretations which are calculated to arouse religious experiences. Incidentally, " religious experience " is used in a loose sense here and in chapter fifteen to mean any feeling of communication with something holy. The author rightly insists on the inviolability of the individual conscience on page 117, but he goes on to say, " a religious sect may be powerful enough politically to ban certain plays and books, but it cannot claim the sanction of the natural law for

such an act unless it is already admitted by everyone that it has access to some revealed truth." Surely, the "sanction of natural law" does not depend on revealed truth, although it might often be clarified or made more certain by revelation.

Chapters six and seven on the curriculum are two of the most important in the book and along with chapter eight might well be of the most interest to people in education. They should be read, however, in dependence on the preceding chapters. With balance and good sense, Mr. Broudy reviews the problems of motivation, and the development of ability to think that are involved in settling on a type of curriculum. He considers the subject matter curriculum and the problem centered curriculum, as well as a third view which is ordered to providing the student with the skills of learning and an understanding of actual problematic situations. The use of "habit" is somewhat loose in this chapter, but perhaps it is well adapted to common usage today. How can the author reconcile his view that habits are forms of activity, and as such, "they have no specific content" (p. 183) with the fact that the intellectual habits, e. g., understanding and the various sciences, surely do have content? In chapter six there is a sympathetic presentation and evaluation of Dewey's notions on learning.

Chapter seven contains some well thought-out and practical suggestions for curriculum construction. They are based on clear principles, but they are not abstract deductions, rather they are carefully adjusted to the needs of students at the present time. One cannot go into the details here, but the author divides the curriculum into Natural Science, Social Science, and what he regrettably calls Self Science (including psychology, literature, philosophy, fine arts, and knowledge about religion) to which is added a guidance program. Each general subject matter ought to be accompanied by a course covering current problems. A sample taken from a section on the course treating current social problems follows. Should the class arrive at a decision favoring some particular solution? "As the study progresses, opinions will be formed and transformed. A group decision, however, is meaningless unless the group is in position to carry it out. No school group, as a rule, is in such a position and, therefore, on most issues decision-making is only a gesture. The group is in a position to understand and perhaps to be convinced by that understanding, but conviction is not equivalent to action. The school is responsible for understanding, but not for social action." (p. 194)

The chapter on method is again a practical and well considered approach to the subject. Mr. Broudy's view of method as the matching of the levels of abstraction of the pupil and the task seems to be admirable. The chapter on the organization of an educational system distinguishes well between the intellectual and the social goals of education. It treats of grouping on elementary, secondary, college, and university levels. One of Mr. Broudy's

most ingenious ideas is the "Adjustatorium," an institution to take care of a group that cannot profit from further formal training but can nevertheless get something out of more group activity and social cooperation. The suggestion would seem to have some merit if everyone is to remain in school until he is seventeen or eighteen years old and if, on the other hand, students of superior ability are not to waste time in a program that offers them no challenge. At one point the author says, "Our best and finest hope for democracy and the good life lies not in keeping all people somehow in the same school as long as possible, but rather in finding for each boy and girl a type of schooling that will fully exploit his or her potentialities for formal learning." (p. 259)

In Part Two Mr. Broudy courageously takes up questions of education and values. Perhaps this section is bound to be less satisfactory because the principles governing judgments of value are less easily identified and agreed upon. However, it is refreshing to find some one treat these matters in a analytic manner. The author frankly comes out for the objectivity of values. "For, at best, a doctrine that holds all values to be relative is a protective theory, i. e., it justifies our resistance to aggressive people who insist on their own value scheme as final. But it does not give us a weapon with which to wage war on injustice, cruelty, or any other state of affairs that we regard as 'evil.'" (p. 280)

The general chapter on "Education and Values" is soundly conceived as are the more particular discussions of economic values, aesthetic values, etc. Catholics might go a bit further than Mr. Broudy does on the subject of moral values, but he is certainly right that ultimately moral decisions must be made by the individual deliberately choosing. The statement, "What we ought to do we learn nowhere," (p. 410) needs some modification. After all, we can learn what we ought to do in general, although we cannot learn concrete individual acts in any scientific way. Our general knowledge of what we ought to do surely is useful to us in our practical decisions, even though it may not be sufficient to account for all the contingencies involved in any practical act. To the extent that there is something we can learn about what we ought to do, there can be a course teaching just that. Why not? There is a subject matter and reasons can be given or at least a good many statements about what we ought to do. Learning about morality is not limited to such a course, but the role of ethical teaching ought not to be neglected.

Again, in the chapter on religious values, a Catholic would find it necessary to supplement the text—not so much to contradict it as to add points, for Mr. Broudy, of course, is writing a non-sectarian treatise. It must be emphasized, however, that he does not take a secularist point of view. He recognizes the gap between the natural and the supernatural and understands that there is no natural proof of the supernatural. He sees that the

adolescent's knowledge of God and religion must keep pace with his intellectual development in other spheres, otherwise the maturing youth will regard religion as something childish and without intellectual content. The author rightly sees that a generalized religion is too vague and formless to be of any use in religious education, and he sees that practical difficulties would prevent courses in philosophy of religion from being widely introduced on the secondary level, although he is of the opinion that such courses would be good. Serious doubts can be raised against the philosophy of religion courses he suggests. Are they really so objective? One point alone is enough to challenge that objectivity: often the philosophy of religion treats what is really supernatural as a merely natural phenomenon. A proposition known by divine faith is no less objective than one known by natural knowledge, even though the relation between evidence and assent may be different. One last reservation might well be made to this chapter; that Mr. Broudy associates religion a little too much with feeling.

Despite occasional modifications or additions one might make, *Building a Philosophy of Education* can be recommended for classes in the philosophy of education with enthusiasm. I wish to go further and suggest it as a good supplement to other philosophy courses particularly because of the fresh way of expressing traditional teachings and because of the way it reveals and criticizes much of the philosophy of John Dewey and others. It does a better job than many textbooks that explicitly set out to do either of these two things. Lastly, anyone interested in philosophy or in education will certainly find this book absorbing and stimulating reading. Mr. Broudy has genuinely performed the functions of a philosopher and he has done so in a way that consistently arouses admiration and agreement.

HENRI DULAC

Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachsetts

Teología de San José. By BONIFACIO LLAMERA, O. P. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1953. Pp. 689 with index.

" The Holy Spirit will not cease to act on the hearts of the faithful until the universal Church will shower honors on the divine Joseph with new veneration, and will erect monasteries, build churches and altars in his name, multiply his feasts and celebrate them more solemnly. . . . For the honor of his name God has chosen St. Joseph as head and special patron of the kingdom of the Church Militant. Before the day of judgment it must happen that all peoples know, honor and adore the name of the Lord and the great gifts of God which He Himself has placed in St. Joseph and which

he has left almost in obscurity for a long period . . . the Lord will open the ears of the understanding and great men will search out the inner gifts of God that are hidden in St. Joseph, and they will find an exceedingly precious treasure such as was never found in the fathers of the Old Testament . . . his name will be listed on the calendars of the saints, no longer at the end but at the beginning."

Isidore de Isolanis wrote these words in 1521 when St. Joseph was not honored by any special feast-day nor even mentioned in the Litany of the Saints. Now that his prediction has been fulfilled in so many respects, especially in regard to the devotion of the Church, it is not surprising to find the Lord opening the ears of the understanding, and great men searching out the inner gifts of God that are hidden in St. Joseph. While many books have confined themselves to the devotional aspects, there is a discernible movement towards a genuine theology of St. Joseph which is being called Josephology.

The work of Father Llamera avoids the extreme of "pious rashness" which bases itself on privileges erroneously supposed and its opposite overcautiousness which would entirely reject arguments of fittingness as if theological deduction had no value when it did not achieve complete certitude. St. Thomas says that, despite the universal character of science, theology can concern itself with individual facts, so Father Llamera feels justified in speaking of Josephology as a "part of the science of theology which, from revealed principles, studies the holy Patriarch as spouse of the Mother of God and putative father of the Incarnate Word, with all the graces and privileges which are derived from this ministry." (p. 9) The sources of this theology are the Sacred Scriptures, papal documents, the Church Fathers, and theologians.

Scripture itself presents four principal statements about St. Joseph: 1) he is the spouse of the Blessed Virgin; 2) as a result, Joseph was considered by the people as the father of Jesus; 3) Joseph did indeed exercise an office as head of his family; 4) Joseph was a just man. Papal documents are few until the time of Pius IX when there begins a steadily increasing number of discourses, decrees, apostolic letters and encyclicals.

There is an interesting development in the writings of the Fathers on St. Joseph. The earlier Fathers simply do not mention him, and this is hardly surprising in view of the fact that the apostolic catechesis began with John the Baptist, when it would seem that St. Joseph was already dead. Later Fathers mention Joseph insofar as his name occurs in the sacred text. In their expositions they were so concerned to defend the perpetual virginity of Mary that some allowed themselves to be unfortunately influenced by the *deliramenta apocryphorum*. Thus St. Joseph was at times presented as an elderly man and indeed art still has him carrying the blossoming rod which the apocrypha gave him. At other times, the apocryphal legends provided

an easy exegesis for the "brothers of the Lord" by making Joseph a widower with children by his first marriage. The great doctor of the Scriptures, St. Jerome, with his customary contempt for such legends, seems to have been the first to oppose all this, and states flatly that St. Joseph, like Mary, was a virgin. St. Augustine came to this opinion, too, and others followed so that St. Peter Damian in the eleventh century could write: "it is of the faith of the Church that he was a virgin."

St. Thomas teaches not only that St. Joseph was always a virgin, but that he vowed his virginity. Besides these two principles St. Thomas teaches that there was a true and perfect marriage between Joseph and Mary. Most Thomistic commentators, Suarez excepted, pass over these doctrines in silence. Fr. Llamera offers the explanation that the commentators rarely went beyond the twenty-sixth question of the Third Part except to repeat the conclusions of St. Thomas. Nevertheless from the fifteenth century theological writings on St. Joseph have continued to grow from Isidore de Isolanis and Gerson, through St. Bernardine of Siena down to Cardinal Lepicier and the current interest in Josephology.

After this introductory background Father Llamera divides his own work into three main parts: the foundations of the theology of St. Joseph which involves a discussion of the meaning of his marriage to the Blessed Virgin, his virginal paternity towards Christ, his relation to the hypostatic union and cooperation with the redemption; then the consequences to Joseph—his dignity, holiness, virtues and gifts, his virginity, privileges and glory; and finally his relation to us—universal patronage and the cult due to him. Since the last two sections are in the nature of corollaries to the main thesis, we confine ourselves to the main principles of Josephology as set forth in the section of Fr. Llamera's work.

The marriage of St. Joseph is considered from both the scriptural and theological aspects. In regard to the scriptural aspect, Father Llamera explains the Hebrew customs of marriage, especially the distinction between espousals and nuptials. The Gospel narrative raises the problem of Mary's exact status at the time of the Annunciation—was she simply espoused to Joseph or was she completely married and dwelling with Joseph? Although there are many arguments in favor of the espousal theory in both ancient and modern exegesis—St. Luke, the acknowledged Greek scholar among the Evangelists, uses the word ἐμνηστευμένη (2: 5) which is usually rendered "espoused"—Fr. Llamera thinks that the text and context do not demonstrate simple espousal. However, the author thinks that many Fathers and exegetes who hold for the complete marriage interpretation obviously do not understand Hebrew marriage customs. In this section a number of minor points are raised such as the Davidic descent of Joseph which is evident from the Evangelists' genealogies of Jesus, the residence of St. Joseph which is taken to be Nazareth rather than Bethlehem or Jerusalem

as some ancient opinions held, his age which is given as uncertain although the author from arguments of convenience holds for the younger hypothesis. From the theological point of view, marriage is defined with all its elements and *bona* with the Thomistic conclusion that Joseph was truly married to the Blessed Virgin.

The paternity of Saint Joseph treated in the next chapter is a more difficult matter. Paternity is first discussed through the action of generation which constitutes the relation paternity-filiation; then the various kinds of paternity—divine, natural and adoptive are considered. As to the fact of Joseph's paternity there can be no doubt. Scripture clearly teaches that Mary called Joseph the father of Jesus, and that Joseph was considered by the Jews to be such. Since Jesus was, as Scripture records, subject to Joseph, it is evident that Joseph by giving his name and his paternal care did indeed exercise the function of father of the holy Family. However, certain theories about the nature of that paternity Father Llamera is at pains to reject. Of course the " natural paternity " for which Cerinthus held is certainly heretical, and the " physical supernatural paternity " theory of Father Corbató according to which the Holy Spirit takes the seed of St. Joseph, sanctifies it and unites it miraculously to the Blessed Virgin is rejected. But so also are theories of incomplete natural paternity and real paternity. Father Llamera states his own thesis: " The denominations of legal, putative, provider (*nutricio*), adoptive, virginal and vicarious father of the heavenly Father only express partial and incomplete aspects of the paternity of St. Joseph." Then he states more positively that " the paternity of St. Joseph is new, unique and singular, of a superior order to natural and human adoptive paternity," and proves this by authority and by reason of Joseph's marriage and virginity. His final conclusion is that " St. Joseph had true paternal sentiments towards Christ " which is proved from the nature of divine grace, which is more effective of love than nature alone.

The apex of the work for theological speculation is the relation of St. Joseph to the hypostatic union. The problem is admittedly difficult for St. Joseph's position is unique and human language cannot adequately express in any single term the notion of his relationship to the Incarnate Word. But there is an unquestionably true relationship which ancient writers hinted at in their references to St. Joseph as " minister of the Incarnation,' as one " united in a profound manner to Christ," as a " cooperator in the Redemption," as a minister " necessary and proximately related to the very person of Christ." Even though more has been written recently on the possible inclusion of St. Joseph in the order of the hypostatic union, there is little positive development on which Father Llamera can work. He, however, not only collects but penetrates the ideas of various ecclesiastical writers. After discussing the hypostatic union itself and the various ways of belonging to

it, Father Llamera rejects the opinions that St. Joseph belonged to that union either intrinsically and physically or intrinsically but morally. He prefers to say that St. Joseph cooperated in the constitution of the hypostatic order in a way which is true and singular, but to be denominated extrinsic, moral and mediate. Moreover, the cooperation of St. Joseph in the conservation of the hypostatic union was direct, immediate and necessary. After an exhaustive explanation of his terms, the author concludes that Saint Joseph was indeed included in the divine decree of the Incarnation.

The final question of major moment for theology is St. Joseph's part in the work of our Redemption. Once the concepts of redemption, co-redemption and satisfaction are applied to Jesus and to Mary, a parallel conclusion in regard to Joseph is established: "In being chosen spouse of the Virgin Mary and virgin father of Christ, St. Joseph was also associated in a singular way in our redemption by a real and objective, though extrinsic and moral, cooperation." Its reality is based on his particular capabilities for that office, especially his divinely bestowed graces, the divine ordering of his entire life and ministry to the Redemption, his voluntary acceptance of this divine plan, and his intimate union with the Redeemer Himself and the Co-Redemptrix. The cooperation of Saint Joseph remains extrinsic and moral for Joseph did not contribute to the meriting of redeeming graces to the degree that Mary did, nor did he have her close union to the hypostatic union. Since Father Llamera holds that Mary is a physical, instrumental cause in the communication of grace, his conclusion that Joseph's cooperation is inferior to this and moral causality quite naturally follows. St. Joseph's cooperation in the work of redemption consisted in his self-immolation in the silent service of Jesus and Mary long before Jesus was publicly revealed as the Messias. The Gospels show this immolation consisted in a life of great interior suffering united to the sufferings of Jesus and Mary.

The inclusion of the early Josephology of Father Isidore de Isolanis, O. P. increases the value of Father Llamera's own work, for the Latin text of this sixteenth century work has long been difficult to obtain. Now this text of an early and very significant contribution to the theology of St. Joseph is made available in the Latin text with a Spanish translation. Thus the greatest theological synthesis of St. Joseph in its own day is placed side by side with more modern developments. Father Bonifacio Llamera, as well as his director Father Nuñiz, deserve our thanks for these contributions.

James J. Davis, O. P.

Dominican House of Philosophy,
St. Rose Priory,
Springfield, Ky.

BRIEF NOTICES

The Third Revolution. By KARL STERN. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1954. Pp. 318. $4.00.

The argument of this book—as the author asserts twice (p. 90, 290)—is primarily historical. It traces the origin and development of the "Third Revolution." Three revolutions arose out of the nineteenth century: the social, started by Marx, the biological and racist, due to Darwin and the evolutionists, and the positivist revolution which began with Comte and has become widespread through the ideas of the scientific positivists. The aim of this Comtean revolution is to replace revelation, faith and philosophy by science, and science in this case means first the science of man, that is, psychology and sociology. Positivistic psychology develops the mechanistic concept of *l'homme machine*—which, it be said in passing, derives from La Mettrie and not from Descartes, as the author asserts.

Stern feels that psychoanalysis now forms, to a startling degree, part of the positivist revolution. By psychoanalysis the author understands the Freudian type which consists of a psychological structure, the therapeutic method, and a philosophical or superstructure. The author believes—contrary to several other Catholic authors—that the superstructure is not an essential part of the Freudian system; hence, that it can be removed so as to make the system philosophically neutral. In order to prove this statement the author in the first place uses a kind of pragmatic argument by pointing out that a number of psychiatrists, with a Christian set of beliefs, actually use psychoanalytical methods to great advantage. But his chief piece of evidence is that the main tenets of psychoanalysis not only are opposed to scientific positivism, but fit in perfectly with a Christian idea of the nature of man.

If it were essentially materialistic and atheistic, it certainly would have been embraced by the communists, but psychoanalysis is banned in the Soviet Union. This is one of Stern's favorite arguments developed previously in an article published in the "Bulletin of the Guild of Catholic Psychiatrists" (December, 1952)—which provided a kind of preview for the present book. Dr. Stern goes even so far as to say that Freud's entire philosophical superstructure was not much more than an academic play. Accordingly, the basic concepts of psychoanalysis—the dynamic unconscious, libido, sublimation and transference—can all be stripped of the materialistic or mechanistic connotation which Freud and other analysts have given them. For instance, no one really accepts Freud's crudely mechanistic theory concerning sublimation, as if the "quantum" of libidinal

energy were shunted back and forth in different channels. Stern particularly stresses the concept of transference as altogether alien to materialistic or positivistic interpretations. For transference means the relationship of "I and Thou," and that is based upon empathy—the function by which one re-feels another person's feelings or re-experiences his experiences, "as if you were he" (p. 19 ff.). In this relationship there is an interpenetration of being and, therefore, it contains an implicitly metaphysical quality. For that reason the concept of empathy is incompatible with materialism and for the same reason we are able to integrate psychoanalytic teachings into Christian philosophy and theology. In other words, Stern makes an attempt to "baptize" Freud, as others have done before.

Has Dr. Stern succeeded in proving that the main features of psychoanalysis can be made philosophically neutral? Many readers will probably be impressed by the author's evidence. However, what Stern gives with one hand, he retracts with the other. In theory, he holds, it is possible to isolate the therapeutic method from the rest of the system and thus make it philosophically neutral, but in practice neutrality is impossible, precisely because the analytical method is based on the mechanism of transference. That unique relationship between patient and therapist never can be really neutral, due to the fact that the moral attitude, the outlook on life, the philosophy of the physician will necessarily enter into it. It works both ways. As an atheistic and an amoralist attitude will permeate the atmosphere of the therapeutic situation, so will the philosophy of the Christian physician. In neither case do they have to formulate in words their moral or religious outlook; in both instances their very silence speaks. "In the psychoanalytic process the *praeter-verbal* is as important as that which is spoken. The total moral attitude of the physician, though never formulated, forms the rock bottom" (p. 271).

In the opinion of the present reviewer this is the core and the best part of Stern's book. Out of it he develops his psychoanalytic views on the symbolic language of the unconscious, the so-called organ language, personality development, the abortive form of puberty which is only another word for infantile sexuality, guilt, anxiety, identification, and so forth. Here we may ask, whether the author gives conclusive evidence that the psychoanalytic concepts are empirically established, as he believes. Those who before reading this book were already "converted" to psychoanalysis will obviously feel "confirmed" by Stern's "baptizing" Freud. Those readers who thus far had misgivings about Freudian psychoanalysis will probably still feel reluctant to give them up, even though they will readily admit that Stern has defended his case brilliantly. He proceeds in a friendly, almost paternal manner, taking the reader, so to say, by the hand, leading him through the labyrinth of mental aberrations and showing him with numerous examples, not only how effective but also how Christianlike the

analytic approach is. One may become almost convinced, but in retrospect one may request some more evidence. For it may appear to one that most of the argument is based on symbols, analogies, metaphors, figures, images, hypothetical assumptions, and the usual verbiage of Freudian semantics—not to speak of the typical analytical twist to turn opposites around.

Some readers, especially among the clergy, may feel that the author generalizes too much, when he says that a large number of Catholic moralists are Jansenistic in matters of sex, and they may raise their eyebrows when they hear Dr. Stern say that he has much more sympathy with our moral relativists who advocate the abolition of "sexual taboos," than with our Jansenist teachers of morality. On the other hand, most readers will probably agree that they learned a great deal from this book. It means a serious attempt to integrate psychoanalytic concepts with Catholic thinking. This is not only a brilliant but also a sound book—and some may add that it would be a still better book if it had an index.

The Christian Experience. By Jean Mouroux. Translated by George Lamb. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1954. Pp. 370. $5.00.

In the larger purpose which he has set for himself, the Abbé Mouroux will surely be commended. It is his object to expound the sound and traditional teaching concerning the elements that constitute the Christian experience, those elements, that is, of the daily life of the ordinary Christian whose presence gives him the assurance that he is truly living as a Christian, whose presence in himself provides the evidence he seeks in this life that he will be found worthy in the next.

As the Abbé points out in his introduction, this kind of theology especially recommends itself to the modern mind. If men today are searching primarily for experience, if they value that which can be grasped directly as working within themselves, if experience is the test of all things, then insofar as it can be rightly and safely accomplished, we—who must also be all things to all men—should try to satisfy that craving. If it is the subjective that today holds men's attention, let us introduce Christ to men through the subjective. If in the subjective approach there are special dangers to spiritual life, by all means let us carefully and accurately map out, in the subjective, the lines of true development.

There are dangers in the subjective approach to religion, and first among them is the danger of psychologism, the danger of making psychological reactions the prime facts of evidence and the ultimate norms of judgment. Alive to this danger the author never falls into, nor even slips towards, the rim of the abyss. He intends, and he accomplishes his intention, to inquire philosophically and theologically. In the terms of his own distinction, he is

not inviting an empirical approach, which relies on the probative or manifestative force of some particular more or less intensely felt condition. He relies on the experiential approach, which places the proof of Christian life in a certain pattern of structured experience. This is indeed the traditional teaching in a new garb, with the addition of at least this much, that, to the ordinary listing of the signs of a good life, there is introduced a theological analysis of their intrinsic connections and their hierarchic formation.

Opening his treatment with a discussion of the nature of religion and of experience, and consequently of religious experience, the author quickly faces into the problem of the very possibility of a knowledge of the Christian experience. The main difficulty here is, of course, that man does not know if he be worthy of love or hatred, does not know whether or not he has charity, and hence whether or not he has anything that can be called Christian life. Threading his way along the traditional paths that theologians have cleared among the dogmatic definitions, he establishes his right to talk about Christian experience, and proceeds to the absorbing question of the knowability of faith. (This chapter is weakened by a too long, too involved digression into Suarezian opinions—suitable for a textbook but destructive of the smooth development that an expository book should try to maintain.) So much comprises the first part of the book.

Having laid down his main lines of approach, the author begins to gather evidence extensively, culling from the Gospel of St. Matthew, the Epistles of St. Paul and the First Epistle of St. John. Finally, the mass of data is re-presented, re-organized along those lines which will most happily illustrate the nature of the " structured experience." So the Christian experience is seen to be an experience in the Church, in Christ and within faith. Considerable space is devoted, and justifiably, to a long analysis of the part that feeling or affectivity must contribute to the spiritual life.

For so much, then, we must commend—for the excellence of the intention, for the diligent collation of material, for the earnest and vigorous effort to trace out the main lines of a theology of Christian experience. If we must regret anything, it is only a certain inconsistency in exposition. In places the book proceeds simply as a commentary or summary of the works of others, in places like a biblical theology, and in other places it labors heavily to bring forth in obscure and involved language truths that would sound better in simpler dress. It almost seems that the raw materials of the book were not thoroughly digested. Comprehended they were, but not enough to be released from the conditions of the original authors. This is regrettable principally because it makes the book more difficult to read than the subject warrants. And this is regrettable because there is so much in the book that warrants reading.

Présentation de la Somme Théologique. By A. Bernard, O.P. Avignon: Maison Aubanel Père, 1954. Pp. 168 with index. Fr. 600.

This little book was written to assist souls of good will to become intellectually aware of the great truths of Thomism, especially those found in the *Summa Theologiae.* The details of doctrine are left to those who pursue the scientific study of theology; here the author presents only the outstanding theses of Thomistic doctrine which are adapted to other levels of intellectual culture. The work of adaptation is difficult, of course, but it is necessary for otherwise the doctrinal content of a truly great book remains inaccessible to the general reader. Père Bernard has as a model the work of an outstanding theologian who was at the same time a great preacher, the late Père Janvier, who could draw from the rich wealth of scientific matter in St. Thomas' treatise on Justice a series of six simple conferences on Justice and Rights which he preached in Notre Dame de Paris.

In a facile presentation expressed in a graceful style the author presents the Thomistic synthesis in four parts: an introduction which takes up the nature of Theology and its relations to Faith, to Science and to the purely rational sciences; a treatise on God Himself and as the origin of all; another on man's return to God; and finally a consideration of our Lord Jesus Christ Who is the Way by which man returns to God.

While there is certainly no serious divergence from the thought of the Angelic Doctor, one may justly complain about what has been left unsaid. The sketches of the virtues and gifts with their opposed vices are really too brief for any genuine comprehension of the meaning of the Second Part; especially distressing is the cursory treatment or even complete omission of the potential parts of the cardinal virtues, which at times, according to St. Thomas, are more important than the cardinal virtues themselves.

While one can appreciate that the motive of adaptation demands brevity, there must be present in any digest sufficient incentive for the reader to return to the source itself in order to drink more deeply from the fountains of truth.

On the other hand, of course, the digest of its very nature should preclude the technicalities involved in the scientific study of theology. The author does not completely escape this pitfall either, for, instead of simply interpreting the mind of Saint Thomas on a controversial point, he sometimes gives more than is necessary or wise. Thus he raises the question of the formal constituent of the Divine Essence, and instead of proposing his own theory as more likely, that it is God's subsisting Being, he goes on to explain that some Thomists propose the Divine Intelligence as the formal constituent. Such matters ordinarily would be beyond the grasp of the ordinary reader; they would certainly be of little or no interest, and might easily prove confusing. Thus various interpretations and even the statement of a controversy are better left to mature students and specialists.

Nevertheless this little work is a good beginning. Such work continued and perfected would certainly achieve a position of eminence in the library of the general reader not only in Père Bernard's own country, but in this country, too, where we have already profited from the same kind of work from the pen of the late Father Walter Farrell. Even members of the clergy who are hindered by pressing parochial duties from long personal studies may find in such simple digests a means of recalling to memory their past theological studies and thus more fruitful nourishment for their work of preaching the Word of God.

Philosophy of Law. By Georgio Del Vecchio. Translated by Rev. Dr. Thomas O. Martin. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1953. Pp. 474 with index. $6.50.

For the first time, " Lezioni di filosofia del diritto " by the well-known neo-Kantian Professor of Legal Philosophy at the University of Rome has been made available in English. *Philosophy of Law* is a very competent translation of the eighth Italian edition. This excellent textbook was intended primarily for lay readers and for those lawyers who are not experts in this specialized field. Dr. Del Vecchio has organized the presentation of the material in accordance with his definition of philosophy of law: " the course of study which defines Law in the logical universality, seeks its origins and the general characteristics of its historical development, and evaluates it according to the idea of justice drawn from pure reason " (p. 4).

The author first discusses the concepts and functions of philosophy of law, its relation to allied subjects (including theoretical and moral philosophy, psychology and sociology), and the methods of philosophy of law. Next follows a very comprehensive history of philosophy of law from the ancient Greeks to the present time. The author employs his neo-Kantian philosophy in criticising and evaluating the writings and teachings of the philosophers and would-be philosophers who pass in review before him. Space limitations have necessarily caused a curtailed treatment of these subjects, resulting at times in possibly misleading oversimplified or exiguous presentation. However, despite these limitations this historical summary alone will make worthwhile the use of this book by students of law and of philosophy of law. Dr. Del Vecchio endeavors in the last half of his book to give a thorough vindication of his neo-Kantian philosophy of law and a refutation of the principal opposing schools.

The author's concepts of law might be gleaned from a few excerpts: Law is " the objective coordination of possible actions between several subjects, according to an ethical principle which determines them, excluding the impediments thereto " (p. 270). " The source of Law, in general, is human

nature, that is, the spirit that shines forth in individual consciences rendering them capable of comprehending, together with their own, the personality of others. From this source are deduced the immutable principles of Justice, that is, of Natural Law" (p. 304). "By Positive Law we mean that system of juridical norms which gives form to and regulates in fact the life of a people at a particular period in history" (p. 305). "The methods of manifestation of the preponderant social will are called the sources of Positive Law" (p. 306). "Natural Law . . . is the criterion which permits us to evaluate Positive Law and to measure its intrinsic justice" (p. 450). With these criteria in mind, it is not surprising that Dr. Del Veechio concludes that "even the unjust law is law, and that it must be studied and and understood in its logical species, since it has the formal character of juridicity [a logical form answering the question *quid jus?*], and it must be analyzed in its causes, since, as Positive Law, it pertains to the series of natural facts" (p. 447). The State is defined by Dr. Del Vecchio as "the subject of the will which lays down a juridical arrangement, or . . . the subject of the juridical order, in which is verified the community of life of a people" (p. 359).

In a well-written critical foreword Dr. Brendan Brown, sometime Dean of the School of Law of the Catholic University of America, states that "This book may well be hailed as one of the greatest books of all time in its field." However, neither this evaluation nor the recollection of Cardinal Newman's definition of a university has laid to rest a question which lingers uneasily in the mind of this critic: Is it wise to make available, under Catholic auspices, to Catholic lawyers and students of the law, most of whom are either poorly instructed or entirely lacking in knowledge of scholastic philosophy, a 456 page book on the philosophy of law by an admitted neo-Kantian philosopher with only a ten-page critique in the foreword to guard such untrained readers against the author's errors?

Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de Causis Expositio. Edited by H. D. Saffrey, O. P. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1954. Pp. 223 with indexes. Fr. 1800.

When composing his earliest works Saint Thomas accepted the opinion of the time that the *Liber de Causis* was a work of Aristotle. Yet even then he seems to indicate his doubt by the use of the phrase *ille qui librum illum condidit*; and finally, in his *Expositio*, written in 1272, he concluded that the work had never existed in the Greek but had been translated into Latin from the Arabic. Perhaps it was the vague differentiation that existed in his time between the fine details of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine that occasioned his own commentary, since the Angelic Doctor certainly makes

many profound observations regarding the relationships between these two positions.

A work of primary importance to Saint Thomas in his study of the causes of things was *The Elements of Theology* of Proclus, made available in a trustworthy translation by William of Moerbeke, O. P. in 1268. This work, Neo-Platonic and eclectic, was obviously a major source for the unknown author of the *Liber de Causis*, for Saint Thomas observes that all is contained much more fully in the work of Proclus.

With this in mind the importance of having a critical edition is obvious, particularly for one studying the Platonic influence on the thought of St. Thomas. In his exposition the Angelic Doctor constantly clarifies the position *secundum Platonicos*, the *sententia Aristotelis*, as well as the thought of Proclus, and of "the author of this book." To those who feel that the Platonic influence on St. Thomas is being overemphasized today, the occasional phrase *secundum fidei doctrinam et Aristotelis* will be read with an enthusiasm that springs from a realization that Thomas is seeking truth and not merely playing favorites. Only once does the *fides ecclesiae* part company with Aristotle and that on the question of the eternal movement of the heavens as opposed to creation in time.

Even though the editor admits that his research was neither exhaustive nor final, the critical work is exceptionally well done. The text is readable, makes sense throughout, and a glance at the critical apparatus reveals Father Saffrey's good judgment in editing a difficult manuscript. The introductory notes on the history of the text and on the relative roles of Platonism and Aristotelianism are well worth careful study. This critical work from the University of Fribourg is a valuable text for the study and utilization of a mature Thomist.

Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Convention. The Catholic Theological Society of America, 1954. The Secretary c/o *The Sign*, Union City, N. J. Pp. 264. $3.00.

This report on the papers and discussions of the Montreal Convention of the Catholic Theological Society indicates broad interests on the part of American theologians. The major paper, "Morality and Contemporary Psychology" of Père Noel Mailloux, O. P., of the Institut de Psychologie at Montreal University, discusses with rare success the problem of diminished imputability which psychiatry and the so-called new morality have brought into sharper focus. In this brilliant summary of the major points of contact between moral theology and psychology the caricature of moral theology often assumed by psychiatrists and the proponents of a more subjective morality is dismissed by the presentation of moral theology

as it is, or at least, as it ought to be. This very positive approach is not confined to theology; the author does not hesitate to offer the theologians valuable empirical data which psychological studies have already produced or may reasonably be expected to produce. Although the applications and examples given in the original reading are absent in this formal paper, there is such material here that the reader is encouraged to hope for further work in this field from the pens of those who, retaining a sound and vital theology, pursue psychological investigation.

Father Coyle, C. SS. R. presented an historical study of the development of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception with special attention to the major obstacles which inhibited the understanding and acceptance of the dogma. Likewise historical for the most part was the study of the ecumenical movement among Protestants and schismatics given by Father Hanahoe, S. A., although the final part of the paper concerned itself with the liceity of Catholic participation in such activities as last year's Evanston meeting.

Two of the seminars raised rather important problems and reached something of a solution. Father Martin J. Healy canvassed the theological qualification or systems of notes such as *theologice certa* and *proxima fidei* regularly appended to propositions by theologians. Probably the most important distinction of these notes made was one on the part of their source; judicial notes express the judgment of the Church's magisterium while doctrinal notes are those of private theologians. In view of the confusing diversity among the latter revealed by this seminar, besides the general need of a special work on this problem, it will certainly be necessary that theologians explain carefully the meaning of the notes they use, follow that given meaning rigidly and explain the source of their judgment as to this particular note. Father Gardiner, S. J., conducted another seminar on the meaning of obscenity in order to give some workable generalization for censors in their determination of the morality of particular books or pictures. While there was wide divergence in the two-hour discussion of the problem, a descriptive definition was achieved. " The obscene is that which, in its general tenor, invites or excites to illicit sexual passions by appeal to the sensitive appetite." In the course of discussion, Father Gerald Kelly, S. J., on whose work Father Gardiner had relied, offered a healthy caution to Catholic reviewers to beware " least their presumed artistic appreciation blunt their realization of the normal reaction of the normal reader."

A panel discussion by four theologians under the chairmanship of Monsignor O'Connor on infused contemplation as the normal development of the life of grace and the virtues unfortunately did not live up to expectations. Once the chairman had set up the problem, the four theologians developed their own points of view quite independently of one another. In one instance a speaker wandered off on a completely tangential line, and in another the line of development was taken from personal experience which

made the question bog down in an empirical quagmire. Father Michael Griffin, O. C. D., however, gave a lengthy and interesting interpretation of St. John of the Cross on the point, and the traditional arguments were developed in meaningful brevity by Father J. R. Gillis, O. P. It was unfortunate that the floor discussion was so limited because the problem had been well stated and deserved airing. Perhaps a better arrangement would give the speakers a second chance to offer rebuttal to the other speakers. Certainly these papers as well as those of the entire convention offered ample evidence of the vitality of current theology.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Aubert, Jean-Marie. *Le Droit Romain dans L'Oeuvre de Saint Thomas.* Paris: Vrin, 1954. Pp. 164.

Aybar, Benjamin. *El Realismo Intuitivo.* Argentina: Universidad National Tucman, 1954. Pp. 99.

Berdyaev, Nicholas. (tr. by Donald A. Lowrie). *The Meaning of the Creative Act.* New York: Harper, 1955. Pp. 344 with index. $4.00.

Biddle, W. Earl. *Integration of Religion and Psychiatry.* New York: Macmillan, 1955. Pp. 183 with index. $3.75.

Bouyer, Louis. *Liturgical Piety.* Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1955. Pp. 294 with index. $4.75.

Buckler, O. P., Reginald. *The Perfection of Man by Charity.* St. Louis: Herder, 1955. Pp. 244. $3.50.

Calvetti, Carla. *La Filosofia di Giovanni Calvino.* Milan: Ed. "Vita e Pensiero," 1955. Pp. 295. L. 1500.

Ciappi, O. P., Luigi. *La Predestinazione.* Roma: Editrice Studium, 1955. Pp. 190 with index.

Cronan, Edward P. *The Dignity of the Human Person.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 223 with index. $3.00.

Cunningham, O. P., Francis L. B. *The Indwelling of the Trinity.* Dubuque: The Priory Press, 1955. Pp. 421 with index. $7.50.

Donceel, S. J., J. F. *Philosophical Psychology.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955. Pp. 376 with index. $4.50.

Elaide, Mircea. (tr. by Willard R. Trask.) *The Myth of the Eternal Return. Bollingen Series XLVI.* New York: Pantheon, 1954. Pp. 206 with index. $2.75.

Eldarov, O. F. M. Conv., Giorgio M. *Presenza della Teologia.* Chaska, Minn.: Bede's Book-Nook, 1955. Pp. 155 with index.

Esslinger, Wm. *Politics and Science.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 178 with index. $3.00.

Fremantle, Anne. *The Age of Belief.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955. Pp. 218 with index. $2.75.

Gilby, Thomas. (tr.) *St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts.* New York: Oxford, 1955. Pp. 441 with index. $3.50.

Gilson, Etienne & Others. *Truth and the Philosophy of Teaching. The McAuley Lectures, 1953.* West Hartford: St. Joseph College, 1955. Pp. 28.

Haller, Wm. *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. 425 with index. Pp. $6.00.

Harding, Arthur L. *Natural Law and Natural Rights. Studies in Jurisprudence, II.* Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1955. Pp. 106 with index. $3.00.

Horton, Walter M. *Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach.* New York: Harper, 1955. Pp. 316 with index. $3.75.

Johann, S. J., Robert O. *The Meaning of Love.* Westminster: Newman, 1955. Pp. 141 with index. $4.00.

Jurgensmeier, Friedrich. (tr. by Harriet G. Strauss.) *The Mystical Body of Christ.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955. Pp. 400. $5.00.

Kelley, S. M., John J. *Bergson's Mysticism.* Dayton: Marianist Publ., 1955. Pp. 151. $2.50.

Lamb, George (tr.). *Tolerance and the Catholic.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955. Pp. 207. $3.50.

Lamont, Corliss. *Soviet Civilization.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 477 with index. $5.00.

Leblanc, Hugues. *An Introduction to Deductive Logic.* New York: John Wiley, 1955. Pp. 256 with index. $4.75.

McCann, C. S. B., Leonard A. *The Doctrine of the Void.* Toronto: Basilian Press. Pp. 146.

MacDonald, Margaret (ed.). *Philosophy and Analysis.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 303. $7.50.

Mandelbaum, Maurice. *The Phenomenology of Moral Experience.* Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955. Pp. 338 with indexes. $5.00.

Merton, Thomas. *No Man is an Island.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955. Pp. 287. $3.95.

Osborne, Harold. *Aesthetics and Criticism.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 348 with index. $6.00.

Palmer, S. J., Paul F. *Sources of Christian Theology, Vol. I.—Sacraments and Worship.* Westminster: Newman, 1955. Pp. 249 with index. $4.75.

Patch, Howard R. & Others. *Christian Humanism in Letters. The McAuley Lectures, 1954.* West Hartford: St. Joseph College, 1955. Pp. 67.

Patrick, Catherine. *What is Creative Thinking?* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 221 with index. $3.00.

Philippe, O. P., Paul. *The Blessed Virgin and the Priesthood.* Chicago: Regnery, 1955. Pp. 82. $3.00.

Pike, James A. *Doing the Truth.* New York: Doubleday, 1955. Pp. 192. $2.95.

Redfield, Robert. *The Educational Experience.* Pasadena: The Fund for Adult Education, 1955. Pp. 61.

Roberts, W. Rhys & Bywater, Ingram (trs.). *The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle.* New York: Modern Library, 1955. Pp. 311 with index. $1.45.

Romein, Tunis. *Education and Responsibility.* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1955. Pp. 224 with index. $3.50.

Rosenberg, Max. *Introduction to Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 502 with index. $6.00.

Ross, Sir David. *Kant's Ethical Theory.* New York: Oxford, 1954. Pp. 96. $.80.

St. John, O. P., Henry. *Essays in Christian Unity.* Westminster: Newman, 1955. Pp. 163. $3.00.

Suzuki, D. T. *Studies in Zen.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 212 with index. $4.75.

Swabey, Marie C. *Logic and Nature.* 2nd ed. New York: New York University Press, 1955. Pp. 211. $3.75.

Tillich, Paul. *The New Being.* New York: Scribner's, 1955. Pp. 179. $2.75.

Ulanov, Joan and Barry (trs.), *The Last Essays of Georges Bernanos.* Chicago: Regnery, 1955. Pp. 269. $4.50.

White, Andrew D. *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom.* New York: Braziller, 1955. Pp. 508 with index. $5.00.